This will be the last crosspost for NPC 2026. This year, I’ve decided not to crosspost our substantive coverage of the session, as we published quite a few pieces. Here they are, in case you missed any:

• On the Ecological and Environmental Code

  • “A First Look at China’s New Environmental Code“

  • “China Elevates Environmental Law to an Official Branch of Law“

• On the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress: “China Enshrines Xi-Era Ethnic Policy in New Law“

• On the Law on National Development Plans

  • “China Enacts Law on the Formulation and Implementation of Five-Year Plans“

  • “New Development Planning Law to Codify Party Authority in Detail“ (for the Brookings Institution)

• On the cleanup of national laws: “Chinese Legislature Revokes Landmark 1985 Delegation of Economic Lawmaking Power to the State Council“

Next week, I’ll try my best to get the Winter 2025–26 triple issue out, and then recap March shortly thereafter. And then hopefully we’ll be back on schedule!

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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[The following post was first published on NPC Observer]

The fourth session of China’s 14^th National People’s Congress (NPC) concluded on Thursday, March 12. Below we have compiled a list of all official documents from this session (except for several legislative reports the NPC has so far neglected to release1). We have also included the submitted (i.e., draft) versions of key documents for your reference. Documents are available in Chinese only unless otherwise noted. The vote results for each bill and resolution are listed below in brackets, in the order of for–against–abstention, followed by the number of delegates not voting (NV), if any.

Work Reports

State Council (i.e., Government Work Report)

• Approved version: zh | en

• Submitted version: zh | en

• Approval resolution [2759–1–2]

NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC)

• Approved version: zh | en

• Submitted version: zh (with appendices) | en

• Approval resolution [2757–2–3]

Supreme People’s Court

• Approved version

• Submitted version (with appendices)

• Approval resolution [2703–44–15]

Supreme People’s Procuratorate

• Approved version

• Submitted version (with appendices)

• Approval resolution [2726–23–13]

15^th Five-Year Plan

• Full text

  • Approved version

  • Submitted version: zh | en (unofficial)

• NPC Financial and Economic Affairs Committee (FEAC) review report

• Approval resolution [2758–1–2, 1 NV]

Annual Development Plans

• National Development and Reform Commission report

  • Approved version: zh | en

  • Submitted version: zh | en

• NPC FEAC review report

• Approval resolution [2748–3–11]

Central and Local Budgets

• Ministry of Finance report

  • Approved version: zh | en

  • Submitted version: zh | en

• NPC FEAC review report

• Approval resolution [2745–11–6]

Legislation

Ecological and Environmental Code

• Full text [2752–7–3]

• Explanation

• NPC Constitution and Law Committee (CLC) report on results of deliberations (pending)

• NPC CLC report on suggestions for revisions (pending)

• Presidential order

Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress

• Full text [2756–3–3]

• Explanation

• NPC CLC report on results of deliberations (pending)

• NPC CLC report on suggestions for revisions (pending)

• Presidential order

Law on National Development Plans

• Full text [2753–3–6]

• Explanation

• NPC CLC report on results of deliberations (pending)

• NPC CLC report on suggestions for revisions (pending)

• Presidential order

Decision approving NPCSC’s report on legislation cleanup

• Full text [2759–1–2]

• NPCSC report on legislation cleanup

  • Approved version (pending)

  • Submitted version

• NPC CLC report on results of deliberations (pending)

• Presidential order

Other

• Secretariat report on the disposition of delegate bills

I’m crossposting all our coverage of the 2026 NPC session on our main site to this Substack. You can deselect “NPC Observer Crossposts” in the settings for this newsletter to opt out of the crossposts.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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[The following post was first published on NPC Observer]

China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) has released its 2026 session’s agenda and daily schedule of meetings, as well as a preliminary schedule of press events during the session. This year’s session will open on the morning of March 5 and close on the afternoon of March 12, lasting eight full days. As the NPC spokesperson announced in 2024, Premier Li Qiang will not hold a press conference after this session (or during the remainder of this NPC term “absent special circumstances”).

All times below are in China Standard Time (UTC +8:00). For a primer on the NPC and its annual sessions, check out this FAQ.

The 2026 session’s agenda contains the following eleven items:

1. Deliberate the Government Work Report;

2. Review a draft Outline of the 15^th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (“15^th FYP”);

3. Review a report on the implementation of the 2025 Plan for National Economic and Social Development (“Development Plan”) and on the draft 2026 Development Plan; and review the draft 2026 Development Plan;

4. Review a report on the execution of the 2025 Central and Local Budgets (“Budgets”) and on the draft 2026 Budgets; and review the draft 2026 Budgets;

5. Deliberate a draft Ecological and Environmental Code (“Environmental Code”)[生态环境法典];

6. Deliberate a draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (“Ethnic Unity Law”) [民族团结进步促进法];

7. Deliberate a draft Law on National Development Plans (“Planning Law”) [国家发展规划法];

8. Deliberate the work report of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC);

9. Deliberate the work report of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC);

10. Deliberate the work report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP); and

11. Deliberate the NPCSC’s Report on Efforts to Clean Up Laws and Opinions on Handling Relevant Laws and Decisions (“Cleanup Report”) [关于法律清理工作情况和有关法律和决定处理意见的报告].

Key documents will be introduced and voted on according to the following schedule:

• March 5 (a.m.): Hear the Government Work Report; review the draft 15^th FYP; review the report on the Development Plans and the 2026 Development Plan; review the report on the Budgets and the 2026 Budgets; hear explanations of the draft Environmental Code, draft Ethnic Unity Law, and draft Planning Law.

• March 9 (a.m.): Hear the NPCSC’s, SPC’s, and SPP’s work reports; and review the Cleanup Report.

• March 12 (p.m.): Vote on all resolutions, the draft Environmental Code, draft Ethnic Unity Law, draft Planning Law, and a draft decision to approve the Cleanup Report.

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A more detailed description of the session’s daily schedule follows. “Delegates’ Corridors” [代表通道] and “Ministers’ Corridors” [部长通道] are brief Q&As that will take place immediately before and after, respectively, each plenary meeting. We will update this post with links to all plenary meetings and press events throughout the session. [Please check the original version of this post for updates.]

Thursday, March 5

🎙 a.m.: Delegates’ Corridor #1

9 a.m. (plenary meeting #1): Hear the Government Work Report from Li Qiang (Premier); review the draft the 15^th FYP; review the report on the Development Plans and the 2026 Development Plan; review the report on the Budgets and the 2026 Budgets; and hear explanations of the draft Environmental Code, draft Ethnic Unity Law, and draft Planning Law by Li Hongzhong (NPCSC Vice Chairman).

🎙 a.m.: Ministers’ Corridor #1

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the Government Work Report as delegations.

Friday, March 6

9 a.m.: Delegates review the draft 15^th FYP as delegations.

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the Government Work Report and review the draft 15^th FYP in small groups.

🎙 p.m.: Press conference on the economy

Saturday, March 7

9 a.m.: Delegates review, in small groups, the report on Development Plans and the draft 2026 Development Plan, as well as the report on the Budgets and the draft 2026 Budgets.

🎙 a.m.: Press conference on “the people’s livelihood”

3 p.m.: Delegates review, in small groups, the report on Development Plans and the draft 2026 Development Plan, as well as the report on the Budgets and the draft 2026 Budgets.

Sunday, March 8

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate the draft Environmental Code in small groups.

🎙 a.m.: Press conference on foreign affairs

📄 12 p.m.: Deadline for submitting delegate bills

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the draft Ethnic Unity Law and draft Planning Law in small groups.

Monday, March 9

🎙 a.m.: Delegates’ Corridor #2

9 a.m. (plenary meeting #2): Hear the NPCSC’s work report from Zhao Leji (NPCSC Chairman); hear the SPC’s work report from Zhang Jun (SPC President); hear the SPP’s work report from Ying Yong (SPP Procurator-General); and review the Cleanup Report.

🎙 a.m.: Ministers’ Corridor #2

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the NPCSC’s work report and Cleanup Report in small groups.

Tuesday, March 10

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate the SPC’s and SPP’s work reports in small groups.

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate, in small groups, revised versions of the draft Environmental Code, draft Ethnic Unity Law, and draft Planning Law, as well as the SPC’s and SPP’s work reports.

Wednesday, March 11

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate the NPCSC’s, SPC’s, and SPP’s work reports as delegations.

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate, in small groups, four draft resolutions on the Government Work Report, 15^th FYP, Development Plans, and Budgets, respectively.

Thursday, March 12

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate, in small groups, three draft resolutions on the NPCSC’s, SPC’s, and SPP’s work reports, respectively; and a draft decision to approve the Cleanup Report.

🎙 p.m.: Delegates’ Corridor #3

3 p.m. (plenary meeting #3): Vote on all resolutions, the draft Environmental Code, draft Ethnic Unity Law, draft Planning Law, and the draft decision to approve the Cleanup Report.

🎙 p.m.: Ministers’ Corridor #3

This is, unfortunately, not the December (or January) recap you are looking for. The NPCSC’s December session produced a great deal of noteworthy news, but several key legislative records remain unavailable. I’m waiting for their release (hopefully sometime this month) to write about the relevant legislation in a more informed way. In the meantime, I’ve covered two major developments from December—an inaugural report on legislative review of budgets and fiscal policy measures and China’s revised common language law—on the main site. My current plan is to publish a triple issue recapping December, January, and February by the time the NPC convenes on March 5. Thank you for your patience!

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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While I wait for the missing legislative records, I thought I’d send out a special issue with updates on selected delegate bills submitted during the NPC’s 2025 session. For background on delegate bills, please check out this explainer or the shorter version here.

In 2025, NPC delegates submitted 268 legislative bills, which were referred to the 10 NPC special committees for deliberations. The committees’ 2025 year-end reports are partially compiled in this PDF.1

As usual, I’ll focus on legislative projects that are not already included in a legislative plan, and won’t discuss recurring proposals that I’ve mentioned before (2023 bills; 2024 bills) but for which last year’s reports provided no meaningful updates, including closely watched legislation like the Artificial Intelligence Law. The following developments disclosed by six of the committee reports caught my attention.

Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee

Delegates Qi Xiumin et al. proposed amending the People’s Mediation Law (PML) [人民调解法] to, among other things, include funding for people’s mediation in government budgets, extend the terms of people’s mediation committees to five years (from three), and improve the professionalization and quality of mediators. “People’s mediation” is a voluntary process organized by grassroots people’s mediation committees to settle everyday disputes. The Supreme People’s Court didn’t explicitly support amending the PML but agreed with the bill’s specific proposals. It also pledged to “fully incorporate” those proposals into another legislative project in which it’s involved: a Law on Promoting Diversified Dispute Resolution [矛盾纠纷多元化解促进法]. The Ministry of Justice, for its part, found it “indeed necessary” to amend the PML to reflect current practice and address existing problems. The Committee recommended that the relevant departments coordinate the two legislative projects—drafting the Law on Promoting Diversified Dispute Resolution and amending the PML—and that the latter be included in an annual NPCSC legislative plan at the appropriate time.

Financial and Economic Affairs Committee

Delegates Wang Dongwei et al. proposed amending the Individual Income Tax Law [个人所得税法] to “moderately” lower the top marginal tax rate of 45% to “further attract and retain high-level talent from within and outside China.” The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the State Taxation Administration (STA) appeared to favor maintaining the status quo. They argued that any adjustment of the tax brackets would “affect tax revenues” and must conform to the “policy direction of . . . reasonably regulating high incomes.” In their review, the current rate of 45% is “appropriate.” The Committee did not seem to disagree. The Communist Party’s 2024 Third Plenum called for income-tax reforms, so the Law might nonetheless be amended soon. Still, China’s highest earners should not expect a substantial tax cut.

Delegates Dong Mingquan et al. proposed enacting a Low-Altitude Economy Promotion Law [低空经济产业促进法]. They argued that specialized, unified national legislation could help China tap into the “enormous market and development space” in the low-altitude economy, which is centered around drones and other airborne devices flying below 1,000 meters. The relevant national regulators agreed with the delegates’ views “in principle,” but pointed out that “the low-altitude economy is overall at a critical stage of transitioning from exploratory application to regulated development and that internationally there is not yet mature experience to draw upon,” suggesting that enacting a comprehensive statute now would be premature. Rather, they would use a variety of legislative forms (including lower-level regulations) to improve the law governing “areas of urgent practical need.” The Committee agreed, adding the formulaic recommendation that the agencies “strengthen research and put forward legislative proposals at the appropriate time.”

Two delegate bills proposed enacting an Estate (and Gift) Tax Law [遗产（和赠与）税法], citing the “increasingly prominent problems of an unreasonable income-distribution structure as well as unbalanced and inadequate development.” They argued that levying an estate tax (or an estate tax together with a gift tax) would promote social equality, increase fiscal revenue and consumer spending, and boost the philanthropy sector. The MOF, the STA, and the NPCSC Budgetary Affairs Commission didn’t reject the proposals outright. Instead, they appear to view the Party’s 2024 Third Plenum decision—particularly, its call to “reform the system of direct taxes” and “improve redistribution mechanisms such as taxation”—as providing policy support for estate and gift taxes. Levying these taxes, they argued, would “prevent excessive concentration of wealth, narrow the wealth gap, and promote social equality,” though they acknowledged that “there are also some difficulties and problems that need to be studied.” The Committee found the delegates’ proposals valuable and recommended further research and analysis, followed by legislative proposals in due course.

Delegates Jiang Chenghua et al. proposed enacting a Law on Countering Foreign Economic Sanctions [反外国经济胁迫法] to enrich China’s “toolbox for external legal struggle, respond to the coercive and bullying practices of Trump 2.0, . . . , unite more countries to hedge against the unilateral bullying by the United States, and resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interest.” While acknowledging that the proposal aligns with the Party’s emphasis on developing “foreign-related rule of law,” the Ministry of Commerce responded that China had already adopted a combination of countermeasures, indicating that, for now, it would prioritize making use of existing legal tools and pursue additional legislation to counter sanctions, interference, or long-arm jurisdiction only where “urgently needed.” It said it would study the necessity and urgency of passing a Law on Countering Foreign Economic Sanctions, but it doesn’t sound like one would materialize anytime soon.

The Yunnan delegation proposed enacting a Law on the Classified and Graded Protection for Cross-Border Data Flows [数据跨境流动分类分级保护法]. It recommended that the Law “clarify generally applicable standards for identifying the classification and grading of cross-border data flows, standardize the procedures for data classification and grading, while leaving room for specific industries or departments to adopt their own data classification and grading, and providing special protection for data involving children’s privacy and data of special groups.” The National Data Administration and other unnamed departments rejected the proposal, though not in so many words. They vowed to “effectively implement [existing] national policies on the security management of outbound data transfers,” suggesting they didn’t view a new national law as necessary. The Committee concurred.

Delegates Tang Weijian et al. proposed enacting a Data Resource Law [数据资源法] to “regulate data-processing activities, safeguard the lawful rights and interests of participants in the data-factor market, promote the efficient production and circulation of data factor, and support the high-quality development of the digital economy.” The National Data Administration didn’t endorse the idea. It explained that existing policy and institutional arrangements already addressed the bill’s proposals to establish “systems for data property rights, data-trading contracts, open operation of public data, and systematic protection for data resources.” Going forward, its priority would lie in implementing and improving existing policies, though it promised to study the feasibility of a national law. The Committee concurred.

Environmental Protection and Resource Conservation Committee

Delegates Yin Ping et al. proposed enacting a Geological Survey Law [地质调查法] to, among other things, “grant necessary powers related to geological survey, regulate the exercise of such powers, strengthen rights protections, establish systems for the scientific use and regular updating of geological survey data and materials, [and] qualification and credential management.” The Ministry of Natural Resources affirmed the “important pioneering and foundational” role of geological work in economic development and emphasized the need to “intensify geological-survey and mineral-exploration efforts” to implement the Party’s 2024 decision to improve the systems relating to strategic mineral resources. It also disclosed that the China Geological Survey had already drafted a Geological Survey Law. The Committee recommended that the relevant agencies study the bill’s proposals and that the Law be listed in an NPCSC legislative plan when conditions are ripe.

Social Development Affairs Committee

Delegates Cui Ronghua et al. proposed amending the Law on Protecting the Rights and Interests of the Elderly [老年人权益保障法] specifically to designate September 9 as the annual Elderly Caregivers’ Day, citing a shortage of eldercare workers as well as their low social recognition and weak sense of professional honor. The Ministry of Civil Affairs agreed that the Law needs improvement “in the face of the severe trend of population aging in China and the growing needs of the elderly for a better life” and vowed to advocate for amendments when conditions are ripe. But it didn’t sound enthusiastic about establishing an Elderly Caregivers’ Day. Nor did the Ministry of Justice, which was skeptical that such a holiday alone would solve the problems identified by the bill. The Committee agreed that the Law must be amended, while similarly dismissing the bill’s main proposal.

Education, Science, Culture, and Public Health Committee

Three delegate bills proposed amending the Compulsory Education Law [义务教育法] to “increase funding for compulsory education [i.e., Grades 1–9] and extend its duration” to include three years of either preschool or high school. The Committee pointed out that China has been steadily increasing investment to promote “high-quality, balanced development” of compulsory education across the country. It also cited the Party’s call to “explore” lengthening compulsory education in its recommendations for the 15^th Five-Year Plan. It therefore urged the relevant departments to “reasonably plan the pathways and methods” for achieving that objective and recommended amending the Law when conditions are ripe.

Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee

Three delegate bills proposed enacting an Agricultural Insurance Law [农业保险法] to, among other things, “clearly define . . . the special principles and mechanisms of agricultural insurance, improve the fiscal cost-sharing mechanism for agricultural insurance, . . . and refine the regulatory framework for agricultural insurance.” Under governing State Council regulations, agricultural insurance protects farmers against financial losses caused by natural disasters, accidents, pests, and livestock diseases. The Office of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) argued that enacting such a law is “very necessary” and that the legislative conditions have matured, recommending that the Committee lead its drafting. The National Financial Regulatory Administration, by contrast, did not believe the timing is yet ripe.

In addition, eight other delegate bills proposed comprehensively revising the Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Law [农业机械化促进法] that has not been meaningfully updated since its enactment in 2004. MARA agreed, believing that the timing for amending the Law is “basically ripe.”

The Committee reported that, after having had conducted extensive field research and consultations with relevant stakeholders, it, too, found both projects necessary. It vowed to “actively push for” the inclusion of legislative projects concerning agricultural protection and promotion in the NPCSC’s 2026 legislative plan.

Besides catching up on recent NPC news, I’m also working on previews for the upcoming #NPC2026, so stay tuned—and subscribe!

The NPCSC will next meet on February 25–26; here’s my preview.

Meanwhile, happy Year of the Horse to all those who celebrate! 🐎🐎🐎

Today, I’m cross-posting our year-end review for 2025. If you’d like to avoid receiving duplicative emails, head over to the settings for this newsletter and deselect “NPC Observer Crossposts.“

Thank you for following along in 2025. Happy New Year! 🎉 —Changhao

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As we bid farewell to 2025, we reflect on the work of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and of this publication over the past year.

The NPC in 2025

In 2025, the 14^th NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) held six sessions, lasting a total of 24 days. In March, the 14^th NPC met for its third (week-long) session, during which it amended the law governing the delegates to people’s congresses. Their legislative output in 2025 was consistent with the previous year’s. Altogether, the NPC and its Standing Committee enacted 6 new laws, approved major changes to 13, adopted 3 quasi-statutory decisions, and issued 1 legislative interpretation. An additional 15 bills remain pending as of today. For details, please see the lists at the end of this section.

Looking back, these were the most notable developments in the NPC’s work in 2025:

• Private Economy Promotion Law (PEPL): The NPCSC approved this law on April 30 after three reviews in rapid succession—without seeking public comment on its second draft, as would have been customary. The PEPL attracted significant global attention, though it “contains little new in terms of substantive legal requirements, protections, or policy,” as our friend Jamie P. Horsley observes in a guest commentary. Instead, the PEPL’s “impact lies in serving as a political statement of the [Communist Party]’s intent to better ensure China’s private firms continue to invest, hire, train, innovate, and otherwise contribute to the country’s socioeconomic development,” she argues.

• Ecological and Environmental Code: Since April, the NPCSC has been focusing on revising this bill, which will become China’s second formal statutory code once the NPC enacts it next spring. The Code will incorporate ten statutes in full and portions of approximately two dozen others. The NPCSC has followed roughly the same deliberative process used for the Civil Code [民法典]: it first considered the Code as a whole, then its individual parts, and finally the entire Code again, before referring it to the full NPC. This time, though, it has moved at a considerably faster pace. (The Civil Code took almost two years, counting from August 2018.)

• Controversy over record-sealing for petty offenses: On June 27, after a lengthy process, the NPCSC approved comprehensive revisions to the Public Security Administration Punishments Law (PSAPL) [治安管理处罚法], which we covered in depth here and here. Just over a month before the revised PSAPL is scheduled to take effect (on January 1), however, a hitherto obscure provision requiring record-sealing for all public security violations triggered an unexpected public backlash. We commented on the controversy in this piece for The Diplomat. Last week, the legislature finally responded to the online criticisms; we summarized and translated its statement here.

• Legislation clean-up: In 2025, the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission carried out a comprehensive “clean-up” of existing laws—that is, an effort to identify obsolete or internally inconsistent statutory provisions. It reported its findings and recommendations to the legislature last week. The full implications of this clean-up so far remain unclear, as the Commission’s report has not been made public. But the NPCSC took an initial step to implement the Commission’s recommendations on December 27, by confirming that 104 instruments enacted between 1955 and 2021 have lapsed and are no longer in force. At the same time, the NPCSC also disclosed that it would ask the NPC (presumably next March) to address the legal force of an additional 35 obsolete documents. We will cover this development in greater detail in early 2026.

• Legislation database upgraded: In August, the NPCSC rolled out major upgrades to the National Database of Laws and Regulations, which we reviewed here. In short, we concluded that the revamped Database would “prove to be much more valuable for the average citizen, if not for legal professionals as well.”

• 15^th Five-Year Plan preparations: From March to July, various NPC components carried out preparatory research for the drafting of the 15^th Five-Year Plan, due to be approved next March. This work culminated in 26 (non-public) research reports. In September, the NPCSC General Office delivered a public summary of those reports to the legislature. In the meantime, the NPCSC reviewed the draft Law on National Development Plans [国家发展规划法] three times before deciding last week to submit it to the full NPC. The Law will govern the procedures for drafting, approving, and implementing China’s five-year plans and will be adopted alongside the 15^th Five-Year Plan.

• Recording and review (R&R) … for fiscal and budgetary matters: On December 22, the NPCSC Budgetary Affairs Commission reported to the legislature for the first time on its “R&R of fiscal and budgetary matters” [财政预算事项备案审查]. This report appears likely to become annual, paralleling the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission’s yearly reports on the more familiar form of R&R for legislation (see the next highlight). A separate R&R process for fiscal and budgetary matters is presumably necessary because the documents under review either do not qualify as legislation (e.g., local budgets) or do not fall within the NPCSC’s legislative R&R authority (e.g., ministerial documents). Requiring annual reports may push the Budgetary Affairs Commission to conduct more rigorous review, which in turn could pressure the relevant administrative bodies to stay within the boundaries of their delegated authority. We will have more to say about this report soon.

• Recording and review of local legislation: The NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission also delivered its annual R&R report on December 22. Two of the disclosed decisions cited the Constitution, though neither relied on it exclusively. One rejected local rules requiring people with disabilities to hold a local hukou to register motorized wheelchairs; the other disapproved a local government policy barring those with criminal records from obtaining a local hukou. Once again, the report offered little reasoning for these decisions—an omission that becomes increasingly difficult to justify as the years go by. So perhaps the true highlight of the report is that, in 2025, Chinese citizens submitted a record 6,705 petitions for review, despite the legislature’s continued unwillingness to promptly provide full explanations. We will delve deeper into this report in the next issue of our newsletter.

[The following lists are omitted to limit the length of this email. Check out the original version here.]

New laws (and one legislative interpretation) passed in 2025 . . .

Revisions & major amendments passed in 2025 . . .

Legislative bills pending by the end of 2025 . . .

Quasi-statutory decisions passed in 2025 . . .

NPC Observer in 2025

In 2025, here on our main site, we published 35 posts and received almost 128,000 pageviews—a roughly 10% drop from 2024, though still our second-best year to date—by just over 67,000 visitors from 177 jurisdictions worldwide. Readers from the United States (based on recorded IP addresses) again contributed the most traffic, followed by those from Hong Kong, Mainland China, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Germany, and India.

Not counting email opens, our most popular post published in 2025 was the report on the agenda and daily schedule of the 2025 NPC session, followed by Jamie P. Horsley’s guest commentary on the Private Economy Promotion Law. Two older posts—on the allocation of seats in the NPC and China’s leadership transition process, respectively—continued to attract significant traffic.

Unsurprisingly, The Primate Economy Promotion Law [民营经济促进法] page was the most viewed bill page™️ in 2025, followed by those for the Anti–Foreign Sanctions Law [反外国制裁法], Civil Code [民法典], Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典], Public Security Administration Punishments Law [治安管理处罚法], Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress [民族团结进步促进法], and Cybersecurity Law [网络安全法].

On our Substack newsletter, NPC Observer Monthly, we published nine recaps (including a triple issue) and six special issues in 2025. In the recaps, we supplemented the coverage here with discussions of additional topics, including NPC special committees’ reports on 2024 delegate bills; China’s new laws on infectious diseases, national parks, and neighborhood committees; and the recent decline in delegate bills. The special issues featured our commentary in the Made in China Journal on the 2024 retirement-age legislation; a discussion of proposed changes to the State Council’s regulation-making procedures; and translations of the State Council’s reports to the NPCSC on “new quality productive forces” and China’s climate actions, respectively. If those sound interesting to you, consider subscribing to the newsletter today.

In 2025, we began covering the NPCSC’s oversight work more seriously, beyond R&R. We published a report on its 2025 oversight plan (the first such post since 2017) and translated two oversight reports it heard last year for our newsletter (as mentioned above). With large language models making it much easier to produce quality translations of lengthy, jargon-heavy policy reports, we intend to continue such coverage in 2026.

Finally, we gave this website a major facelift last year. With new fonts (both Chinese and English), refined colors, and a new hyperlink style, in addition to interactive enhancements, we aim to continue making the site easier to use and more enjoyable to read. This also serves as a reminder to email subscribers that you should consider reading new posts directly on our site for the full experience.

That concludes our programming in 2025. Best wishes to everyone in 2026.

Happy New Year!

I had originally planned to skip this issue as there was little1 NPC-related news in November, until an online firestorm broke out in the final days of the month that very much implicates the legislature.

As China’s revised Public Security Administration Punishments Law (PSAPL) [治安管理处罚法]—which I covered in depth here and here—will take effect on New Year’s Day, official social media accounts have recently begun publicizing the law. On Douyin, the account of a drug rehab center highlighted Article 136 of the revised PSAPL—which newly requires the police to seal the records of all PSAPL violations—and specifically noted that drug offenses would be covered. After another official account insinuated in the comments that Article 136 was aimed at shielding the drug-abusing rich and powerful from public exposure, the new policy quickly went viral across multiple platforms and caused an enormous uproar.

Today, in a commentary for The Diplomat, my coauthor and I respond to—and reject—online accusations of improprieties in the legislative process, though we argue the controversy does expose other flaws that have escaped attention. Here’s a short excerpt from the introductory section laying out the backlash and our response:

Besides predominantly substantive criticisms of Article 136, social media users also objected to how it was adopted in the first place. They targeted leading legal professionals who had written or spoken in support of sealing PSAPL records, particularly Professors Zhao Hong and Lao Dongyan. Some netizens accused academics of pushing their insidious agenda into law by exerting outsized influence over the legislative process. The topic “controversy over Professor Zhao Hong’s bill to seal drug records” (赵宏教授吸毒史封存法案争议) even briefly trended on Weibo before censors took it down.

Relatedly, others criticized the absence of consultation on the draft in which Article 136 first appeared in its final form, implying procedural manipulation by bad actors inside or outside the legislature.

The first charge amounts to a conspiracy theory. The second correctly notes the lack of consultation on that particular draft, but the NPCSC acted by the book (such as it is) in this case and did nothing untoward. In our view, the controversy over Article 136 nevertheless exposed a more alarming problem: The Chinese legislature’s public engagement mechanisms—meant to both inform and consult the public about its legislative activities—may not be functioning effectively.

We then briefly trace the PSAPL’s revision process and address the two procedural criticisms in more detail, before turning to our main argument: that the NPCSC’s public-engagement mechanisms may be malfunctioning, thus “limiting its ability to accurately gauge public opinion and inform the Chinese people about its work.” Lastly, we recommend several ways for the NPCSC to improve public engagement and close the article with the following:

The Chinese legislature should recognize that public engagement can strengthen its institutional legitimacy, improve the quality of laws, and generate popular support for them. It should strive to ensure that such engagement is broad-based and effective, especially because it lacks meaningful electoral accountability. Otherwise, as a Chinese scholar has warned, when formal channels for public participation prove ineffective, public sentiment tends to surface in more disruptive ways.

Let the controversy over Article 136 be a cautionary tale.

We hope you’ll read the piece in full here.2

On Monday, December 15, the NPCSC announced that it will next meet from December 22 to 27, with a packed agenda. I have previewed it here.

That’s all for this quick issue. Thanks for reading! As is tradition, I’ll cross-post our year-end review on December 31. Until then!

Each issue starts with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage published on our main site, NPC Observer. Then, in “Non-News of the Month,” I provide a round-up of any post we’ve published on the main site that’s not tied to current events. Finally, I usually end an issue with a more in-depth look an NPC-related topic linked to the past month in some way.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Month

On October 24–28, the 14^th NPCSC met for its eighteenth session, during which it reviewed 10 legislative bills.

On the session’s first day, it heard and approved a (previously undisclosed) bill to designate the next day (October 25) as the annual “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration” [台湾光复纪念日]. On October 25, 1945, Japanese forces in Taiwan surrendered to the Republic of China following Japan’s defeat in World War II. The NPCSC’s decision reads in its entirety:

In 1945, all the sons and daughters of China, including compatriots in Taiwan, advanced bravely and fought heroically, achieving the great victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Taiwan was thus restored and returned to the embrace of the motherland. The restoration of Taiwan was an important outcome of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, solid proof of the Chinese government’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, a vital link in the historical fact and the legal chain affirming that Taiwan is part of China, and a source of shared pride and collective national memory for compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To uphold the fruits of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the postwar international order, demonstrate a firm will to adhere to the one-China principle and safeguard national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, strengthen the shared national historical memory of compatriots across the Strait, promote the spirit of patriotism, and inspire compatriots on both sides of the Strait to make new contributions to national reunification and rejuvenation in the New Era and on the new journey, the 18^th Session of the Standing Committee of the 14^th National People’s Congress has decided, in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China:

1945年，包括台湾同胞在内的全体中华儿女前仆后继、浴血奋战，取得中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争的伟大胜利，台湾随之光复，重回祖国怀抱。台湾光复是中国人民抗日战争胜利的重要成果，是中国政府恢复对台湾行使主权的重要铁证，是台湾作为中国一部分的历史事实和法理链条的重要一环，是两岸同胞的共同荣光和全体中华儿女的民族记忆。为维护世界反法西斯战争胜利成果和战后国际秩序，展现坚持一个中国原则和捍卫国家主权、统一、领土完整的坚定意志，强化两岸同胞共同民族历史记忆，弘扬爱国主义精神，激励两岸同胞在新时代新征程中为国家统一、民族复兴作出新的贡献，根据《中华人民共和国宪法》，第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议决定：

October 25 is designated as Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration. The State is to hold commemorative activities in various forms.

将10月25日设立为台湾光复纪念日。国家通过多种形式举行纪念活动。

On October 28, the NPCSC adopted five other bills:

• revision to the Maritime Law [海商法] (eff. May 1, 2026);

• amendment to the Villagers’ Committees Organic Law [村民委员会组织法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026);

• revised Urban Residents’ Committees Organic Law [城市居民委员会组织法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026);

• amendment to the Cybersecurity Law [网络安全法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026); and

• amendment to the Environmental Protection Tax Law [环境保护税法] (eff. Oct. 28, 2026).

I’ll focus on the updated organic statutes of China’s neighborhood organizations below, after first taking a brief look at each of the other bills.

First, the first amendments to the 2016 Cybersecurity Law—in particular, the first statutory provision on AI governance—have already generated a ton of analyses and commentaries. Check out, for example, this one by China Briefing. I’ve also prepared a comparison chart (in Chinese). The amendments will take effect on New Year’s Day.

Second, the 33-year-old Maritime Law was updated for the first time since 1992. This statute operates as a blend of property, contracts, and tort law, but tailored to the maritime context. It governs ships, crews, cargoes, and shipping, while also addressing issues including accidents, marine salvage, ship-source oil pollution, and choice of law in maritime disputes. It looks like a wonderfully technical statute that I wish I knew more about. Here, I’ll just flag one provision added only before the final reading. Article 308, paragraph 2 provides:

Where any country or region adopts discriminatory prohibitions, restrictions, or other similar measures against the PRC in fields relating to maritime transport and shipbuilding, the PRC may, in light of actual circumstances, take corresponding measures against the relevant country or region.

任何国家或者地区在海上运输和船舶建造相关领域对中华人民共和国采取歧视性的禁止、限制或者其他类似措施的，中华人民共和国可以根据实际情况对有关国家或者地区采取相应的措施。

Such a provision authorizing countermeasures against “discriminatory” foreign conduct has almost become standard for any statute with implications for foreign relations.1 The phase “relevant country or region” in the second clause was changed from “said country or region” shortly before the Law’s passage, in response to lawmaker suggestions to “increase the flexibility of the countermeasures.”

The revised Maritime Law will enter into force on May 1, 2026.

Third, the Environmental Protection Tax Law was amended to authorize the State Council to pilot levying the tax on the emission of additional volatile organic compounds—pollutants that contribute to the formation of ground-level ozone and smog—beyond the 18 currently listed in the Law. A new Article 27 reads in its entirety:

Based on the needs of national economic and social development and environmental protection, the State Council is to carry out a pilot program for levying the environmental protection tax on enterprises, public-service institutions, and other producers and operators that directly discharge volatile organic compounds not listed in the “Table of Taxable Pollutants and Equivalent Values” appended to this Law. The measures for the implementing the pilot program are to be formulated by the State Council and filed with the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for recording.

国务院根据国民经济和社会发展以及环境保护需要，对直接向环境排放本法所附《应税污染物和当量值表》规定以外的挥发性有机物的企业事业单位和其他生产经营者开展征收环境保护税试点工作。试点实施办法由国务院制定，报全国人民代表大会常务委员会备案。

The State Council and its relevant departments shall, in light of the characteristics of volatile organic compounds, reasonably define the scope of taxation and the range of tax rate, improve monitoring techniques and methods for calculating emissions, strengthen work coordination, and accelerate the advancement of the pilot program.

国务院及其有关部门应当根据挥发性有机物的特点，合理设定征税范围和税额幅度，完善监测技术和排放量计算方法，加强工作协同，加快推进试点工作。

Within five years from the date the pilot’s implementation measures take effect, the State Council shall report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the pilot levy of the environmental protection tax on volatile organic compounds and propose recommendations for amending the Law.

国务院自试点实施办法施行之日起五年内，就征收挥发性有机物环境保护税试点情况向全国人民代表大会常务委员会报告，并提出修改法律的建议。

This new article (specifically, paragraph 3) is notable for being the first reform authorization to require the authorized body to propose legislation to codify the reform by a clear deadline.2 Most prior authorizations contained the boilerplate language that the relevant laws shall be amended or enacted if the reforms have proven feasible or if the conditions have become ripe.

The amendment has already taken effect, though the State Council has not yet issued detailed rules to start the pilot.

The NPCSC is seeking public comment on the other bills it reviewed last month through November 26:

• Part on Pollution Prevention and Control and Part on Legal Liability and Supplementary Provisions of the draft Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典];

• draft Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation Law [检察公益诉讼法]; and

• draft Cultivated Land Protection and Quality Improvement Law [耕地保护和质量提升法].

While as a general policy I no longer write about draft legislation, I wanted to make an exception for the new draft Part on Legal Liability and Supplementary Provisions of the Ecological and Environmental Code. This Part, among myriad other things, will codify rules governing environmental public interest litigation in China.

In a change that would’ve flown under my radar if it weren’t for this post by the leading environmental NGO Friends of Nature [自然之友], the draft appears to no longer allow preventive public interest suits—litigation brought before irreversible environmental damage occurs. As Friends of Nature explains, “preventive public-interest litigation is a critical form of litigation for effectively stopping environmental harm from occurring, and this type of litigation plays an irreplaceable and important role in particular when confronted with irreversible ecological risks such as the extinction of endangered species.” In 2017, the organization brought China’s first preventive environmental suit that successfully halted the construction of dam that would’ve flooded the largest remaining habitat of the green peafowl, an endangered species.

As mentioned, the comments period closes on November 26.

Updated Organic Laws of Urban Residents’ Committees and Villagers’ Committees

Under Article 111 of the PRC Constitution, urban residents’ committees and villagers’ committees (together, neighborhood committees) are “grassroots self-governing mass organizations.” Their formation, functions, and operations are governed by two statutes first enacted in the late 1980s: the 1987 Provisional Villagers’ Committees Organic Law (VCOL) and the 1989 Urban Residents’ Committees Organic Law (URCOL).

The provisional VCOL became a permanent statute in 1998, was overhauled in 2010, and most recently underwent a small but important change in 2018 (more on this below). The URCOL, except for the same minor amendment in 2018, had never been comprehensively revised until last month. Both statutes now contain 50 articles in seven chapters.

On paper, neighborhood committees don’t constitute a separate level of government, though higher-level governments have often been tempted to use them as de facto administrative units. Still, “[s]tate organs cannot give direct orders to [neighborhood committees] without creating at least some tension between the nominal legal recognition of self-governance and the reality of top-down governance.”3

Communist Party entities have never faced the same constraint, and recent research shows that, since 2018, the Party has deepened its penetration into both urban and rural grassroots communities, increasingly blurring the boundaries between the nominally self-governing neighborhood committees and the lowest levels of government.4 Key mechanisms through which the prior legal separation is being dismantled include the election of neighborhood Party secretaries as heads of neighborhood committees under a policy known as “carried on one shoulder” [一肩挑], stricter political vetting for neighborhood committee candidates, and the formalization of Party entities’ role in neighborhood decisionmaking.5 These measures were all codified in the two organic laws last month. In a way telegraphing the changes that were to come, the two laws’ 2018 amendments extended the terms of neighborhood committees from three years to five precisely so that they would align with the five-year terms of grassroots Party organizations.

To be sure, the two statutes still maintain the formal status of neighborhood committees as “self-governing mass organizations through which [residents and villagers] manage, serve, educate, and oversee themselves” (art. 2, para. 1).6 Local governments may only “provide guidance, support, and help” for the committees, which, in turn, are supposed to “assist” with the former’s work (art. 6). Any task delegated by a local government must “comply with the provisions of laws and regulations” and the local government must bear the necessary expenses (art. 43, para. 2). The Party, by contrast, in now statutorily embedded in neighborhood governance, as reflected in the following provisions:

• As a general principle, neighborhood committees must uphold the Party’s leadership in their work (art. 4, para. 1). The amended VCOL retains—and the revised URCOL has added—a provision providing generally that the Party’s grassroots organizations are to carry out work consistent with the Party Constitution and “lead and support“ neighborhood committees in performing their duties (art. 4, para. 2).

• The central and local “departments that guide and supervise grassroots mass self-governance”—likely referring to the Party’s Central Society Work Department and its local counterparts—are tasked with “guiding and supervising” related work (art. 5).

• Reflecting the “carried on one shoulder” policy, neighborhood Party chiefs “may” serve as committee heads “through legal procedures” (art. 8, para. 3). Though the laws stop short of using the mandatory “shall,” the Party has called for “comprehensive implementation” of the policy or used mandatory language in policy documents. The laws also expressly contemplate “cross-appointments” [交叉任职] between neighborhood committees and corresponding grassroots Party organizations (id.).

• Neighborhood committees are now tasked with publicizing the Party’s policies (in addition state policies as well the Constitution, laws, and regulations), among other statutory duties (VCOL art. 11; URCOL art. 10). They and their members must also abide by those policies (VCOL art. 12; URCOL art. 11).

• Grassroots Party organizations now have the statutory right to nominate candidates for neighborhood committees (joint nominations by voters are still allowed) (art. 18). Candidates must uphold the Party’s leadership; those expelled from the Party are ineligible to run (id.).

• Any “important matter” that must be decided by the assembly of community members [居民/村民会议] or their representatives [居民/村民代表会议] must first be studied and discussed by the community Party organization (VCOL art. 28; URCOL art. 30). In practice, this process consists of the four steps in the “Four Discussions” portion of the Party’s “Four Discussions and Two Disclosures” [四议两公开] policy for deciding on and disclosing major community affairs. The relevant grassroots Party organization first puts forward a proposal, followed by deliberations by the neighborhood committee and then by the assembly of Party members [党员大会] in the community. The assembly of community members or their representatives finally votes on the proposal.

Last month’s revisions to the two statutes also introduced a host of other changes, including to the rules on committee composition, functions, elections, meetings, and oversight. Check out these comparison charts (URCOL; VCOL) for detail. The updated organic laws will take effect on New Year’s Day.

That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!

Each issue will start with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage published on our main site, NPC Observer. If, during that month, we have also written posts that aren’t tied to current events, I’ll then provide a round-up in “Non-News of the Month.” Finally, depending on the month and my schedule, I may end an issue with a discussion of an NPC-related topic that is in some way connected to the past month.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Month

On September 8–12, the 14^th NPCSC met for its seventeenth session. The session reviewed 18 bills and passed the following six:

• draft Atomic Energy Law [原子能法] (eff. Jan. 15, 2026);

• draft revision to the Arbitration Law [仲裁法] (eff. Mar. 1, 2026);

• draft Public Health Emergency Response Law [突发公共卫生事件应对法] (eff. Nov. 1, 2025);

• draft National Parks Law [国家公园法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026);

• draft Law on Publicity and Education on the Rule of Law [法治宣传教育法] (eff. Nov. 1, 2025); and

• draft amendment to the Food Safety Law [食品安全法] (eff. Dec. 1, 2026).

I won’t discuss the first two, but will note that the latter, in particular, has been widely analyzed by law firms and other outlets. Below, I’ll take a look at each of the other four bills.

The NPCSC also hear several oversight reports last month. We posted a translation of the State Council’s report on addressing climate change and advancing carbon peaking and carbon neutrality:

translated the NPCSC General Office’s report on NPC components’ preparatory research for the 15^th Five-Year Plan (covering 2026–30), due to be approved next March. The report includes following paragraph on (some of) the legislation recommended for the next five years (I added bullet points for readability). Most proposals are already found in the 14^th NPCSC’s five-year legislative plan, which covers the period 2023–28 (the few exceptions are marked by *).

(5) Strengthen legislation in key, emerging, and foreign-related fields to provide robust rule-of-law safeguards for economic and social development during the 15^th Five-Year Plan period. The reports from the special committees and working commissions each put forward proposals to enact or amend laws in various areas.

• In national security, it is recommended to enact laws such as Law of the Sea, Space Law, Telecommunications Law, and Law on Cybercrime Prevention and Control Law, and to amend the National Security Law* and the Cybersecurity Law.

• In fiscal and economic affairs, accelerate legislation on the consumption tax and land value-added tax; amend the Individual Income Tax Law* and the Enterprise Income Tax Law*; and clean up existing legal and regulatory provisions that restrict consumption*.

• In science, technology, and culture, accelerate the enactment of a Historical Cultural Heritage Protection Law and a Cultural Industry Promotion Law; amend the Tourism Law and the Intangible Cultural Heritage Law; and study legislation on artificial intelligence, gene technologies*, and other areas.

• In environment and resources, speed up amendments to the Energy Conservation Law, the Electricity Law, the Coal Law, the Renewable Energy Law, and the Circular Economy Promotion Law*.

• In urban-rural development, accelerate legislation on territorial spatial planning and study the enactment of a Collectively Owned Land Marketization Law*, Urban Renewal Law*, Urban Management Law*, and Cultivated Land Protection Law.

• In social security, amend the Employment Promotion Law, the Social Insurance Law, and the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly*; and study laws on eldercare services, childcare services, medical security, long-term care insurance*, and the protection of the rights and interests of overseas Chinese.

（五）加强重点领域、新兴领域、涉外领域立法，为“十五五”时期经济社会发展提供坚强法治保障。各专门委员会、工作委员会的调研报告都提出了一些领域的立法修法建议。在国家安全方面，建议制定海洋法、航天法、电信法、网络犯罪防治法等，修改国家安全法、网络安全法；财政经济方面，加快消费税、土地增值税等立法，修改个人所得税法和企业所得税法，清理现行法律法规有关限制消费的规定；科技文化方面，加快历史文化遗产保护法、文化产业促进法立法，修改旅游法、非物质文化遗产法，研究制定人工智能、基因技术等方面法律；环境资源方面，加快修改节约能源法、电力法、煤炭法、可再生能源法、循环经济促进法等；城乡建设方面，加快国土空间规划立法，研究制定集体土地入市法、城市更新法、城市管理法、耕地保护法；社会保障方面，修改就业促进法、社会保险法、老年人权益保障法等，研究制定养老服务、托育服务、医疗保障、长期护理保险、华侨权益保护等方面法律。

From September 12 to October 11, the NPCSC sought public comment on the following bills that it also reviewed last month:

• draft Hazardous Chemicals Safety Law [危险化学品安全法];

• General Part, Part on Ecological Conservation, and Part on Green and Low-Carbon Development of the draft Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典];

• draft Law on National Development Plans [国家发展规划法];

• draft revision to the Prisons Law [监狱法];

• draft amendment to the Cybersecurity Law [网络安全法];

• draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress [民族团结进步促进法];

• draft revision to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law [企业破产法];

• draft revision to the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language [国家通用语言文字法];

• draft amendment to the Environmental Protection Tax Law [环境保护税法]; and

• draft revision to the Foreign Trade Law [对外贸易法].

Last month, the NPC released the official (but non-binding) English translation of the Charity Law [慈善法] (as amended on December 29, 2023).

Food Safety Law Amendments

These amendments make two changes (for background, see this post). First, they subject liquid infant formula to the same regulatory regime as infant formula powder. That means, starting December 2025, formulas for liquid milk must be registered with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), China’s national food regulator, before they may be marketed (art. 81, para. 2). Applicants must submit evidence demonstrating the scientific soundness and safety of the formula (id.). Manufacturers are prohibited from purchasing finished or semi-finished products in bulk and simply repackaging them into retail containers (art. 81, para. 3). Nor may they use the same formula to produce liquid milk under different brand names (id.).

Second, the amendments establish a licensing regime for the road transport of key liquid foods in unpackaged form. According to a draft catalog released by SAMR (see art. 41, para. 5), such foods would include edible vegetable oil, liquid condiments (e.g., vinegar), alcoholic beverages, and syrups. To obtain a license, transporters must have dedicated containers, qualified personnel, and appropriate internal procedures (id. para. 2). They must clean the containers promptly and cannot use them to carry substances other than food (id. para. 3). Shippers must verify transporters’ licenses and containers, whereas receivers must verify their licenses, transport logs, and the integrity of the seals on the containers (id.). The amendments further prohibit anyone from falsifying or altering transport logs and cleaning logs or using falsified or altered records (id. para. 4).

The amendments will take effect on December 1.

Public Health Emergency Response Law (PHERL)

PHERL is yet another piece of legislation that the NPCSC enacted post-COVID to improve China’s public health laws, joining (among others) the revised Emergency Response Law [突发事件应对法] passed in November 2024 and the revised Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Infectious Disease Law) [传染病防治法] adopted in April 2025. I covered the latter two on this newsletter here and here, respectively.

PHERL defines “public health emergencies” to mean “major epidemics, mass occurrences of diseases of unknown cause, mass poisonings, and other events that seriously affect the life and health of the public that occur suddenly, cause or may cause serious harm to the life and health of the public, and require emergency response measures.” It is the primary statute that governs the response to public health emergencies, though the Infectious Disease Law takes precedence to the extent it deals specifically with “major epidemics” [重大传染病疫情]. Finally, the Emergency Response Law, as the general statute that addresses emergencies in addition to public health emergencies (such as natural disasters), fills any gaps in those laws.

PHERL’s core substantive provisions, found in Chapters III–V, address, respectively, prevention and preparedness, monitoring and early warning, and emergency response. The framework resembles that of the Infectious Diseases Law, given the closeness of their subject matter. For example, like the latter’s infectious-disease reporting requirements, PHERL requires the relevant entities to report actual or likely public health emergencies within 2 hours through the Direct Reporting System or by other means (art. 30).

Once emergency response is triggered, PHERL authorizes the following measures “within specified areas” (art. 39):

(1) organizing and carrying out medical treatment;

(2) controlling sources of risk, sealing off or sealing up contaminated public water sources and goods, and closing venues that may cause the spread of harm;

(3) evacuating, relocating, and properly accommodating persons vulnerable to the harm of the public health emergency;

(4) implementing personnel screening, health monitoring, medical observation, and preventive medication;

(5) restricting or suspending mass gatherings;

(6) suspending work, business operations, and classes;

(7) deploying public health emergency response teams and other personnel participating in emergency response efforts;

(8) activating temporary emergency response sites and mobilizing equipment, supplies, and transportation needed for the response;

(9) taking other necessary measures in accordance with law to control, mitigate, or eliminate the harm caused by the public health emergency.

The failure to abide by these measures, refusal to cooperate with epidemiological surveys conducted by centers for disease control, or intentional fabrication or dissemination of false information on public health emergencies will lead to a warning as well as an optional fine of up to RMB 20,000 for entities and up to RMB 1,000 for individuals (art. 59).

PHERL will take effect on November 1.

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Law on Publicity and Education on the Rules of Law

To quote my preview of this Law when it was first introduced last December:

The Communist Party’s efforts to disseminate legal knowledge among the Chinese population are as old as its rule, but it did not turn law propaganda into “a regular, systematized, and institutionalized practice” until 1985.1 That year, the Party and the State Council issued a five-year plan to popularize “common legal knowledge” among citizens, followed by an NPCSC resolution on the same subject that kicked off the effort nationwide. Since then, “law popularization” [普法] has continued under quinquennial NPCSC resolutions and detailed five-year plans issued by central propaganda and justice authorities. The currently operative 8^th five-year plan, adopted in 2021, outlines an array of law-popularization initiatives: for instance, promoting the Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law; disseminating knowledge about key legal instruments such as the Constitution and the Civil Code; increasing the readiness of citizens, especially cadres and the youth, to abide by laws through education and practice; and requiring governmental bodies to popularize the law as part of legislative, administrative, and judicial processes.

As expected, the Law seeks to codify the tried-and-true methods of popularizing the law that have developed over the past four decades.

Under Article 5, the main contents of “publicity and education on the rule of law” include:

(1) Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law;

(2) the provisions, principles, and spirit of the Constitution;

(3) rule-of-law principles, the legal system, and basic legal knowledge;

(4) the practice and achievements of comprehensive law-based governance;

(5) socialist rule-of-law culture and the fine traditional Chiense legal culture;

(6) Other matters that shall be included in publicity and education on the rule of law.

Chapters II through IV of the Law address “law popularization” efforts directed against the society at large (Ch. II), civil servants (Ch. III), and the youth (Ch. IV), respectively. These provisions impose general obligations on a variety of public and private entities to popularize the law in particular ways, toward particular demographics, and on particular topics, though enforcement would appear to depend on the five-year plans issued by each level of government (see art. 6). The Ministry of Justice and its local counterparts bear the primary responsibility for overseeing law-popularization efforts (art. 7). They are required to evaluate the implementation of five-year plans and publicize the results, and may urge compliance by issuing “law popularization notices” [普法提示] to derelict entities (arts. 56–57).

To give one example, the Law codifies the requirement that “whoever enforces the law should popularize the law” [谁执法谁普法] in the following provisions:

Article 17: Organs that enact laws or regulations shall strengthen publicity and interpretation throughout the entire legislative process, actively release information, introduce relevant developments, and respond to public concerns in various means; by openly soliciting opinions, holding symposiums, expert debate sessions, and hearings, and by establishing grassroots legislative outreach offices, they shall expand social participation and organically integrate legislation with publicity and education on the rule of law.

Article 18: Administrative organs shall integrate publicity and education on the rule of law into their daily management, provision of services, law enforcement, and dispute resolution processes, and carry out publicity and education on the rule of law through a combination of methods such as explaining the law and reasoning, providing guidance and responses, offering demonstrations, organizing hearings, and publishing and explaining typical cases.

Article 19: Supervision, adjudicative, and procuratorial organs shall integrate publicity and education on the rule of law into their case-handling processes; and, in accordance with their respective functions, shall carry out publicity and education on the rule of law by means such as publicly adjudicating cases, explaining the law through legal documents, and publishing and explaining typical cases.

This Law will take effect on November 1.

National Parks Law

At the 2013 Third Plenum, the Communist Party first decided to “establish a system of national parks.” Pilot programs began in early 2015, culminating in the formal establishment of China’s first five national parks in October 2021: Sanjiangyuan (in Qinghai, with a part under de facto Tibetan administration); Giant Panda (in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu); Northeast China Tiger and Leopard (in Jilin and Heilongjiang); Hainan Tropical Rainforest; and Wuyi Mountains (in Fujian and Jiangxi). In the interim, the 2018 government reorganization created the National Forestry and Grassland Administration, also known as the National Park Administration (NPA), to unify regulatory authority over China’s protected areas. Those national parks now operate under the relevant central guidance documents, NPA rules, and local regulations issued over the years. The National Parks Law is therefore essentially a codification of the general framework for establishing and running national parks that has proven workable.

The Law endows the State Council with the ultimate authority to establish national parks and outlines a three-step process (arts. 12–13). First, it directs the NPA, in conjunction with other relevant departments, to draw up a National Park Spatial Layout Plan [国家公园空间布局方案]. Such a Plan was already issued in late 2022, though it has not been made public. According to a press release, the Plan selected 49 “candidate sites” [候选区] (including the five that had been officially established): 44 terrestrial sites, 3 marine sites, and 2 hybrid sites (see map above). Next, to demonstrate that a candidate site is ready to become a national park, the relevant provincial government(s) must undertake what the statute calls “preliminary work” [前期工作]: extensive studies on the proposed park’s name, boundaries, zoning plan, baseline conditions, management structure, impacts on original residents and economy, among other matters. During this stage, the authorities must also address any development projects within the proposed park that would be incompatible with its objectives. Finally, upon the completion of the preparatory work, if the NPA finds that the site satisfies its criteria for establishing a national park, the provincial authorities must conduct another round of studies on largely the same issues and prepare a final plan for the State Council’s approval. This proves to be a lengthy process. The State Council has not approved any additional national park beyond the original five. As of November 2024, 10 sites were in the final stage, while 15 others proceeded to various points in the preparatory phase.

Once a national park is formally established, any other types of protected areas—such as nature reserves, forest parks, geological parks, and scenic areas—that fall entirely within the park’s boundaries are abolished (art. 15, para. 2). Those only partially included in the park are to be consolidated or abolished on a case-by-case basis (id.). The Giant Panda National Park, for example, has absorbed in whole or in part 73 prior protected areas.

China uses a central-local cooperative model for managing national parks. All existing parks are at least nominally under the dual leadership of the NPA and the relevant provincial government(s). In one case, Sanjiangyuan, the NPA has delegated full management authority to the Qinghai provincial government, under which the Park’s managing body functions as a “field office” [派出机构]. In addition, the relevant provincial government(s) take the lead in drafting each park’s “master plan” for the NPA’s approval (art. 21). A master plan typically sets out the park’s conservation objectives, boundaries and zones, ecological protection and monitoring schemes, scientific research, education and tourism initiatives, and community engagement strategies. Lastly, the Law expressly (and retroactively) permits the relevant provincial people’s congresses to enact local legislation on issues such as “the protection and restoration” of park ecosystems and “the management of related activities” (art. 62).

As for the management of individual parks, the Law outlines only broad, universal rules. Each park must be divided into “core protection zones” [核心保护区] and “general control zones” [一般控制区]—with the former reserved for areas “where natural ecosystems are well preserved and highly representative, where core resources are concentrated, or where ecosystems are fragile and require recovery” (art. 16).

Human activities are prohibited in core protection zones except for the following (art. 27):

(1) activities carried out for the protection of national parks, such as surveys and monitoring, ecological restoration, patrolling and management; scientific research and observation, basic surveying and mapping, cultural relics protection, disaster prevention and mitigation, emergency rescue; and activities that state organs truly must carry out in performing their law enforcement duties in accordance with law;

(2) necesary production and livelihood activities of original residents, as well as the operation and maintenance of existing major infrastructure that truly must be retained and cannot be relocated;

(3) activities that truly must be carried out for safeguarding national security, implementing major national strategies, or constructing major infrastructure;

(4) other activities prescribed by laws or administrative regulations, or approved by the State Council.

Only the following human activities are permitted in general control zones (art. 28):

(1) activities permitted within core protection zones;

(2) construction, operation, and maintenance of major infrastructure that conforms to territorial spatial plans and cannot be relocated;

(3) paleontological fossil surveys and excavations, basic geological surveys, prospective assessments of strategic mineral resources, and exploration of strategic mineral resources within designated areas;

(4) public service activities such as science popularization, ecological tourism, education, culture, and sports;

(5) other activities prescribed by laws or administrative regulations, or approved by the State Council.

Any activity permitted within national parks must still be carried out in a way that avoids or minimizes harms to the park’s ecosystem as well as its natural and cultural landscapes (art. 30, para. 2). The Law further requires that the original residents within a national park restrict economic and household activities to their existing “scale and intensity,” while allowing for “reasonable improvements to their living and production conditions” (art. 29, para. 1).2 It prescribes fines for violating all these restrictions and vests enforcement authority in a park’s managing body (arts. 55–58, 60).

The Law also includes a chapter on “participation and sharing.” It directs the managing bodies of national parks to strengthen engagement with the local governments, residents, and communities to plan and develop gateway communities and offer appropriate ecological products and services (arts. 36–37). It requires national parks to prioritize local residents in recruiting park rangers and encourages a park’s original residents to become concessioners (art. 38; art. 41, para. 2). And it encourages national parks to designate free entrance days and give discounts to certain groups, including people with disabilities, minors, the elderly, and veterans (art. 42, para. 2). Finally, the Law encourages the public to volunteer at national parks and requires the latter to provide proper training, management, and protections (art. 43).

The Law will take effect on January 1, 2026.

Non-News of the Month

In late August, the NPC rolled out major upgrades to the National Database of Laws and Regulations [国家法律法规数据库]. Last month, I introduced and reviewed the updates in this post, while looking ahead at the future of the Database. Here’s the verdict:

While this new version—or “Phase II”—has the same coverage [as the original Database], there have been significant improvements on all other fronts: it has a more modern look, upgraded core functionalities, and useful new features. In short, we believe Phase II will prove to be much more valuable for the average citizen, if not for legal professionals as well.

That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!

The NPCSC’s next session begins today (Friday) and runs through next Tuesday, October 28. Check out my preview of the agenda items.

Yesterday (September 10), Minister of Ecology and Environment Huang Runqiu reported on behalf of the State Council to the NPCSC on China’s efforts to address climate change and achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality (aka “Dual Carbon“ goals). Full text of the report is available here [perma].

As I’ve highlighted here, this report is part of the NPCSC’s 2025 oversight agenda. Though most oversight reports touch on issues far beyond my area of expertise, I plan to continue posting lighted edited machine translations here if they may be of wider interest. If you wish to quote from the translation, I strongly recommend verifying it against the original text.

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国务院关于应对气候变化和碳达峰碳中和工作情况的报告
Report of the State Council on Addressing Climate Change and Advancing Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress:

I have been entrusted by the State Council to report to the NPC Standing Committee on China’s response to climate change and the progress of work toward carbon peaking and carbon neutrality. Please deliberate.

General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that responding to climate change and achieving carbon peaking and carbon neutrality are not things others are asking us to do, but tasks we ourselves must accomplish. Since the Party’s 18^th National Congress, the Party Central Committee has placed climate change at a more prominent position in national governance, implemented a national strategy of actively responding to climate change, made the major strategic decision to achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, and incorporated “dual carbon” work into the overall framework of ecological civilization and the broader agenda of economic and social development. The Party’s 20^th National Congress called for coordinated progress on industrial restructuring, pollution control, ecological conservation, and climate action, advancing carbon reduction, pollution reduction, ecosystem expansion, and growth in tandem. The Third Plenum of the 20^th Central Committee stressed the need to actively respond to climate change and to improve mechanisms for green and low-carbon development. The various localities and departments have earnestly implemented the important instructions and comments of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the decisions and plans of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, taken proactive measures, and achieved notable results. China has built the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable energy system and the largest and most complete new energy industrial chain, and has contributed one-quarter of the world’s new greened area. The decline in carbon intensity and the increase in the share of non-fossil energy consumption are broadly on track with the progress expected under our 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets. The total installed capacity of wind and solar power and the national forest stock volume have already exceeded the 2030 NDC targets ahead of schedule.

The NPC Standing Committee has attached great importance to and long supported efforts to respond to climate change and to achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, consistently strengthening the legal framework and oversight, and providing strong guarantees for such efforts.

I. Major Progress and Achievements

Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, the State Council and relevant departments have advanced efforts to respond to climate change and to achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality in an all-out effort, established a “1+N” policy framework for “dual carbon,” accelerated the shift from dual controls on energy consumption to dual controls on carbon emissions, and promoted systemic transformation across the economy and society.

(1) Remarkable progress in energy and industrial transformation. As of the end of June 2025, installed capacity of non-fossil energy reached 2.22 billion kilowatts, accounting for 60.9% of total capacity. Fossil energy has been used more cleanly and efficiently, with coal-fired power undergoing “three reform linkages” [三改联动] and outdated capacity phased out, while natural gas production and use steadily increased. Construction of “desert, Gobi, and barren land” renewable energy bases and major hydropower projects has accelerated, and China’s operating and under-construction nuclear power capacity is now the largest in the world. A new-type power system is being built, forming the world’s largest clean power generation system and transmission network, and a multi-tiered unified electricity market is taking shape. New productive forces represented by the “new three” [photovoltaic products, lithium batteries, and new energy vehicles] have grown rapidly: since the start of the 14^th Five-Year Plan period, photovoltaic module output has risen 3.7 times and lithium battery output 6.4 times, while new energy vehicles have led the world in production and sales for ten consecutive years. Industrial upgrading continues, with 590 million tons of crude steel capacity retrofitted for ultra-low emissions. Energy-saving and carbon-reduction renovations, large-scale equipment renewal, and consumer product replacement have been widely advanced. More than 6,000 national-level green factories have been established, with their output accounting for about 20% of manufacturing output. Circular economy development has accelerated, with waste recycling systems being built.

(2) Continuous progress in green development in key sectors. High-quality green buildings are expanding rapidly: efforts to actively promote green construction brought 1.69 billion square meters of new urban green building area in 2024, accounting for 97.9% of new urban building area that year. Clean and low-carbon transport has advanced, with about 70% of bulk freight in key sectors transported cleanly in 2024, and civil aviation making notable strides in green transformation. Efforts to build national ecological security barriers have accelerated, including the “Three-North” shelterbelt project and large-scale land greening, making China the fastest-growing country in terms of forest resources. Pilot projects for coordinated pollution and carbon reduction innovation are under way. Control of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases has strengthened: the Regulations on Ozone-Depleting Substances [消耗臭氧层物质管理条例] have been revised to include hydrofluorocarbons under quota management, and a methane emissions control plan has been issued.

(3) Steady improvement of the national carbon market. An opinion on strengthening the national carbon market have been issued, the Interim Regulations on Carbon Emissions Trading [碳排放权交易管理暂行条例] promulgated, and a series of departmental rules, normative documents, and technical specifications formulated, completing the basic legal and policy framework. A routine monthly data verification mechanism has been put in place to improve data quality. The first expansion of the national carbon market has brought in the steel, cement, and aluminum sectors, covering more than 60% of national emissions. As of the end of June 2025, cumulative transactions of carbon emission allowances reached 670 million tons, with a value of 45.93 billion yuan. A national voluntary greenhouse gas emissions trading market has been launched, with the first batch of certified voluntary emission reductions registered and traded, supporting the realization of ecological product value.

(4) Deepened progress in efforts to adapt to climate change. The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035 has been issued and implemented. Pilot projects for climate-resilient cities, urban assessments, and sponge cities have been carried out. Climate system monitoring now covers multiple spheres, and meteorological disaster warning capacity has improved. Major disaster prevention and response have been strengthened, and the national emergency command system is now essentially in place. Infrastructure resilience is being enhanced, and a national climate change and health adaptation plan has been released. Climate adaptation requirements have been integrated into territorial space plans at all levels, with a focus on the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau, the Yellow River Basin, and the Yangtze River Basin. An early warning–based adaptation action plan has been issued, and climate adaptation partnerships are being built.

(5) Steady strengthening of basic capacity. A carbon emissions statistics and accounting system has been established, with a national database of greenhouse gas emission factors launched, and regular compilation of national greenhouse gas inventories carried out. An implementation plan for a carbon footprint management system has been issued, with work carried out on developing standards for product carbon footprint and the certification of labeling. A plan for building a national climate change standards system has been issued, with ongoing efforts to build carbon measurement capacity. Several environmental monitoring satellites are in orbit, enhancing remote sensing capacity. New occupations such as carbon emissions manager and carbon sink assessor have been added to the National Occupational Classification Catalogue. Twenty undergraduate and vocational majors related to climate change have been added, accelerating professional talent training. Various outreach activities and public participation mechanisms, including carbon-inclusive schemes, are raising public awareness of green, low-carbon living.

(6) Strengthened sci-tech innovation and policy incentives. The system and mechanisms for carbon peaking and neutrality and sci-tech innovation have been improved, with a carbon neutrality technology roadmap prepared. National key laboratories related to carbon peaking and carbon neutrality have been established, strengthening basic research on low- and zero-carbon technologies, advancing frontier technology development, and enhancing studies on climate change mechanisms and the research of key response technologies. A market-oriented green technology innovation system has been strengthened, with broader adoption of green and low-carbon technologies. The central government has continuously increased fiscal investment, with a focus on supporting the development of new energy and green, low-carbon sci-tech innovation. Green tax reform has been promoted, including implementing vehicle purchase tax exemptions for new energy vehicles. Support for green finance has been strengthened through the establishment of a reserve of ecological and environmental finance projects, the creation of a National Green Development Fund, and enhanced information disclosure. By the end of 2024, incentive loans through carbon reduction support tools exceeded 1.3 trillion yuan, and the balance of green loans reached 36.6 trillion yuan.

(7) Important contributions to global climate governance. China has supported head-of-state climate diplomacy and played a key role in global climate governance, contributing significantly to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. China has initiated and hosted multilateral mechanisms such as the BASIC countries and the Ministerial on Climate Action, building political consensus. It has fulfilled international obligations by submitting climate reports to the UN. As the world’s largest exporter and investor in clean technology, China has helped drive down the cost of wind and solar. It has advanced international cooperation on climate change, deepened South-South cooperation, promoted a green Belt and Road, and advanced the Global Development Initiative. China has actively participated in climate consultations across sectors, responded to unilateral measures such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and promoted international alignment and mutual recognition of rules and standards.

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II. Difficulties and Challenges

While we have made notable progress, we are soberly aware that as the largest developing country, China still faces a series of problems and challenges. Balancing development and emissions reduction, coordinating national and local priorities, and reconciling short- and long-term objectives have all become more difficult. The tasks of responding to climate change and achieving carbon peaking and neutrality remain arduous.

(1) Difficulty in controlling carbon intensity. Since the start of the 14^th Five-Year Plan period, the various localities and departments have pushed hard to reduce carbon intensity, and progress has been made. Yet challenges remain due to the effects of COVID-19, extreme weather, and changes in the international economic and trade environment. Reducing carbon intensity is proving difficult. China aims to move from carbon peaking to carbon neutrality in the shortest time span in world history, and to achieve the steepest reduction in carbon intensity globally—a daunting task.

(2) Challenges in sustaining the green and low-carbon transition. Energy demand continues to grow rapidly. With the accelerated application of digital and intelligent technologies and the effects of global warming, future electricity demand may be even higher. As the share of renewable energy rises, coal power’s role in grid balancing and ensuring supply has become more critical, placing higher demands on the power system’s flexibility and regulation capacity. Industrial transformation is also increasingly difficult: in some areas, “two high” projects [high energy consumption and high emissions] have been launched blindly, while new industries face challenges such as bottlenecks in key technologies and homogeneous competition.

(3) The legal and policy framework remains incomplete. The legal system and standards for climate action are not yet sound, and stronger policy coordination is urgently needed. Energy system reforms must go further. Policies on carbon accounting, carbon footprinting, green certificates, and the carbon market need stronger alignment. The system for climate adaptation remains relatively weak, with large funding and technology gaps.

(4) Need to further strengthen basic capacity. Carbon accounting methods remain insufficient, with room to improve accuracy, timeliness, and localization of emission factors. Basic research and sci-tech innovation fall short, and key low-carbon, zero-carbon, and negative-carbon technologies have not yet been scaled up. Some localities and enterprises still lack full awareness of climate action and “dual carbon” goals, continue to rely on traditional high-energy, high-emission development models, and face gaps between their capacities and the demands of the work.

(5) A complex and severe international climate governance landscape. The climate crisis is intensifying: in 2024, the global average temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1.5 °C for the first time, underscoring the urgency of action. Global climate governance faces uncertainty. The Trump administration has again announced U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, while unilateral measures such as the EU’s CBAM are expanding.

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III. Considerations for Next Steps

This year marks the fifth anniversary of China’s proposal of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets. Guided by the Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization, we will uphold a systems approach, continue to implement the national strategy of actively responding to climate change, advance carbon peaking and neutrality in an active and prudent manner, formulate and implement China’s 2035 NDC targets, and foster a new pattern of green, low-carbon, high-quality development.

(1) Improve laws and policies to advance climate goals in a coordinated manner. We will work with the legislature to formulate dedicated laws on climate response and “dual carbon,” accelerate the adoption of the Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典], and advance revisions to laws and regulations such as the Energy Conservation Law [节约能源法]. We will strengthen regulatory enforcement on carbon emissions, improve the linkage between administrative enforcement and criminal justice, and crack down in accordance with the law on data falsification in the carbon market. We will enhance interdepartmental coordination, policy coherence, and data sharing, continue conducting situation analyses and issuing operational reminders, and spare no effort to achieve the 14^th Five-Year Plan’s carbon intensity reduction target. We will plan ahead for the 15^th Five-Year Plan period, accelerate the establishment of a dual control system for carbon emissions, and develop a comprehensive evaluation and assessment framework for carbon peaking and neutrality.

(2) Focus on key sectors and accelerate the green and low-carbon transition in development. We will speed up the construction of a new energy system, adhere to the principle of “establishing before breaking,” advance the building of large-scale wind and solar bases and integrated water-wind-solar projects, and promote distributed energy based on local conditions. We will advance nuclear power actively, safely, and in an orderly manner. We will implement renewable energy substitution projects, and rationally deploy pumped storage, new storage technologies, and solar thermal power. We will continue to use fossil fuels, especially coal, more cleanly and efficiently. We will deepen power system reform and support new business models such as direct supply of green electricity. Industrial decarbonization will be accelerated, with strong and effective control over “two high” projects, faster phase-out of outdated and inefficient capacity, deepened energy-saving and carbon-reduction renovations, major technological upgrades, and large-scale equipment renewal. We will build zero-carbon parks and factories and further promote low-carbon cities. We will promote digital and green transformation in tandem, advance AI applications in key sectors, support green building development, and strengthen green design and construction. We will optimize transport structures and continue promoting new energy vehicles. We will consolidate and enhance the carbon sink capacity of ecosystems.

(3) Improve market mechanisms and build a more effective, dynamic, and internationally influential carbon market. We will accelerate national carbon market development, establish a transparent emissions allowance management system with well-defined expectations, steadily adopt a mix of free and paid allowance allocation, and gradually increase the share of paid allocation. We will broaden trading instruments, participants, and methods, and expand sectoral coverage in an orderly way. We will continue improving the voluntary greenhouse gas reduction market and study the establishment of a cross-border carbon trading management system. We will advance the cautious development of green financial products and services by financial institutions. We will strengthen policy coordination among markets for green electricity, green certificates, and carbon trading.

(4) Improve working systems and comprehensively enhance climate adaptation capacity. We will improve mechanisms for climate change adaption, intensify adaptation actions in key sectors such as urban and rural development, agriculture, and infrastructure, and in key regions such as the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau. We will strengthen early warning platforms through multiple channels and enhance our ability to respond to extreme weather and climate events. We will study and develop adaptation indicator systems, formulate evaluation methods, and conduct regular assessments. Pilot projects for climate-resilient cities will continue to be deepened.

(5) Strengthen support systems and comprehensively enhance basic capacity. We will improve the carbon emissions statistics and accounting system, establish a carbon emissions quick-reporting system, and enhance data accuracy and timeliness. We will improve the national greenhouse gas emission factor database, and build a national network of greenhouse gas–monitoring stations and three-dimensional monitoring system. We will establish a product carbon footprint management system and labeling-certification system. We will improve standardization and metrology, refine the climate change standards system, and accelerate the upgrading of energy consumption and efficiency standards. We will strengthen the green and low-carbon sci-tech innovation system and plan major climate response projects. We will strengthen basic research and intensify research and development in controlled nuclear fusion, carbon capture, utilization and storage, energy storage, and other frontier and disruptive technologies, while advancing research on carbon sinks and non-CO₂ greenhouse gas mitigation technologies. We will build platforms for joint innovation among universities, enterprises, and localities, improve the efficiency of technology commercialization, and better integrate sci-tech and industrial innovation, giving enterprises a stronger role as innovation leaders. Talent development will be enhanced. We will refine green taxation, continue preferential tax policies related to energy conservation and emissions reduction, and improve green finance policies, expanding the scope of support for carbon reduction support tools. We will promote climate investment and financing, and align fiscal funds with financial instruments. We will advocate green consumption and promote green, low-carbon production and lifestyles.

(6) Uphold multilateralism and enhance China’s influence, leadership, and agenda-setting power in global climate governance. We will strengthen bilateral and multilateral exchanges, advance international cooperation across fields and levels, deepen South-South cooperation on climate change, oppose unilateralism and protectionism, and promote a fair, equitable, cooperative, and win–win global climate governance system. We will track developments in international climate law, strengthen cooperation on green trade and investment, and promote international alignment and mutual recognition of rules and standards on carbon accounting, carbon footprinting, and more. We will prepare transparency and compliance reports on our climate actions. We will enhance international communication of the Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization, contributing Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to global climate governance.

China’s development of ecological civilization has entered a critical stage where carbon reduction is the strategic priority. We will resolutely implement the decisions and plans of the Party Central Committee, and with the oversight and support of the NPC and its Standing Committee, advance our work with greater resolve, broader vision, stronger efforts, and more concrete measures. We will accelerate the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development, build a Beautiful China more quickly, and help create a clean and beautiful world, providing stronger support and guarantees for advancing Chinese-style modernization.

I’ve previously announced that I’d publish a double issue for June and July. As it turned out, there wasn’t much news from August, either, as the NPCSC postponed its typical August session to September for the second year in a row. So here we are—a rare triple issue. Going forward, monthly recaps should again become the norm.

Today, I’ll first provide a roundup of NPC-related developments from the last three months, and then end with a bit of NPC trivia.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Summer

June 2025

On June 1, the Preschool Education Law [学前教育法] (adopted on Nov. 8, 2024) and the amendment to the Supervision Law [监察法] (adopted on Dec. 25, 2024) took effect.

On June 24–27, the 14^th NPCSC met for its sixteenth session, which the Council of Chairpersons convened on June 16. During the session, the NPCSC reviewed twelve bills and approved two of them.

First, it revised the Anti–Unfair Competition Law [反不正当竞争法], effective October 15, 2025. There are many commentaries on the revisions out there, so I won’t produce my own. Check out, for example, this comprehensive summary and analysis by China Briefing. (Note, however, that two sections of the article—“Expanded trade secret protections” and “Shift in burden of proof for trade secret cases”— in fact discuss changes already made in 2019.)

Second, the NPCSC revised the Public Security Administration Punishments Law [治安管理处罚法], effective January 1, 2026. I’ve recently published a two-part analysis of this bill. The first part focuses on several broader issues that arose during the revision process—the use of administrative detention, the availability of detention hearings, and the vagueness of certain offenses—while the second part conducts a more comprehensive survey of the changes.

Finally, the NPCSC took two other actions of note:

• It ratified the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation.

• It removed Miao Hua [苗华] as a member of the PRC Central Military Commission. For suspected serious disciplinary violations, he was previously placed under investigation in November 2014 and removed as an NPC delegate in April 2025.

On June 27–July 26, the NPCSC sought public comment on the following bills:

• draft Public Health Emergency Response Law [突发公共卫生事件应对法];

• draft revision to the Maritime Law [海商法];

• draft Law on Publicity and Education on the Rule of Law [法治宣传教育法];

• draft revision to the Fisheries Law [渔业法];

• draft revision to the Civil Aviation Law [民用航空法];

• draft amendment to the Villagers’ Committees Organic Law [村民委员会组织法];

• draft revision to the Urban Residents’ Committees Organic Law [城市居民委员会组织法];

• draft Social Assistance Law [社会救助法];

• draft Healthcare Security Law [医疗保障法]; and

• draft amendment to the Food Safety Law [食品安全法].

July 2025

On July 1, the revised Mineral Resources Law [矿产资源法] (adopted on Nov. 8, 2024) took effect.

On July 18, the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) released a batch of three “recording and review” (R&R) [备案审查] guiding cases.1 (Given this is the umpteenth time I’ve mentioned R&R on this Substack, I’ll assume some familiarity with the process. If not, however, don’t worry—start here!) All three cases had already been disclosed in the LAC’s annual R&R reports. Unlike those reports, which discuss each case in only a few sentences, the guiding cases explain in detail the legislation under review, the LAC’s conclusions and reasoning, and the procedures followed. This latest batch also, for the first time, begins each case with a new section—“审查要旨” (Key Points of Review)—that summarizes the documents at issue and the LAC’s conclusions, roughly analogous to the holding of a judicial opinion.

Here’s a quick summary of each case:

Case #1: Thirty-one jurisdictions across 11 provinces required property developers to pay a “property warranty deposit” [物业保修金]—typically set at 1%–3% of the total construction costs—to ensure they would fulfill repair obligations during the warranty period. In October 2024, the LAC carried out a target review of such requirements and rejected them on three grounds:

• They conflicted with the Communist Party’s and State Council’s directives to eliminate most security deposits required of businesses;

• They violated the State Council’s Regulations on Improving the Business Environment [优化营商环境条例], which prohibit collecting security deposits from businesses unless permitted by national laws or regulations; and

• They no longer reflected reality, since many jurisdictions had already switched to requiring developers to purchase insurances—or ceased collecting the deposits altogether due to the burden on businesses.

Case #2: In October 2024, after another targeted review, the LAC discovered 3 local regulations (legislation enacted by local people’s congresses) and 2 local government rules that required non-local ridesharing companies to establish local branches before commencing operations. The LAC concluded that this requirement violated a 2022 joint opinion by the Party and the State Council on building a “unified national market” as well as the State Council’s Fair Competition Review Regulations [公平竞争审查条例]—both of which prohibit localities from creating market-entry barriers by requiring companies to establish local branches.

The LAC then added another reason: it also found the local-branch requirement inconsistent with a 2016 State Council policy document and ministerial rules regulating the ridesharing industry. Neither instrument mandates local branches for ridesharing companies, so local authorities cannot impose such a requirement, either, the LAC reasons. Insofar as the legislative authority of local people’s congresses is concerned, I’m not sure I’m persuaded by this second rationale. As I’ve elaborated here (in a different context), local legislatures may supplement national legislation as long as they don’t “contravene” the latter; it therefore turns their authority on its head to claim that they cannot go beyond national legislation in imposing new regulatory requirements (unless expressly or implicitly prohibited, of course).

Case #3: In 2020, an NPC delegate requested review of 5 municipal taxi regulations that required cab drivers to have a local hukou. In 2022, several scholars submitted a follow-up request targeting similar requirements imposed by 9 other cities. The LAC agreed with the petitioners that the requirement ran counter to a 2020 Party and State Council opinion vowing to “correct employment discrimination based on status [身份]”—a directive that the LAC says embodies the constitutional principle that all citizens are “equal before the law.”

The LAC reports that all nine regulations at issue in Case #3 have been amended, whereas the relevant local authorities have all agreed to correct the problems identified in the other two guiding cases.

On July 22, the LAC released amended work rules for its “grassroots legislative outreach offices” [基层立法联系点], which it had adopted on July 14. I briefly introduced those offices in this issue of the newsletter. In short, they are existing grassroots institutions—most are county-level people’s congresses—that, upon application, the LAC has designated to gather the views of local communities on legislative matters (legislative agenda, pending legislation, etc.). Each outreach office is directed to recruit personnel to proactively engage with its local community. I’ve prepared a comparison chart (in Chinese) for those interested.

The amendments reinforce the volunteer role that those offices play, making clear that they aren’t subordinate to the LAC. For example, the amended rules bar performance evaluations or rankings of the offices, so as not to add to the workload of the host institutions. They also require the LAC to consult the offices on the draft laws they wish to work on and to “fully respect” those preferences. Other notable changes include involving the offices in the LAC’s R&R work; providing for greater informatization of their workflow; and specifying the role of the LAC’s new Office of Grassroots Legislative Outreach Offices.

August 2025

On August 20, the NPC rolled out major upgrades to China’s National Database of Laws and Regulations. They gave the site a more modern look, introduced useful new features, and substantially improved core functionalities (such as search). I’m preparing a full guide and review, so stay tuned. (In the meantime, check out our lukewarm review of the original database from four-and-a-half years ago.)

On August 26, the Council of Chairpersons decided to schedule the 14^th NPCSC’s next regular session for September 8–12. The session will consider 16 legislative bills and 8 oversight reports, among other business. I’ve previewed its agenda here.

In August, the NPC released the official (but non-binding) English translations of the following laws:

• Law on the Delegates to the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses [全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法] (as amended Mar. 11, 2025) [bill page];

• Cultural Relics Protection Law [文物保护法] (as revised Nov. 8, 2024) [bill page]; and

• Anti–Domestic Violence Law [反家庭暴力法] (adopted Dec. 27, 2015) [bill page].

NPC Trivia: Statutory References to Administrative Regulations

The Chinese legislature is loath to amend statutes frequently. So presumably to obviate the need for technical conforming amendments, it cites other laws as a whole in statutory cross-references, without specifying particular provisions.2 For the same reason, it has stopped citing specific administrative regulations in statutes since around 2010 (except when repealing them), instead referring vaguely to the “relevant regulations” on a certain subject.

The legislature has consistently deleted references to specific administrative regulations when it revises draft laws. For example, the first draft of the pending Public Health Emergency Response Law [突发公共卫生事件应对法] would require that, during public health emergencies, medical waste be handled in accordance with the State Council’s Regulations on the Administration of Medical Waste [医疗废物管理条例], among other authorities. The latest draft now simply requires compliance with the “provisions of the relevant laws and regulations.”

I was therefore surprised to see that the revised Public Security Administration Punishments Law bucked this trend by citing a specific regulation. Article 141, paragraph 2 reads:

Where public security organs impose punishments in accordance with the PRC Firearms Control Law [枪支管理法], the Regulations on the Management of the Safety of Civilian Explosives [民用爆炸物品安全管理条例], and other laws or administrative regulations that directly relate to public security and social order, this Law applies to the punishment procedures.

This provision was in the draft submitted by the State Council. The legislature might have thought that the scope of “administrative regulations that directly relate to public security and social order”would be too vague without an example, so it probably retained the citation in the interest of procedural clarity.

As far as I can tell, only two other statutes still cite specific regulations:

• a 1993 statute applying the State Council’s interim regulations on the value-added tax, consumption tax, and (now-repealed) business tax to foreign or foreign-invested enterprises, which names those regulations in full; and

• the 2010 National Mobilization Law [国防动员法], which cites the Regulations on the Preferential Treatment of Military Personnel [军人抚恤优待条例].

That’s all for this triple issue. Thanks for reading!

On June 24, Deputy Director of China’s National Development and Reform Commission Xiangli Bin reported to the NPCSC on the development of “new quality productive forces” [新质生产力] on behalf of the State Council. Full text of report has just been released today in the latest issue of the NPCSC Gazette.

This is far from my area but I thought it might be of interest to others. So in this newsletter I’m providing a lighted edited machine translation of the report. You can also download the report as published in the Gazette below. If you wish to quote from the translation, I strongly recommend verifying it against the original text.

State Council Report On The Development Of New Quality Productive Forces

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Report on the Development of New Quality Productive Forces

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress:

Entrusted by the State Council, I hereby report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the development of new quality productive forces. Please deliberate.

The development of new quality productive forces is a major strategic decision made by the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, reflecting a profound insight into the complex domestic and international environment facing China, a deep understanding of the phased characteristics and laws of China’s economic and social development, and an accurate grasp of the trends of the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation. Since the 20^th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has delivered a series of important statements on the theory and practice, methods and pathways for developing new quality productive forces, providing fundamental guidance and a roadmap for action. The Party Central Committee and the State Council have strengthened top-level design and made systematic arrangements for developing new quality productive forces as suited to local conditions. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has attached great importance to this work, providing careful guidance and strong support through means such as enacting or amending legislation and overseeing the handling of key proposals [by NPC deputies or CPPCC members]. All regions and departments have conscientiously implemented the decisions of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, carefully listened to the opinions and suggestions of deputies to the National People’s Congress, and vigorously promoted the steady growth of new quality productive forces.

I. Main Progress and Achievements

(1) The effectiveness of sci-tech innovation continues to improve, and the results of innovation-driven development are increasingly evident.

The system for sci-tech innovation has been steadily strengthened. The national laboratory system is advancing, with national-level innovation platforms and bases being optimized and consolidated. Beijing, Shanghai, and the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area have made remarkable progress in building international sci-tech innovation centers, all ranking among the top five in the 2024 Global Science and Technology Cluster Ranking. Management of major sci-tech infrastructure across its full life cycle has been enhanced, with 77 facilities laid out and 42 already operational. Leading sci-tech enterprises and specialized, sophisticated, and innovative small and medium-sized firms are being cultivated and expanded, with enterprises playing an increasingly central role in innovation.

Major scientific and technological breakthroughs are emerging. The Sci-Tech Innovation 2030 Major Projects and subsequent state sci-tech megaprojects have been comprehensively launched, producing a number of landmark results. The Dream deep-sea drilling vessel was completed and commissioned; the Striver manned submersible achieved record-breaking deep dives; the third-generation homegrown superconducting quantum computer Origin Wukong went online; and a 300-megawatt-class F-type heavy-duty gas turbine completed its first full-load test.

Progress has also been made in tackling critical “bottleneck” technologies. A nationwide effort has been mobilized to overcome key technical hurdles, with breakthroughs in several major constraints. The industrial chain for integrated circuit design, manufacturing, and packaging and testing has been further strengthened. In 2024, China’s integrated circuit output grew by 22.2%, with exports exceeding 1.1 trillion yuan, both record highs. Domestically developed high-end equipment such as high-horsepower continuously variable transmission tractors and large LNG carriers have been put into service. The C919 large passenger aircraft has entered full operation across the three major airlines, with cumulative passenger numbers exceeding 2 million.

(2) Sci-tech innovation and industrial innovation are deeply integrated, accelerating the building of a modern industrial system.

The transformation and upgrading of traditional industries is picking up pace. The 2024 Guiding Catalogue for Industrial Structure Adjustment was implemented to accelerate the high-end, intelligent, and green transformation of traditional industries. The smart manufacturing program has been advanced, with China accounting for more than 50% of global annual industrial robot installations. The Manufacturing Excellence and Quality Program is helping traditional industries expand product varieties, improve quality, and build brands. The national modern agricultural industry technology system has been strengthened, with the comprehensive mechanization rate for crop cultivation, planting, and harvesting exceeding 75%.

Emerging industries are developing rapidly. Strategic emerging industries are being promoted in integrated clusters. In 2024, the value-added of high-tech manufacturing enterprises above a designated size grew by 8.9% year-on-year, accounting for 16.3% of all large-scale industry. Annual production of new energy vehicles surpassed 13 million units, with China ranking first globally in production and sales for ten consecutive years. Innovation in pharmaceuticals is supported across the full chain, with the number of drugs under research and new drug approvals among the highest worldwide. Large-scale application of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is accelerating, with coverage exceeding 90% in transport, natural resources, emergency response, and other key areas.

Future industries are being proactively laid out. Top-level design for industries such as artificial intelligence, biomanufacturing, and quantum technology has been strengthened, with coordination mechanisms established. The “Future Industry Launch” initiative has been carried out for central state-owned enterprises. The “AI+” initiative is being fully implemented to empower a wide range of industries. Mechanisms for growth in future industry investment are being established, with a national venture capital guidance fund set up.

The digital economy is booming. The “Data Elements ×” initiative has been rolled out, cultivating a unified national data market. The “Eastern Data, Western Computing” project is advancing, supporting the construction of a nationwide integrated computing power network, now the world’s second largest. In 2024, the value-added of core digital economy industries accounted for about 10% of GDP.

(3) Green and low-carbon development has advanced in depth, accelerating the transformation of economic and social development.

The policy system for green development has been steadily improved. Opinions on accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development have been issued, forming a comprehensive “1+N” policy framework for peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality. Systems for carbon emission statistics and accounting, budget management, and standard measurement have been enhanced. A national voluntary greenhouse gas emissions trading market has been launched, and pilot programs for peaking carbon emissions have been promoted. As of April 2025, the national carbon emissions trading market had recorded a cumulative transaction volume of 640 million tons of allowances, with a total value of 44.05 billion yuan.

Green transformation in key sectors has been steadily advanced. The 2024 Catalogue for Guiding the Green and Low-Carbon Transformation of Industries has been implemented, along with the release of 112 green technologies and 147 demonstration projects of advanced green and low-carbon technologies. Support for large-scale equipment renewal and consumer goods replacement has been strengthened, promoting the adoption of efficient and energy-saving equipment and products. Special campaigns for energy conservation and carbon reduction, as well as ultra-low emission upgrades, have been implemented in key industries such as steel and cement. In 2024, China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP dropped by more than 3%.

The transition to green and low-carbon energy has accelerated. Efforts to improve the clean and efficient use of fossil energy have continued. China has built the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable energy system, with non-fossil energy accounting for 19.8% of consumption. In 2024, ultra-high-voltage direct current transmission channels delivered more than 400 billion kilowatt-hours of green electricity. China supplied 80% of the world’s photovoltaic modules and 70% of key wind power components.

(4) Reform of systems and mechanisms has been steadily advanced, optimizing the innovation ecosystem.

A high-standard market system is being built more quickly. Market access rules have been improved, with a series of systemic and breakthrough measures introduced to ease access and eliminate unreasonable barriers that restrict the development of new technologies, products, business models, and industries.

Reform of market-based allocation of production factors has advanced in a coordinated way. Progress has been made in labor, capital, technology, and data markets, while a financial services system supporting sci-tech and industrial innovation has been strengthened. By the end of 2024, outstanding loans to high-tech enterprises reached 15.2 trillion yuan, up 13.8% year-on-year.

High-level opening-up continues to deepen. China has signed Belt and Road cooperation documents with more than 150 countries and over 30 international organizations. A new action plan has been introduced to advance high-level opening-up and attract and utilize foreign investment. The Belt and Road Sci-Tech Innovation Action Plan has been continuously implemented, further integrating China into global innovation networks.

(5) Education, sci-tech, and talent development have been advanced in an integrated way, with a steadily growing pool of high-quality talent.

The training system integrating science and education has improved. Adjustments and improvements to higher education disciplines and specialties have been promoted, with new programs established in urgently needed fields such as integrated circuits, life and health sciences, and quantum science. The National Strategy for Cultivating Top Talent in Basic Disciplines has been implemented, with 288 training bases established across 77 universities. Efforts have been made to cultivate globally minded, international talent, with more than 1,600 cooperative institutions and programs established at the undergraduate level and above.

The mechanism for integrating industry and education has been further improved. A pilot program has established 139 specialized colleges, such as modern industry colleges and future technology colleges, while 45 national platforms for industry–education integration and innovation have been laid out in key areas such as integrated circuits, artificial intelligence, and biological breeding.

The development of professional and highly skilled personnel has accelerated, with the total number of skilled workers exceeding 60 million nationwide. Mechanisms to unleash talent vitality are being strengthened. Reforms to the classification of sci-tech personnel have advanced, with new standards for professional title evaluation and measures supporting enterprise-led skills evaluation. Pilot reforms of salary systems in universities and research institutes are under way, along with policies to incentivize remuneration in public-service institutions for high-level talent and in state-owned enterprises for major sci-tech innovations.

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II. Challenges and Opportunities in Developing New Quality Productive Forces

At present, global sci-tech innovation is entering an unprecedentedly intensive and active period. A new round of sci-tech revolution and industrial transformation is reshaping the global innovation landscape and restructuring the world economy. At the same time, major changes unseen in a century are accelerating, and factors of instability and uncertainty are increasing significantly, creating a more complex and challenging environment for the development of new quality productive forces in China.

First, competition in sci-tech innovation is becoming increasingly fierce, and the supply of high-quality science and technology needs to be strengthened. High-tech fields have become the frontier and main battlefield of international competition. At the same time, China’s capacity for original basic research and disruptive technological innovation remains weak, and support mechanisms are still incomplete.

Second, there are weaknesses in key sectors and critical links, and industrial innovation capacity needs to be improved. Dependence on others for core technologies in areas such as integrated circuits and industrial machine tools remains pronounced. Some industries face phased and structural supply-demand imbalances, resulting in “involution-style” competition.

Third, the tasks of peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality are daunting, and the comprehensive policy framework for green transformation needs to be improved. China’s energy consumption is still growing rapidly, and the pressure of balancing energy security with the energy transition has increased. Certain energy-intensive and high-emission industries remain locked into path-dependent development models, and the standards system for green and low-carbon development requires faster progress.

Fourth, the smooth flow of production factors still faces obstacles, and the mechanisms for stimulating innovation vitality need to be strengthened. Financial support for sci-tech and industrial innovation is insufficient. New technologies, products, business models, and industries are placing higher demands on regulatory rules and standards.

Fifth, the quality and effectiveness of talent cultivation remain inadequate, and the virtuous cycle among education, science, and talent needs strengthening. The mismatch between talent supply and the needs of science, technology, and industrial development remains prominent. Universities, research institutions, and enterprises have not yet fully formed synergy in talent cultivation.

At the same time as confronting these challenges, we must strengthen our confidence in development and be adept at seizing opportunities. China has a solid foundation and many favorable conditions for developing new quality productive forces.

First, we have notable institutional advantages. The socialist system’s ability to mobilize resources for major undertakings continues to show its strengths. More than 300 major reform measures adopted at the 20^th Central Committee’s Third Plenum are being accelerated, providing a strong guarantee for unleashing new drivers of the development of new quality productive forces.

Second, we have a strong industrial foundation. China is the only country in the world with all the industrial categories classified by the United Nations, and has ranked first in the world in manufacturing output for 15 consecutive years. Of the world’s 500 major industrial products, China leads in output for more than 220 of them.

Third, we have a vast market. With a population of more than 1.4 billion, including more than 400 million people in the middle-income group, China is the world’s most promising consumer market. In 2024, domestic demand contributed 69.7% of economic growth, continuing to serve as the main driver of growth.

Fourth, we have abundant human resources. More than 5 million college graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics [STEM] graduate each year in China, the most in the world. China has led the world for years in full-time equivalent research and development personnel.

In sum, while the development of new quality productive forces in China faces new risks and challenges, it also presents new opportunities and space for growth. Under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, we have the foundation, conditions, confidence, and capability to accelerate the cultivation and expansion of new quality productive forces and unleash stronger momentum for high-quality development.

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III. Key Tasks to Further Promote the Development of New Quality Productive Forces

Next, guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, we will fully implement the principles of the 20^th Party Congress and the Second and Third Plenums of the 20^th Central Committee. We will advance innovation in science and technology, industry, development models, systems and mechanisms, and talent management mechanisms, promoting the faster growth of new quality productive forces.

(1) Vigorously advance sci-tech innovation and accelerate revolutionary breakthroughs in technology.

We will strengthen coordination in the allocation of sci-tech resources, explore the establishment of full-process evaluation mechanisms for sci-tech projects, and enhance the effectiveness of sci-tech investment and the transformation of outcomes. Major science and technology projects will be advanced and laid out proactively. Investment in basic research will be increased, with mechanisms combining competitive and stable support improved, and the organization of basic research enhanced.

The national strategic sci-tech strength will be reinforced. The strategic leading role of the national laboratory system will be enhanced, the capacity of national research institutions to undertake breakthroughs and provide foundational support will be improved, the ability of top research universities to conduct basic research and train talent will be consolidated, and the original innovation and global competitiveness of leading technology enterprises will be strengthened.

Infrastructure and conditions for science and technology will be enhanced, with systematic promotion of major sci-tech infrastructure projects. The layout of national sci-tech innovation platforms and bases will continue to be optimized. All parties will be mobilized to decisively win the battle to overcome key core technologies. Enterprises will be firmly established as the main actors in innovation through institutional arrangements, with full implementation of the R&D expense deduction system. Deeper integration of industry, academia, and research under enterprise leadership will be promoted, supporting enterprises in participating in national decision-making on sci-tech innovation and undertaking major sci-tech projects.

(2) Promote industrial innovation through sci-tech innovation, driving deep transformation and upgrading.

We will advance major technological transformation and large-scale equipment renewal in manufacturing. Projects for digital transformation and smart manufacturing will continue, accelerating the “intelligent and digital” transformation of traditional industries. Actions to raise grain production capacity by 100 billion jin, revitalize the seed industry, and develop smart agriculture will be advanced, along with new models such as agricultural factories.

Pilot programs for the integration of advanced manufacturing and modern services will deepen, accelerating the digitalization, standardization, and branding of services. Structural contradictions in key industries will be actively addressed, and “involution-style” competition rectified in a comprehensive manner.

National programs to develop clusters of strategic emerging industries will continue, along with initiatives to cultivate emerging industries and create new growth drivers. Large-scale demonstration projects for applying new technologies, products, and scenarios will be launched, accelerating the cultivation of future industries such as biomanufacturing, quantum technology, and embodied intelligence. The application of AI based on domestically developed large models will be advanced across industries, cultivating and promoting high-value application scenarios.

(3) Advance innovation in development models and accelerate the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development.

We will accelerate the establishment of a dual-control system for carbon emissions, and introduce comprehensive evaluation and assessment methods for carbon peaking and neutrality. Mechanisms to realize the value of ecological products will be improved, along with a unified national green certificate market.

Demonstration projects for advanced green and low-carbon technologies will be expanded. Energy-saving, pollution-reduction, and carbon-reduction upgrades will be supported in key sectors such as steel, coking, non-ferrous metals, and petrochemicals, along with renewal of energy-saving and pollution-control equipment. Clean energy will be phased in to replace coal facilities in an orderly manner, with priority given to eliminating dispersed coal use.

The development and integration of new energy sources will be coordinated, with construction accelerated for major hydropower projects, desert-based renewable energy bases, offshore wind farms, and other clean energy bases. Nuclear power will be developed actively, safely, and in an orderly manner. Distributed energy will be developed based on local conditions. The dispatching system for new energy storage will continue to be improved.

Policies for large-scale equipment renewal and consumer goods replacement will be expanded and upgraded, further increasing the supply and consumption of green products.

(4) Steadily advance institutional and mechanism innovation to promote innovative allocation of production factors.

Comprehensive pilot reforms for market-based allocation of factors will be fully advanced. Fundamental systems for data property rights, circulation and trading, and income distribution will be improved. Rules for secure governance of data circulation will be refined and implemented, with regulated cross-border flows of data promoted.

Universities and research institutes will be encouraged to license sci-tech achievements to medium-sized, small, and micro enterprises on a “use first, pay later” basis. Reforms on the ownership and separate management of job-related sci-tech achievements will be promoted. A more efficient comprehensive system for intellectual property management will be established, and punitive damages systems improved.

A multi-level financial services system for science and technology will be improved. Reforms of the STAR Market and ChiNext will be deepened, while a “science and technology board” in the bond market will be accelerated. Venture capital will be actively developed. The Catalogue of Industries Encouraging Foreign Investment will be expanded, with full implementation of national treatment for foreign enterprises. Outbound investment will be guided toward healthy, safe, and orderly development, and international cooperation on industrial and supply chains optimized.

(5) Deepen innovation in talent systems to build a high-level, innovative workforce.

Education, science and technology, and talent will be advanced in an integrated way. Relying on major tasks and key platforms, we will train and develop strategic scientists, top sci-tech leaders and teams, and outstanding engineers. Mechanisms for early identification and cultivation of top innovative talent will be explored. Adjustments to academic disciplines and programs in universities will be improved, and urgently needed talent in key areas cultivated.

The integrated model of academic and vocational education for training skilled talent will be fully advanced, promoting the integration of vocational and general education, as well as industry and education. Channels for personnel exchange among universities, research institutes, and enterprises will be opened, promoting joint training and exchange of talent.

Reforms of talent classification and the system of “title-based” evaluations will be deepened, with evaluation systems oriented toward innovation capacity, quality, effectiveness, and contribution. Service systems covering all returning overseas students will be improved. Pilot programs for high-skilled immigration will be explored, and services for foreign professionals optimized, accelerating the creation of a globally competitive talent system.

We will continue to study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important statements and instructions on developing new quality productive forces, fully implement the decisions of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, and under the oversight and support of the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee, accelerate the implementation of all relevant policies and measures. This will better promote the development of new quality productive forces and provide powerful momentum for Chinese modernization.

On June 25, 2018, about four months before NPC Observer’s second anniversary, we published what I consider one of the most important pieces we’ve ever produced: a profile of the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) [法制工作委员会]. Today, I’m pleased to announce that we’ve just completed the article’s second major update, the first since 2021. For those unfamiliar with the LAC, here’s how the post now begins:

The Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) under China’s national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC), is such a unique institution that one can hardly find an equivalent in another jurisdiction. Staffed primarily by unelected and unidentified members, the LAC works mostly behind closed doors, although recently it has become much more visible in the public eye. The LAC’s employees outnumber NPCSC members, and unlike the latter, they all work full-time and include more legal experts than the staff of any other NPC body. Their decisions play significant roles throughout the legislative process, from the agenda-setting stage to deliberations—and even after laws are enacted. One Chinese scholar thus aptly dubs the LAC staff “invisible legislators” [隐性立法者]. Some worry that they may have usurped the powers of elected members of the legislature, thus becoming de facto legislators. Below, we provide an overview of the LAC—an essential yet peculiar institution under the Chinese legislature—and its roles in the legislative process.

The piece introduces the LAC’s history, structure, and personnel; discusses its legal status within the NPC and the broader legal system; and finally delves into the multifaceted role it plays in the legislative process, focusing on the following seven functions:

• drafting the NPCSC’s legislative plans;

• drafting legislation;

• proposing amendments to pending legislation;

• researching and reviewing the constitutionality of draft laws;

• reviewing the validity of sub-statutory legislation;

• responding to legal inquiries; and

• engaging in public communications.

This update reflects recent statutory changes and other pertinent developments. It draws on new works by Chinese scholars and benefits from several official documents that we obtained during the revision process—documents that, until now, had not been widely publicized. In addition to the constitutional research opinions discussed below, they include:

• 2015 Guidelines for Releasing Draft Laws for Public Comment [向社会公布法律草案征求意见工作规范];

• 2016 Guidelines for Gathering and Assessing Legislative Projects [立法项目征集和论证工作规范]; and

• 2020 Working Rules of the NPCSC Party Group [中共全国人大常委会党组工作规则] (I’m still working on a translation).

In this newsletter, I’ve reproduced three sections of the article that were the most heavily revised in this update.1 They address, respectively, the LAC’s evolving relationship with other state organs; its ex ante constitutional review of draft laws; and its role as the legislature’s spokesperson.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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Not Just a Legislative Service Agency?

The LAC is a ministerial-level body under the NPCSC. It is commonly characterized as a “working body” [工作机构] of the NPCSC. (The other working bodies are the NPCSC’s Budgetary Affairs Commission, Deputy Affairs Commission, as well as Hong Kong and Macao SAR Basic Law Committees). The late Professor Cai Dingjian [蔡定剑], a leading authority on the NPC, explains:

A working body can be considered a type of semi-functional body [半职能机构]: it can exercise certain statutory authorities, but cannot, in its own name, issue enforceable [执行性的] documents, directives, or orders; its role is to provide services to functional bodies [职能机构] [such as the legislature itself]. Thus, in essence, it is also a kind of service body.

In other words, the LAC is traditionally considered a professional bureaucracy under the NPCSC with only support functions. It has no independent legislative authority and, as Chinese scholars argue, its actions should not have any external legal effect.

But recent developments in the system of “recording and review” (R&R) [备案审查] have begun to challenge that traditional view. R&R, in short, is a process whereby the LAC reviews (on the NPCSC’s behalf) the legislation of other state organs—including the State Council and local legislatures—for inconsistency with the Constitution, national law, or central policy. Since 2015, the Legislation Law [立法法] has authorized it to issue “research opinions” [研究意见] to the relevant organs, urging them to correct problems in their legislation. (In 2023, these opinions were upgraded to the more authoritative-sounding “review opinions” [审查意见].) No one disputes that such opinions do not bind other state organs as a matter of law: If an organ refuses to amend or repeal a problematic document, the LAC by itself cannot order it to do so, but will have to request the NPCSC to annul the document. In practice, however, the LAC’s written opinions have invariably been the final word. Enacting organs have generally chosen to follow them (albeit after some delay in certain cases), whether due to political considerations or the threat of NPCSC action. The effects of the opinions have even “spilled over” beyond specific cases to influence “the exercise of legislative, administrative, and judicial powers” more broadly. For example, a recent empirical study found that, in multiple contract disputes, courts relied on a 2017 LAC opinion rejecting local legislation that had conditioned the final settlement of government-funded construction projects on official audit results.

That said, aside from that (important) aspect of the LAC’s work, the traditional view nonetheless holds today: As we will discuss below, the LAC’s influence on lawmaking is still channeled through the NPC’s internal mechanisms and externalized only via the Council of Chairpersons, the NPC special committees, or the legislature itself.

Reviewing (or Approving?) the Constitutionality of Draft Laws

As part of 2018’s far-reaching state institutional reforms, the former NPC Law Committee was rechristened the Constitution and Law Committee (CLC) [宪法和法律委员会] and assumed new responsibilities over implementing the Constitution, including constitutional interpretation and constitutional review. To help the CLC discharge those duties, the LAC established its newest subdivision—the Office for Constitution [宪法室]—in October 2018. It is now understood that the CLC and the Office for Constitution review the constitutionality of statutes ex ante—that is, before they are enacted—whereas the LAC’s Office for Recording and Reviewing Regulations, as part of R&R, conducts ex post constitutional review of legal instruments other than statutes. (Enacted statutes are not formally subject to constitutional review.)

One of the earliest examples of its ex ante constitutional review concerned the 2019 Foreign Investment Law [外商投资法]. This statute regulates investments by foreign “natural persons, enterprises, or other organizations,” whereas Article 18 of the 1982 Constitution permits only “foreign enterprises and other economic organizations or individuals” to invest in China (our emphasis). In an article published after the Law’s passage, the Office for Constitution endorsed its broader scope. (LAC officials would later describe the article as an “interpretive research opinion” [解释性研究意见], the first publicly available document of this kind.) As it explains, Article 18’s terminology “reflected the social realities and understanding of the time” (i.e., before China’s market-oriented economic reforms), but its underlying “spirit” was clear—that China pursues a policy of opening to the outside world. Indeed, as China embraces foreign investments, the article continues, the meaning of that constitutional provision has “evolved gradually and become more expansive.” Hence, it was “inadvisable” to require the statutory language to match the constitutional text in this case, and the Foreign Investment Law’s “updated” terminology was consistent with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution.

The LAC took another historic step in ex ante review two years later. In July 2021, the State Council proposed amendments to the Population and Family Planning Law [人口与计划生育法] to codify the Party’s earlier decision to adopt a three-child policy and accompanying measures to boost childbirths. Some questioned, however, whether the Law so amended would still comply with China’s constitutional policy of “promoting family planning [计划生育] so that population growth is consistent with economic and social development plans” (PRC Const. art. 25)—for “family planning” undoubtedly referred to the one-child policy in 1982. The LAC defended the proposal’s constitutionality in a research opinion—also subsequently characterized as a “report on constitutional review and research” [合宪性审查研究报告]—that was distributed to lawmakers during deliberations—apparently a first in NPCSC history.2 After reviewing China’s evolving family planning policy, the opinion concludes that the constitutional provisions on “family planning” are “inclusive and adaptable” enough to encompass the birth policies implemented at different periods . The proposed three-child policy and accompanying reforms, too, would “conform to the provisions and spirit of the Constitution.” (Identical language made it into the CLC’s legislative report on the amendments.)

Officials claim to have reviewed the constitutionality of every legislative bill since the start of the 13^th NPC in March 2018. In March 2023, the NPC amended the Legislation Law to formalize this process, requiring the CLC to explain “the issues of constitutionality involved” in legislative bills in its reports to the legislature. Later, the Office for Constitution, in its 2023 report on constitutional enforcement, disclosed the following workflow for ex ante constitutional review:

1. When an LAC executive meeting discusses a draft law, it will hear the Office for Constitution’s “research opinion” on the constitutionality of the draft.

2. When the CLC meets to conduct unified deliberations on a draft law, it will also hear the LAC’s report on “research opinion on constitutional and Constitution-related issues” in the draft and then explain the relevant issues in the appropriate legislative document.

3. When the NPC or NPCSC discusses a draft law, some “constitutional review opinions” may be distributed to lawmakers as references.

As of July 2025, the LAC has released twelve research opinions on constitutional and Constitution-related issues—three from 2022 and seven from 2023, in addition to the two just discussed—likely a fraction of what it has produced internally. And unlike the last two, most of the other opinions did not address discernible, specific constitutional disputes. Rather, they tend to “engage in routine examination of the entire draft law’s constitutionality” by explaining how the law specifically implements relevant constitutional provisions and (in some cases) how the Constitution “regulates” or “guides” the particular legislative endeavor.

Those observations echo the following three asymmetries that Professor Huang Mingtao [黄明涛] recently articulated to encapsulate the current state of the LAC’s routine ex ante constitutional review, now seven years in. Mere citations to the Constitution have outnumbered determinations of the constitutionality of specific provisions. Formal assessments of constitutionality (focusing on textual consistency) have been more common than substantive ones (looking beyond the text). And ex ante review has more often facilitated the legislative process than obstructed it (if at all). While Huang did not benefit from the LAC’s 2022 and 2023 research opinions—they were published only in the expensive and hard-to-obtain NPC Yearbooks and did not become widely available until December 20243—those documents, in our view, further corroborate his findings.

Stepping into the Spotlight

In mid-2019, with the Central Propaganda Department’s blessing, the LAC established a new office of the spokespersons within its Research Office to “strengthen ties with the news media and better inform the public about legislative work.” The heads of the Research Office and the Legislative Planning Office have been serving as co-spokespersons. Their office can be reached at +86-10 6309-8334.

Under its current practice, the LAC generally holds a press conference a few days before each regular NPCSC session. The press conferences follow a largely fixed format. A spokesperson first previews the upcoming session, providing short summaries of selected bills on the agenda. He then gives updates on recent public consultations on draft laws, in fulfillment of the legislature’s statutory duty to disclose such information (see Legislation Law art. 40). The spokesperson typically reveals how many people have commented on a draft (online and offline) and the total number of comments received, in addition to offering terse—if not perfunctory—summaries of the comments. Since December 2022, the spokesperson has also made a point of naming specific citizens, NPC delegates, or grassroots legislative outreach offices that have provided valuable input. Finally, the spokesperson answers questions from the media—mostly pre-arranged, it appears—that allow him to discuss the relevant bills in greater detail, especially those that concern hot-button social issues. (Overseas media outlets have not asked a question since October 2019; it is unclear if they still have access.)

These events offer the public their only opportunity to learn about the comments submitted on draft legislation and, occasionally, about authorities’ responses as well. In 2019, for example, the spokespersons twice acknowledged public comments in support of marriage equality. Although they ruled out the possibility of legalizing same-sex marriage in China in the near future—indeed, the 2020 Civil Code [民法典] did not do so—they were among the very few (if not the only) high-level Chinese officials who have publicly addressed the issue.

Compared to the prior practice of revealing a draft’s contents only during or after a legislative session, the LAC’s pressers have brought the disclosure forward by several days. This shift, one scholar argues, has given the public “the time and opportunity” to follow and influence legislative deliberations. On the flip slide, however, the LAC’s pressers have, for the most part, supplanted the NPCSC General Office’s traditional post-session press conferences, where the legislature would routinely disclose vote tallies on newly enacted laws and invite senior officials to discuss them in depth. In their present format, the LAC’s press conferences cannot perform this important function.

Beyond regular pressers, the spokespersons’ office has employed other forms of media engagements to provide updates on enacted legislation, discuss the legislature’s recent work in specific areas, and explain the legal issues raised by current events—all part of its broader effort to “popularize the law.” For instance, after the NPC adopted Hong Kong–related decisions in May 2020 and March 2021, a spokesperson issued separate statements explaining their significance and briefly previewing next steps. On National Security Education Day in 2021, another spokesperson introduced recent national security legislation in an interview with the People’s Daily. And perhaps the best-known media appearances by the spokespersons came in spring 2020, when they gave multiple press interviews to answer legal questions arising from efforts to contain COVID-19. In one interview, a spokesperson emphasized that local governments must employ measures that “maximally” protect the rights and interests of citizens and other private entities and must not “exceed the necessary limits”—a statement that citizens later recirculated online to protest the “hard isolation” imposed during Shanghai’s spring 2022 lockdown.

The spokespersons have also issued ad hoc statements to convey the legislature’s stance on issues of public concern. They most notably did so in November 2019, during the Hong Kong anti–extradition bill protests. After a Hong Kong court struck down part of a local statute that the government had invoked to ban masks during the protests, a spokesperson issued a stern statement criticizing the ruling. He warned that the ruling had intruded on the NPCSC’s exclusive authority to interpret the Hong Kong Basic Law and threatened NPCSC intervention. (None materialized, however, likely because the statute was upheld on appeal.) More recently, on September 11, 2023, the office issued a public statement responding to strong backlash against a proposed change to the Public Security Administration Punishments Law [治安管理处罚法] that would have punished clothing or speech deemed “detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese people or hurtful to the feelings of the Chinese people.” The statement said the LAC “sincerely welcomed” public input on the bill—which, by the end of the monthlong consultation on September 30, had received almost 126,000 comments—and pledged to “carefully sort out and study” the comments and suggest improvements. The controversial language was dropped from subsequent drafts of the bill.

Thanks for reading! If you haven’t already, I encourage you to read the full profile.

As I’ve previously announced, I’ll publish a double issue for June and July 2025 sometime in August. Until then!

Before getting to today’s topic, here’s a quick scheduling note: Instead of separate recaps for June and July, I’ll publish a combined double issue. I’m still writing up one of the main developments from June, while also working on various other writing projects—some of which I hope to share with you soon—and preparing for the fall semester. Thank you for your patience!

Now, back to the special issue. —Changhao

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Today (July 24, 2025), China’s National Development and Reform Commission and State Administration for Market Regulation released draft amendments to the Pricing Law [价格法] for public comment through August 23. They also published an accompanying explanation that briefly describes the rationales for and the general approach to amending the Law, the drafting process, and its key provisions. (Xinhua also published a Q&A with responsible officials from the two agencies that is basically a shorter version of the explanation.)

Although updating the Pricing Law is a lower-priority (Category II) project in the current NPCSC’s five-year legislative plan, it was not listed in the NPCSC’s or the State Council’s 2025 legislative plan. We thus suspect it has since been prioritized, especially given the central leadership’s recent call to “eliminate disorderly low-price competition.” Indeed, the explanation specifically notes that the two agencies opted for an “amendment” [修正案]—rather than a comprehensive “revision” [修订]—to focus on “provisions that urgently need to be updated and improved and that enjoy broad consensus among all parties.”1

Given the potential interest in this legislation, we’ve decided to post an edited machine translation of (excerpts from) the explanation and of the provision defining “unfair pricing practices,” a core focus of the amendments. We have also prepared a comparison chart (in Chinese) for the draft amendments. (In case you aren’t aware, we track every draft law that a State Council agency has put out for public comment.)

It is probable that the State Council will finalize the draft and submit it to the NPCSC for review within the year.

Drafting Explanation for the Draft Amendment to the PRC Pricing Law (Draft for the Solicitation of Comment)

[Introduction omitted.]

I. Necessity of the Revision

Since it took effect in 1998, the Pricing Law has played an important role in guiding the optimal allocation of resources, promoting the reasonable movement of prices, and protecting the lawful rights and interests of consumers and business operators. With economic and social development and the deepening of price reform, certain provisions of the Pricing Law need to be updated and improved.

First, the need to adapt to new situation and new changes. The situation currently facing pricing work has undergone significant changes. The prices of the vast majority of goods and services are now formed by the market, new economies, business forms, and models continue to emerge, and disorderly low-price competition in some industries has become prominent, placing new demands on price control and regulation.

Second, the need to improve the level of law-based price governance. In recent years, the meaning, methods, and means of pricing work have changed, so consistent with the requirements of law-based administration, it is necessary to refine, in statutory form, the responsibilities and work procedures for price management. And, with the growth of the internet, the government has more channels to solicit opinions, so it is necessary to diversify such channels to better promote public participation and make government pricing sounder and more standardized.

Third, the need to consolidate the practical experience of price reform. As pricing reform deepens, government pricing mechanisms continue to improve, and a relatively sound system of pricing and cost supervision and review [成本监审] has been established; and certain items have shifted from setting specific price levels to formulating pricing mechanisms, allowing prices to reflect the changes in market supply and demand more flexibly. The outcomes of the relevant reforms need to be consolidated through statutory amendments, so as to achieve an organic alignment between legislation and reform.

II. Revision Process. . . .

III. Overall Approach to the Revision

The revision of the Pricing Law follows these principles: First, remain oriented toward serving the overall situation. Guided by the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, [we have] adhered to the direction of reform toward a socialist market economy and provided legal safeguards for deepening pricing reform, strengthening the capacity of price control, and improving the level of price regulation, so as to better serve overall economic and social development.

Second, maintain a problem-oriented approach. In response to the problems that pricing work faces in practice, [we] have focused on key provisions of the Law that no longer meet the new circumstances, new tasks, and new requirements, improved the [relevant] statutory provisions, and strengthened the Law’s applicability and effectiveness.

Third, pursue progress while maintaining stability. On the premise of maintaining the overall stability of the current statutory framework, [we] have advanced the changes in the form of an amendment to build the broadest possible consensus.

IV. Main Contents of the Revision

The Draft Amendment contains 10 articles and mainly covers three aspects:

(1) Improving relevant provisions on government pricing. (1) In light of changes in the methods for managing government pricing, [the draft] clarifies that government-guided prices [政府指导价] are not limited to the form of benchmark prices and their floating ranges [art. 3 as would be amended]. (2) Given the shift in government pricing from setting specific price levels to establishing pricing mechanisms, [the draft] clarifies that pricing authorities may carry out government pricing by formulating pricing mechanisms [art. 21]. (3) Based on recent practice, [the draft] explicitly designates cost supervision and review as an important procedure in government pricing, and further strengthens oversight of the costs used in pricing [arts. 22, 34]. (4) With the development of the internet, the ways in which government solicits opinions have become more diverse, so [the draft] adds new methods for soliciting opinions such as seeking public comment and conducting surveys [art. 23].

(2) Further clarifying the criteria for determining unfair pricing practices [art. 14]. (1) [The draft] improves the criteria for determining low-cost predatory pricing [低价倾销] to regulate the market price order and address “involution-style” competition. (2) [The draft] improves the criteria for determining other unfair pricing practices such as collusive pricing, price gouging, and price discrimination. (3) [The draft] prohibits public utilities, industry associations, and other entities from using their influence or dominant industry positions to force or bundle the sale of goods or the provision of services for payment. (4) [The draft] strengthens the regulation of the pricing practices of the operators of business premises.

[Article 14 is translated below in full, with the proposed changes marked (additions in bold, deletions struck through). Under Article 40, a violation of Article 14 will lead to an order to make corrections, the forfeiture of unlawful gains, and an optional fine of up to five times the unlawful gains. A serious violation will also lead to business suspension or the revocation of business license.]

Article 14: Business operators must not engage in the following unfair pricing practices:

(1) colluding with each other to manipulate market prices, thereby harming the lawful rights and interests of other business operators or consumers;

(2) except for lawfully reducing prices to dispose of perishable goods, seasonal goods, or overstocked goods, or when there are legitimate reasons to reduce service prices, engaging in below-cost predatory pricing to squeeze out competitors or monopolize the market, or forcing other business operators to engage in below-cost predatory pricing according to their pricing rules, thereby disrupting the normal order of business operations and harming state interests or the lawful rights and interests of other business operators;

(3) driving up the prices of goods or services or pushing the prices of goods to rise excessively by means such as fabricating and spreading information about price increases, cornering the market, or, without legitimate reasons, substantially increasing prices far beyond costs;

(4) using false or misleading pricing methods to induce consumers or other business operators to trade with them;

(5) providing the same goods or services but practicing price discrimination against consumers or other business operators with the same trading conditions;

(6) using methods such as raising or lowering product grades, splitting service items, or reducing service content to purchase or sell goods or provide services, thereby covertly raising or lowering prices;

(7) gaining exorbitant profits in violation of laws or regulations;

(8) using influence, dominant industry positions, or similar means to force or bundle the sale of goods or the provision of services for payment;

(9) charging unreasonable fees to business operators within business premises, or imposing unreasonable restrictions on, or attaching unreasonable conditions to, their transaction prices;

(10) other unfair pricing practices prohibited by laws and administrative regulations.

Business operators must not use data and algorithms, technologies, or rules to engage in the unfair pricing practices prescribed in the previous paragraph.

(3) Improving legal liabilities for pricing violations. (1) [The draft] adjusts the penalty provisions for business operators’ unfair pricing practices and increases the penalties for business operators who violate the rules on clearly marking prices [art. 42]. (2) [The draft] specifies the legal liability for business operators who refuse to provide or who provide false materials required for cost supervision and review or investigations [art. 44].

In addition, [the draft] has made a few minor textual adjustments.

Thank you for reading! The double issue for June and July will hopefully drop soon.

On June 5, 2025, China’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) released for public comment through July 5 a draft revision (Draft Revision) to the State Council’s Regulations on the Procedures for Formulating Administrative Regulations (Procedures) [行政法规制定程序条例]. My colleague Jamie Horsley has prepared an annotated translation here, and I’ve made a comparison chart (in Chinese) here.

Today, I’d like to discuss the Draft Revision for two reasons. First, while my research focuses on the NPC, I’m interested in China’s legislative process writ large. And second, the Procedures in fact relate to NPC lawmaking, for they also, to the extent relevant, apply to the preparation of draft laws by State Council agencies. Before delving into the draft, I’ll start with some background.

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State Council’s Regulation-Making Procedures

In China’s complex legislative hierarchy, “administrative regulations” [行政法规] are the category of legislation that ranks just below the laws enacted by the national legislature. For our purposes,1 a legal document is an administrative regulation if and only if it is promulgated by an “Order of the State Council” [国务院令] signed by the Premier. (Administrative regulations therefore don’t encompass anything issued by State Council agencies, including what’s called “departmental rules” [部门规章].) The latest administrative regulation is the Provisions on the Submission of Tax-Related Information by Internet Platform Enterprises [互联网平台企业涉税信息报送规定] issued last week.

Under the Procedures (as last amended in 2017), the process for formulating an administrative regulation has four major steps. Here’s a quick overview:

1. Project initiation. The process begins with formally adding a proposed regulation to the State Council’s legislative agenda—or, in the Procedures’ terminology, “initiating a project” [立项]. State Council agencies may submit proposals to the State Council, and the MOJ—referred to in the Procedures as the “State Council’s legislative affairs body” [国务院法制机构]—may also seek public input (as it most recently did in October 2024). The MOJ will then draft the State Council’s annual legislative plans based on received proposals for the leadership’s approval.

2. Agency drafting. This step is self-explanatory. The Procedures outline the general substantive and procedural requirements that a drafting agency ought to follow. In particular, the Procedures require the drafting agency to solicit public comment on a draft regulation generally for at least 30 days, unless the State Council decides against consultation. The drafting process results in a “draft for review” [送审稿] submitted to the State Council.

3. MOJ review. In practice, the MOJ conducts review on the State Council’s behalf. The Procedures outline several key criteria for this review, such as whether the draft “strictly implements” the Party’s decisions, conforms to the Constitution and laws, or is consistent with existing administrative regulations. The Procedures also list several substantive and procedural grounds on which the MOJ may table a draft or return it to the drafting agency. Overall, MOJ review amounts to another round of revisions to the draft for review, during which it may again seek public comment. Once the MOJ deems a draft ready, it will transmit it to the State Council leadership for approval.

4. State Council decision. Administrative regulations are usually discussed at an executive meeting of the State Council before the Premier signs off on them. The Procedures allow for a final round of presumably minor changes after executive deliberations, which explains why the Order of the State Council signed by the Premier typically postdates the relevant executive meeting by a few weeks. Some administrative regulations (such as simpler ones) may also be directly approved by the State Council without discussion at an executive meeting.

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Key Changes in the Draft Revision

Because the Draft Revision is, well, still in draft form, here I’ll just focus on the three main themes I’ve identified. For a fuller (if brief) overview of the proposed changes, along with additional policy and institutional background, check out my colleague Jamie Horsley’s post on China Law Translate.

First, the Draft Revision would require administrative regulations to be more responsive to central policies and public concerns. When proposing new projects, State Council agencies must prioritize those that are “of high public concern, urgently needed in practice, and relatively mature in terms of [legislative] conditions,” so long as they align with the Party’s or the State Council’s “major decisions and plans” (art. 8). The Draft Revision would also require the MOJ to work with the relevant agencies to fast-track “important” regulations that are “urgently needed to serve the Party’s and the state’s overall work agenda or eagerly awaited by the people” (art. 12). Further, it aims to improve coordination between the State Council’s policy initiatives and its legislative agenda: When a forthcoming State Council policy document drafted by an agency “involves a legislative project,” the agency must seek the MOJ’s view and ensure the document “connects with” [相衔接] the State Council’s annual legislative plans (art. 13).

Second, the Draft Revision would enhance adherence to the State Council’s annual legislative plans. These plans aren’t binding, and they still wouldn’t be under the Draft Revision. But the draft would introduce new mechanisms to achieve stricter implementation of the plans. For one, it would add two preconditions for including a proposed regulation in an annual legislative plan: (1) the relevant drafting agency must have already submitted a “draft for review” to the State Council (along with required accompanying materials); and (2) there mustn’t be major disagreement among stakeholders over the draft (art. 10, para. 3). In other words, this provision would ensure that the plans list only projects that have proceeded to an advanced stage of drafting and wouldn’t be slowed down by controversy. For another, the Draft Revision would also require a drafting agency to obtain the MOJ’s approval before submitting to the State Council any draft regulation not included in the annual legislative plan (art. 11, para. 4). This would discourage agencies from diverting their attention and resources elsewhere.

Finally, the Draft Revision would require drafting agencies to offer additional justifications for their legislative proposals throughout the process. Under the current Procedures, an agency applying for project initiation must explain the main problems the regulation seeks to address, the relevant Party policies and decisions, and the principal legal schemes it proposes to establish. The Draft Revision would also require the agency to thoroughly assess the project’s “necessity and feasibility” and explain the regulation’s “anticipated effects,” the relevant risk assessments and mitigation measures, and the preparatory work already completed (art. 9). As an agency drafts a regulation, the Draft Revision again directs it to strengthen assessment of the project’s timing and expected impact and to ensure it is consistent with the government’s broader policy priorities (art. 17). And finally, the agency similarly must provide the MOJ with additional information and materials when submitting a draft for review. Beyond the content already mentioned, the agency must explain the draft’s relationship to existing administrative regulations and any proposed changes to administrative licenses or compulsory measures (e.g., property seizures) (art. 20, paras. 2–3). As an enforcement measure, the MOJ is allowed to table a draft or return it to the drafting agency if it finds the supporting information and materials lacking (art. 22(5)).

Again, while the Draft Revision touches on a range of other regulation-making issues, the three sets of changes discussed above stood out to me the most. I plan to revisit the revision once it’s finalized.

Finally, a quick housekeeping note: You may have noticed that I’ve turn on paid subscriptions. I’ve explained why on the newsletter’s revamped “About” page. Essentially, they offer a way for those able and willing to support my work, without anything extra promised in return. This newsletter will stay free for all.

Each issue will start with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage published on our main site, NPC Observer. If, during that month, we have also written posts that aren’t tied to current events, I’ll then provide a round-up in “Non-News of the Month.” Finally, depending on the month and my schedule, I may end an issue with a discussion of an NPC-related topic that is in some way connected to the past month.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Month

On May 1, the Rural Collective Economic Organizations Law [农村集体经济组织法] (adopted on June 28, 2024) and the decision of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) authorizing the State Council to temporarily modify a provision of the Seed Law [种子法] in the Xinjiang Pilot Free Trade Zone (adopted on Apr. 30, 2025) took effect.

On May 20, the Private Economy Promotion Law [民营经济促进法] (adopted on April 30, 2025) took effect.

On May 14, the NPCSC released its 2025 work priorities and 2025 plans for legislative, oversight, and delegates-related work.

I’ve already covered this year’s legislative and oversight plans on the main site. Briefly:

• The NPCSC scheduled 37 legislative projects for review in 2025, including 23 that would be reviewed for the first time. The main themes of this year’s legislation include business and financial regulation, grassroots governance, ideology and ethnic policy, social welfare, public health and safety, environmental and resource protection, and national security.

• The NPCSC will review 36 oversight reports in 2025: 12 periodic reports mostly concerning fiscal and economic matters; 15 non-recurring reports covering topics including “new quality productive forces,” China’s climate change response and “dual carbon” goals, food safety, and gig worker rights; and a few topical research reports touching on diverse issues that won’t be made public.

I didn’t spot anything notable in the NPCSC’s 2025 work priorities except for this sentence: “We will take a coordinated approach to [统筹] revising and improving the foreign-related provisions in relevant laws.” As far as I can tell, this phrasing is new. The NPCSC’s 2025 legislative plan, however, still uses the older formulation “[w]e will pay close attention to [注重] refining the foreign-related provisions in relevant laws.” I’m not sure if the use of “统筹” signals a comprehensive review of existing foreign-related statutory provisions, though a general-purpose “legislation clean-up” [法律清理] is now underway, so it’ll be interesting to see its eventual scope.

I’ll return to the 2025 delegates-related work plan below. But to set the stage, let’s first take a quick look at the bills that NPC delegates introduced during the NPC session in March.

2025 NPC Delegate Bills: A First Look

The NPC’s plenary sessions offer its delegates a key annual window to submit “bills” [议案]. Unlike a “suggestion” [建议]—which needs only one signature and is most commonly directed at an administrative agency—a bill must be sponsored by either a delegation or a group of 30 or more delegates, and it calls on the legislature itself to take action. I’ve written about the procedure for processing delegate bills and their role in lawmaking here (or see this newsletter for a shorter version).

In early April, the NPCSC released a list of the bills introduced this year. For each bill, we now know its title, lead sponsor, and total number of sponsors. (For their contents, however, we’ll have to wait until the end of the year, when NPC special committees will report their recommended dispositions to the NPCSC.)

Some stats:

• 269 bills were submitted in March 2025—26 by delegations and 243 by groups of thirty or more delegates. All but one proposed legislation (the sole oversight bill proposed inspecting the enforcement of the National Flag Law [国旗法]).

• Of the 268 legislative bills, 134 proposed new laws, 130 suggested amending existing laws, 1 proposed repealing an existing law, and 3 were codification bills. When grouped by the laws they propose to enact, amend, repeal, or codify, these bills resulted in 145 legislative projects. A bilingual list is available here.

• The 13 projects with the highest number of relevant bills are shown in the table below. All appear in the 14^th NPCSC’s five-year legislative plan except for the proposed Plant Protection Law and changes to the Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Law. Overall, more than 60% of this year’s bills concern legislative projects already in the current NPCSC’s legislative plans.

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Delegate Bills: Quality over Quantity

As mentioned earlier, NPC delegates—nearly 3,000 strong—submitted a total of 269 bills this year. This was the third consecutive year with fewer than 300 bills submitted. Indeed, the drop in delegate bills since 2023 is quite striking (see chart below).1

As the chart illustrates, each NPC’s inaugural session typically sees the fewest bills submitted during its five-year term. The volume of bills then typically picks up the next year, though this hasn’t happened this term—a fact I noted in a previous issue of this newsletter. Now, in the current term’s third year, the number of bills not only didn’t rise but even fell below the 2023 level (albeit by just two bills).

Intrigued by this apparent new normal, I did a bit more research and found some clues in the NPCSC’s annual plans for “delegates-related work” [代表工作], which date back to 2020 and cover efforts to assist delegates in preparing bills and suggestions. In short, the NPCSC appears to have been intentionally limiting the number of delegate bills through new pre-submission quality-control mechanisms.

First, since 2020, the NPCSC has first “explored,” then “implemented,” and is now “improving” a mechanism for communication and coordination between delegates and the relevant governmental bodies before bills and suggestions are submitted. Under this mechanism, the NPCSC “coordinates” with the State Council, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the State Supervision Commission to brief delegates on their work during the past year, report on how they have adopted delegates’ proposals and improved their work, and recommend topics for future proposals. The NPCSC also facilitates delegates’ communication with the relevant government agencies to understand “current policies, work priorities, and prominent issues” and how the latter have handled delegate proposals in the past. The goal is to ensure that bills and suggestions are “more targeted and feasible.” In other words, the legislature now appears to discourage submissions that don’t align with the relevant institution’s priorities and whose proposals are therefore less likely to be adopted.

Second, in 2020, the NPCSC also began efforts to help delegates ensure that their submissions “meet political standards and quality standards” [把好政治关、质量关]—and now “legal standards” [法律关] as well. Since 2023, it appears that the 35 delegations to the NPC have also played a (bigger) role in vetting delegates’ submissions, responsible for “front-end coordination” [前端统筹] and guidance. I take this to mean that at least some submissions deemed politically inappropriate or of lower quality (e.g., because they don’t align with agency priorities or are duplicative) are filtered out early. Pre-submission vetting by delegations isn’t new, but has likely intensified in recent years.

The 2025 delegates-related work plan reiterated these measures and made it explicit that the NPCSC would “place greater emphasis on the quality of bills and suggestions, rather than their quantity.” Consistent with this approach, a legislative official claimed in both 2024 and 2025 that “the quality of this year’s delegate bills has significantly improved.”

The above tentatively explains the decline in delegate bills, but another puzzle remains. As you may have noticed, the work plans always speak of bills and suggestions together, but the volume of suggestions hasn’t declined in tandem and has in fact been trending upward for several terms (see chart below).2 So, despite the work plans’ language, the new vetting mechanisms have affected bills more heavily than suggestions. I surmise that the lower signature threshold for suggestions is a major contributing factor: since delegates don’t seek cosponsors for the vast majority of suggestions, these submissions are likely more difficult to monitor and control.

That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!

For a preview of the NPCSC’s session this month, check out this post. An official announcement is expected next week.

Each issue will start with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage we have published on our main site, NPC Observer. If, during that month, we have also written posts that aren’t tied to current events, I’ll then provide a round-up in “Non-News of the Month.” Finally, depending on the month and my schedule, I may end an issue with discussions of an NPC-related topic that is in some way connected to the past month.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Month

On April 27–30, the 14^th NPCSC met for its fifteenth session, which the Council of Chairpersons convened on April 18. At that meeting, the Council also approved the NPCSC’s 2025 work priorities and plans for legislative, oversight, delegates-related, and foreign-affairs work; all but the foreign-affairs work plan were released on Wednesday, May 13.

At last month’s session, the NPCSC reviewed eight legislative bills and approved three of them.

First, it enacted the Private Economy Promotion Law [民营经济促进法], which took effect on May 20. For those who have missed it, my colleague Jamie Horsley has authored a two-part commentary on the new law. In the first installment on the Law’s December 2024 draft, she concludes that the draft “restates existing policies and legal requirements that have failed to resolve the sector’s legal challenges, emphasizes political correctness, and seems unlikely to succeed on its own to substantially reassure private investors and spark entrepreneurial enthusiasm.” Her follow-up piece for NPC Observer highlights notable new clauses in the Law’s final version and identifies several accountability measures that, if incorporated into the law, could have improved government compliance with it.

Second, the NPCSC revised the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases [传染病防治法], effective September 1. I will return to this law below.

Finally, the NPCSC adopted a decision granting the State Council’s request to suspend Article 31, paragraph 1 of the Seeds Law [种子法] in the China (Xinjiang) Pilot Free Trade Zone for five years, until April 30, 2030. The decision authorizes the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs to delegate its authority under that statutory provision to issue “seed production and operation licenses” to businesses engaged in the import and export of crop seeds to Xinjiang’s provincial agricultural department. The Zone’s founding document, issued in late 2023, listed this pilot program as an initiative the authorities would “explore.”

The NPCSC is seeking public comment on the other bills it reviewed last month. The consultation period will end on June 13 for the draft Ecological and Environmental Code and on May 29 for the other bills:

• draft Atomic Energy Law [原子能法];

• draft revision to the Arbitration Law [仲裁法];

• draft Law on National Development Plans [国家发展规划法];

• draft revision to the Prisons Law [监狱法]; and

• draft Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典].

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Updating the Infectious Diseases Law: Lessons from the Pandemic

China first enacted the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (IDL) in early 1989, following several often-deadly outbreaks across the country in the late 1980s, especially Shanghai’s 1988 Hepatitis A outbreak attributed to the consumption of contaminated raw clams. Until last month, the IDL was only substantially updated once, in August 2004, after the SARS outbreak. In April 2020, about a month after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, the NPCSC included revisions to the IDL in its legislative agenda. The State Council produced an early draft in October 2020 for public comment, though legislative review didn’t begin until three years later and spanned an atypically long 18 months.

I wrote about the bill after the first draft came out in October 2023. As I observed then, the revision “seek[s] to address some of those weaknesses [in China’s public health system exposed by COVID-19] and codify the [epidemic-control] tools that have proven effective in practice.”1 That still holds true. But it’s interesting to see what provisions in that draft that lawmakers, now with some distance from the pandemic, later substantially modified or deleted outright. The following summary therefore builds on and updates my write-up of the October 2023 draft.

Scope of covered diseases. The IDL has always categorized covered diseases into three Classes: A, B, and C, in descending order of severity. Each class includes a list of enumerated diseases. (Class A, for example, includes only plague and cholera.) Previously, an emerging disease wouldn’t trigger a response under the IDL until it was officially classified. To fill this gap, the revision includes “sudden outbreaks of unknown origin [突发原因不明的传染病] and other infectious diseases” within the scope of covered diseases (art. 3, para. 1), along with new provisions on monitoring, reporting, and controlling such outbreaks, as discussed below. In addition, the revision authorizes the State Council to “adjust” the list of Class A diseases—in addition to those in Classes B and C (art. 3, para. 5).

Interagency coordination. Effective epidemic response requires coordination among siloed government institutions. To respond to COVID-19, for example, China established an interagency Joint Control and Prevention Mechanism under the State Council that included officials from 32 institutions as well as its counterparts at local levels. The revision memorializes the role of those “joint prevention and control mechanisms for major epidemics of infectious diseases” in assessing outbreaks and coordinating responses (art. 9, para. 1). Further, the revision clarifies the requirement that government institutions, both across different levels and within the same level, share information related to outbreaks, monitoring, and early warning, including the establishment of an information-sharing mechanism covering at least 12 central civilian and military agencies during an outbreak or epidemic (arts. 55–56).

Infectious disease reporting. After the SARS crisis, China created the world’s largest online direct reporting system for infectious diseases in early 2004. But, in the very early days of COVID-19, key actors in the Hubei public health system either failed to promptly report, or obstructed the reporting of, a new virus to central authorities, thereby delaying efforts to contain its spread. The rest was history. The revision thus aims to improve the direct reporting system in several ways. First, the revised Law elevates online direct reporting into a statutory scheme, while codifying and expanding on existing direct reporting rules (arts. 42, 45). Most notably, it requires that the following be reported within two hours: (1) confirmed or suspected cases of Class A diseases (including any other disease treated as such for prevention and control purposes); (2) emerging infectious diseases or sudden outbreaks of unknown origin; and (3) outbreaks and epidemics of any other infectious disease (art. 45, para. 2). Second, the revision introduces a safe-harbor rule shielding those who (lawfully) report infectious diseases from legal liability, even if it turns out that they sounded false alarms (art. 51, para. 2). Finally, the revision newly prohibits any entity or individual from “interfering with” the reporting of infectious diseases (art. 50) and prescribes attendant penalties for local governments, health and disease-control departments, quasi-governmental centers for disease control (CDCs), medical institutions, and blood banks (arts. 100–01, 103–05).

Epidemic-control measures. The revision maintains the original IDL’s graduated control measures based on a disease’s classification. While medical institutions have some discretion over how they treat and control Class B and C diseases, the IDL mandates certain measures for Class A diseases (arts. 58, 60)—which, again, include any other disease deemed as such for control purposes, such as COVID-19 from early 2020 to early 2023. Confirmed Class A cases and carriers, for instance, must be quarantined for treatment and placed under medical observation (art. 58, para. 1). Because these restrictions implicate individuals’ physical liberty, lawmakers added a provision requiring that affected persons receive written notice of their diagnosis and the measures to be taken, which must not exceed prescribed limits (art. 58, paras. 2–3).

It appears to me that the revision has also instituted a separate tiered framework for responding to infectious disease events based on their severity. This framework distinguishes at least between routine “outbreaks or epidemics” [暴发、流行] and “major epidemics” [重大传染病疫情]—and perhaps “public health emergencies”2 [突发公共卫生事件] as well. Of note, the revision has generally limited the use of the more drastic measures to respond to infectious disease events, and it did so in several ways.

First, some measures previously authorized for all outbreaks are now limited to “major epidemics”—defined as outbreaks that “have caused or may cause serious harm to public life and health” (art. 113(1)). Such measures include what the IDL terms “emergency measures,” such as limiting or prohibiting gatherings, suspending work, businesses, or classes, and sealing off places that may contribute to the spread of the disease (art. 63). They also include the emergency mobilization of personnel and resources and the requisition of private property for epidemic response (art. 69).

Second, the finalized revision deleted all “emergency measures” added by the first draft. These were the controversial measures that China employed to contain COVID-19, including reducing transport capacity, restricting movements through “travel codes,” conducting mass testing and health monitoring, and using “health codes” powered by big data for contact tracing, quarantine, and risk alerts (Oct. 2023 Draft art. 61). A legislative report shows that the legislature deleted those provisions to “strike a balance between epidemic control and socioeconomic development” and to ensure that the measures taken are “scientific and proportionate.” While the revision leaves in place a catch-all provision authorizing other “necessary” emergency measures to contain the spread of a pathogen, I do wonder if the removal of COVID-era tools signals a tacit official recognition that some of those restrictions might have gone too far.

Finally, the revision adds new transparency requirements. When employing an emergency measure or another specified control measure—such as “hard isolation” of the sort ordered in Shanghai in spring 2022 or sealing off a whole city (arts. 64, 66)—the relevant government must issue a public notice “making clear the specifics, scope, and duration of the measure and providing the necessary explanation” (art. 67, para. 1). (Relatedly, when such a restriction is in place, local governments must ensure the provision of basic necessities, afford special care to vulnerable populations, and guarantee access to medical treatment (art. 67, para. 2).)

Challenges to epidemic-control measures. Since 2004, the IDL has allowed private entities to challenge the preventive and control measures taken by health departments, CDCs, or medical institutions through administrative reconsideration or litigation. The revision now adds local governments to the possible defendants listed in Article 17.

A more noteworthy change to available remedies appears in a new Article 74. Under this provision, private entities may challenge the following measures by “filing complaints” [申诉] with the relevant local governments: (1) those taken to contain Class A diseases, including hard isolation (arts. 58, 64); (2) those taken to contain sudden outbreaks of unknown origin that are treated as Class A diseases (art. 65); and (3) those taken to control outbreaks and epidemics (including the emergency measures mentioned earlier) (arts. 63, 66). I understand this complaint process to supplement—and not to supplant—the general remedies of administrative reconsideration or litigation under Article 17, both because the stated legislative intent was to “broaden the avenues for redress” and because Article 17 would otherwise be hollowed out (as it seems to me that Article 74 basically covers all the measures that may be challenged in court). But the revision unfortunately fails to clarify the relationship between the old and new remedies.

Article 74 further requires local governments to “ensure smooth channels for filing complaints, improve handling procedures, and guarantee the timely resolution of relevant complaints.” I was also a bit disappointed by this provision. An earlier version would’ve tasked the National Health Commission with issuing “specific measures” for the complaint procedure, thereby ensuring nationwide uniformity (Sept. 2024 Draft art. 57, para. 4). Yet, under the enacted version, that responsibility now rests with individual local governments. It’s not hard to imagine that the efficacy of the process would vary significantly across jurisdictions.

Local government authority. The revision grants local governments as low as the county-level greater power and responsibility over the prevention and control of infectious diseases. First, it authorizes lower-level governments to issue early warnings about outbreaks that may qualify as public health emergencies and to activate emergency response accordingly (arts. 9, 53), thereby bringing the IDL in line with the Emergency Response Law [突发事件应对法] and related authorities. Previously, only national and provincial authorities had that power under the IDL, raising questions about which statutory regime would govern public health emergencies.

Second, the revision also allows—and requires—lower-level governments to periodically publish data on infectious diseases within their respective jurisdictions, when, again, only higher-level authorities could previously do so (art. 57, para. 2). The revision also tasks lower-level government with releasing “accurate” data to counter false or incomplete information about outbreaks and imposes on them heightened obligation to publish more detailed data during outbreaks and epidemics (art. 57, paras. 3–4).

Finally, in the case of an emerging infectious disease or a sudden outbreak of unknown origin, local governments may now preemptively employ the measures ordinarily authorized only for Class A diseases—a decision that previously only the State Council could make (art. 65). Similarly, they may now employ “emergency measures” (as discussed earlier) to respond to major epidemics before notifying higher-level authorities—instead of obtaining the latter’s approval in advance (art. 63).

Penalties for noncompliance with control measures. The revision fills a big gap by authorizing administrative punishments for individuals and entities that disobey or fail to accept and cooperate with the preventive and control measures lawfully ordered by administrative bodies, quasi-governmental CDCs, or (in the case of confirmed or suspected cases of Class A diseases) medical institutions (art. 111). A violation will lead to a warning and a discretionary fine of up to 20,000 yuan for entities and 1,000 yuan for individuals. Previously, Chinese law (as written) didn’t penalize most violations of official orders to control epidemics (unless, for instance, noncompliance resulted in the spread of a Class A disease). That’s why the police had to twist a statutory provision that should’ve applied only during constitutional “states of emergency” to enforce the zero-Covid policy (China didn’t declare a “state of emergency” over Covid-19).

That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!

No promises, but the next monthly recap should drop a lot sooner. 😅

Today, I’m crossposting an article that my colleague and coauthor Taige Hu and I have just published in the Made in China Journal that comments on the NPCSC’s failure to observe its typical legislative process before enacting China’s historic retirement-age reforms last September. In this version, I have reformatted the citations roughly according to The Bluebook, but have otherwise preserved the Journal’s British spelling and punctuation. The article will appear in “print“ in volume 10, issue 1 of the Journal, forthcoming later this year. Please cite the original version.

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On 16 November 1957, China’s labour minister Ma Wenrui appeared before the country’s top legislature, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), with proposed updates to China’s retirement scheme. Faced with a deluge of secondary-school graduates but insufficient job openings, the government hoped to make it easier for older workers to retire.1 The proposal would, in general, require men to retire at age 60, white-collar women at 55, and blue-collar women at 50. Women must retire earlier, officials contended, because they were ‘generally weaker’ than men.2 As was typical of the time, the NPCSC endorsed the proposal ‘in principle’ the same day, while allowing the State Council to fine-tune the rules before finalising them. The State Council soon distributed the draft law to localities for consultation and later reported that more than 3.1 million workers participated in discussions over the following month. Some (unsuccessfully) questioned the disparate treatment of white-collar and blue-collar female workers, but there was otherwise no serious objection to the proposed changes, according to an official account. The State Council formally promulgated the rules in February 1958.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), China’s nascent retirement system suffered a fatal blow.3 Ultra-radicals attacked the country’s earliest social insurance scheme for ‘breeding loafers’ (养懒汉) and ‘corrupting the working class’ (腐蚀工人阶级).4 The movement soon paralysed the entire labour bureaucracy. By the end of the decade-long turmoil, more than 2 million eligible workers were waiting for the state to process their retirement applications.5 To clear the backlog and reinvigorate the workforce, the State Council came to the NPCSC with a new pair of retirement rules in May 1978—just weeks after the legislature had resumed regular meetings after the Cultural Revolution. Some of the 1958 rules no longer suited the circumstances and needed updates, the State Council said. Among other changes, its proposal would reinstate separate retirement systems for ‘workers’ (工人) and ‘cadres’ (干部), which roughly corresponded to manual and nonmanual labourers under previous rules; create a special retirement status (with full salary) for veteran cadres; and otherwise treat ordinary cadres and workers equally, along with a general increase in their pension benefits.6 The State Council proposed no change, however, to the 1958 retirement ages. The NPCSC swiftly approved the rules ‘in principle’ after a two-day session. The default retirement ages would remain in place, as it turned out, until almost half a century later.

Meanwhile, China experienced a sea change in demographics. Life expectancy has risen rapidly, from 48.8 years in 1958 to 72 by the turn of the century, and to 78 today. Due to socioeconomic development and the One-Child Policy, fertility in China has declined in an equally swift fashion: it has dropped far below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman since the 1990s and is now among the lowest in the world.7 Together, these two forces—rising longevity and declining fertility—have accelerated population ageing, which in turn has led to a shrinking workforce, mounting pressure on healthcare and social security systems, and widening welfare inequities among different social groups.8 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences projected in 2019 that, if the trend continues, China’s main pension fund will run out of money by 2035.

Delaying retirement, as the Chinese leadership was well aware, could mitigate those problems by replenishing the labour force and the pension fund.9 The labour ministry studied such a move as early as 2005, before the Chinese Communist Party eventually added it to the official reform agenda in late 2013. Since then, the Party has repeatedly vowed to raise retirement ages, most recently at the Third Plenum of its Twentieth Central Committee in July 2024. Yet, any retirement delay would have a direct, tangible impact on hundreds of millions of Chinese, who have, for more than a decade, consistently and overwhelmingly opposed the idea in successive polls conducted by various state media outlets. At the top of their concerns were youth unemployment, age discrimination against older workers, and the loss of childcare provided by retired grandparents. Because of the move’s unpopularity, no concrete plan to raise the retirement ages materialised—until last autumn.

On 10 September 2024, the NPCSC suddenly announced that it was considering legislation to raise retirement ages, without the usual prior indication that a bill was in the pipeline, much less drafted and ready for legislative deliberation. Three days later, it passed the ‘Decision on Gradually Raising the Statutory Retirement Ages’ (关于实施渐进式延迟法定退休年龄的决定), or the ‘Reform Plan’. The Reform Plan has three core provisions: first, it gradually raises the retirement age, over 15 years, to 63 for men, 58 for women in managerial or specialist positions (that is, redefined ‘cadres’), and 55 for women in other roles (that is, redefined ‘workers’); second, it will gradually increase the minimum years of contribution required to receive post-retirement benefits from 15 to 20; and third, it allows for ‘flexible’ retirement, whereby eligible employees may retire up to three years earlier or later. The Reform Plan took effect on 1 January 2025.

Though the swift process was reminiscent of the way the NPCSC set and reaffirmed the original retirement ages decades earlier, the times are different. Much like China’s demographics, the NPCSC’s legislative procedure has undergone a profound transformation in the interim. As we will explain, the Chinese legislature has embraced, in rhetoric and in practice, procedural reforms that grant lawmakers more time to review and propose changes to legislative drafts, while considering the views of a broad range of stakeholders, including the public. Yet, that deliberative process was wholly absent from the momentous retirement reform, laying bare the fragility of the legislature’s promises.

‘Scientific, Democratic, and Law-Based Lawmaking’

In official discourse, China’s post–Cultural Revolution lawmaking reforms have been subsumed under the slogan of ‘scientific, democratic, and law-based lawmaking’ (科学立法、民主立法、依法立法). According to an authoritative commentary by legislative officials, this trifecta of principles entails both substantive and procedural commands. Legislation must address actual issues and ‘reasonably’ prescribe the rights and obligations of private and state entities; must ‘reflect the will of the people’; and must conform to higher-level norms in China’s legislative hierarchy. And such goals are achievable only with a process that, among others, promotes thorough and informed deliberations and incorporates public participation.

The NPCSC first moved to extend legislative deliberations. For about the first 30 years of its existence, the Chinese legislature passed all but a few bills after a quick single review, as the 1957 and 1978 retirement laws illustrate. It began to move away from this approach soon after legislative business resumed after the Cultural Revolution. To ‘prevent hasty deliberations and imprudent considerations from undermining the stability of the law’, legislative leaders decided in March 1983 to generally add an extra review to allot more time for discussing and improving draft laws. This two-review process was then codified in 1987 in the NPCSC’s rules of procedure. To some lawmakers, this longer time frame nonetheless still felt ‘hasty’, as they worried that the quality of legislation would suffer from insufficient time to digest certain bills. With a third review down the line, they could instead use the second reading for ‘in-depth discussions over a draft law’s key issues, contentious points, and areas of disagreement’. The NPCSC leadership endorsed this proposal in April 1998, believing that more thorough deliberations would promote ‘the quality and efficiency of legislation’. The three-review rule was formally codified in the landmark Legislation Law (立法法) in 2000 and still applies today (with exceptions for uncontroversial, simple, or emergency bills).

The lengthier legislative process in turn created the space for public consultations, which over time have become another key feature of Chinese lawmaking. In January 1988, the NPCSC carried out the first public consultation on a draft law under the current (post-1982) constitutional order. It published the draft in national newspapers and requested that citizens send in comments by mail. It was not until 2005 that public participation eventually shifted online and instantly reached new heights. The very first bill released on the legislature’s website, a draft Property Law (物权法), received 9,605 comments—almost three times the record of the comment-by-mail era. Despite the technological upgrade, the NPCSC remained highly selective in its consultations, releasing only 13 drafts during the 20 years after the 1988 consultation. But legislative leaders soon instituted improvements. They first required in 2008 that the legislature generally solicit comment on the first draft of every bill, before extending that soft requirement to any additional non-final draft of a bill five years later. Almost 350 drafts have been released since 2008 as a result.

In the meantime, the Chinese legislature has implemented additional reforms to broaden informational input into legislative deliberations. They include involving academics and other experts at various stages of the legislative process—from formulating legislative agendas to revising draft laws, to assessing legislation’s feasibility, impact, and potential enforcement problems prior to enactment—and establishing ‘grassroots legislative outreach offices’ (基层立法联系点) to proactively solicit public input. And, as we have alluded to, the legislature has always allowed for expedited legislative review under specified circumstances and reserved the discretion to waive public consultation when necessary. But the default process—three reviews coupled with two rounds of public consultation—remains the standard.

The ‘Quasi-Statutory Decision’ Shortcut

When the Party reiterated the goal of raising retirement ages at the 2024 Third Plenum—this time with apparent urgency—the NPCSC found itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the reform is wide-ranging and deeply unpopular, as discussed earlier. It is also quite complex, which has led policy experts to propose a range of options based on different combinations of the relevant parameters.10 The case for following the standard process to evaluate these proposals and their implications could not have been stronger. On the other hand, doing so would have opened the floodgates to a deluge of comments. The public would have seized on an opportunity to air their views, as they did with comparable social legislation in the past; the labour contract legislation of 2007 and 2012, for example, together received almost 750,000 comments.11 So, too, would experts have eagerly offered their input. The sheer amount of information would inevitably have compelled the NPCSC to prolong the process by months, if not years, especially given the strong possibility that an overwhelming majority of public comments would have opposed the reform. This prospect would have been politically untenable.

Faced with this dilemma, the NPCSC ultimately chose political expediency: it enacted the Reform Plan as a ‘quasi-statutory decision’12 (QSD, 准法律决定), a category of legislation exempt from the procedural paradigm. Officially known as ‘decisions on legal issues’ (有关法律问题的决定), QSDs are not ‘statutes’ (法律) but nonetheless carry statutory force.13 Because the NPCSC adheres to the unwritten principle that a statute should be comprehensive and infrequently amended, QSDs fill important gaps. Ordinarily, they are short instruments designed to address narrow issues, tackle urgent matters when a comprehensive statute cannot be drafted in time, or develop new legal schemes without formal statutory changes.14 For these reasons, since 1987, NPCSC rules have allowed it to adopt a QSD after a single review without public consultation, even as its legislative process has otherwise grown more sophisticated. Over the past two decades, the legislature has rarely taken a second look at a QSD, and, even when it did, it never solicited public comment.

The Reform Plan’s unusual features suggest the State Council may have deliberately exploited that abbreviated process. Like a typical QSD, it begins with a brief (five-article) main text, which announces the new retirement ages and lays down general principles for implementing the reform. Then, in a break with convention, the Reform Plan proceeds to a separately titled, visually distinct document: ‘Measures of the State Council on Gradually Raising the Statutory Retirement Ages’ (国务院关于渐进式延迟法定退休年龄的办法; our emphasis). Despite appearances to the contrary, officials emphasised that this lengthy document is an integral part of the Reform Plan. The Measures introduce the other two pillars of the reform (longer pension contribution periods and flexible retirement), address various subsidiary issues (such as the application of the reform to unemployed individuals), and include detailed charts that allow affected citizens to look up their new retirement ages and contribution periods. This level of detail brings the Reform Plan closer to a statute than an average reform-initiating QSD.

In addition, the State Council likely drafted the bill in a manner designed to restrict meaningful legislative review of the Measures. The Reform Plan’s main text states that the NPCSC ‘approved’ (批准) the Measures—indicating that lawmakers, at best, had less room than usual to propose changes to the embedded document and, at worst, had to vote on it as drafted.15 As evidence, the Reform Plan’s accompanying legislative report addresses only lawmaker comments on the short main text. While it is true that the State Council also drafted and submitted the 1957 and 1978 retirement laws—both under its name—for the NPCSC’s ‘approval’, the legal landscape of the time necessitated that process. Before 1982, the NPCSC’s legislative power was far more circumscribed than it is today, while the State Council had no authority at all to issue binding regulations. In response to the heightened legislative demand shortly after the PRC’s founding and the Cultural Revolution, the NPCSC resorted to legislating, in part, by approving documents that the State Council sought to issue.16 The 1982 Constitution subsequently expanded the legislative powers of both institutions and more clearly demarcated the boundaries of their authority. Reviving that archaic practice in 2024 was thus not only unnecessary but also legally dubious under today’s constitutional framework.17 Not to mention the resulting Reform Plan—an NPCSC enactment with a component bearing the State Council’s name—is an odd hybrid previously unknown to Chinese law.

That said, the State Council’s drafting choices could not—and indeed should not—have bound the NPCSC. The latter was free to rewrite the Reform Plan so that it contained a unified text. It also faced no legal obstacles to waiving the single-review exception and conducting further review, as it could with any QSD. There has long been scholarly argument that QSDs, like statutes, should comply with the Legislation Law; otherwise, this Law would become a ‘dead letter’ (形同虚设), as the legislature could simply circumvent its more stringent procedures by enacting important legislation as QSDs.18 This view finds additional support in the March 2023 amendments to the Legislation Law, which added a new article applying ‘the relevant provisions’ of the Law to QSDs. This new clause is admittedly cryptic. But there is early scholarly agreement (which we second) that it requires, at a minimum, that QSDs creating or modifying generally applicable legal schemes—such as the Reform Plan—follow the same procedures as statutes: three reviews with public consultations, unless a specified exception applies.19 No such exception would have applied to the Reform Plan.

‘Breaching the Contract with an Entire Generation’

The public predictably reacted to the Reform Plan with ire, confusion, and anxiety. Yet, it is now only possible to glimpse that reaction through contemporaneous press coverage, as China’s censorship machine swiftly kicked into high gear after the document’s release. According to The Economist, of the more than 5,200 replies to Xinhua’s Weibo post announcing the news, only about two dozen remained visible just four days later—‘none of them disapproving’. Most recorded comments expressed apprehension about the reform’s substantive impact on people’s livelihoods. Few directly attacked the lack of process, though that concern underlay posts worrying about a sudden further delay in retirement.

That sentiment more clearly drove netizens to widely circulate an 11-year-old front-page commentary from the China Youth Daily (中国青年报). That 2013 piece by Cao Lin, the outlet’s then chief commentator, responded to a social security official’s call to delay retirement—a few months before the Party would officially endorse the proposal. Among other criticisms, Cao rebuked the suggestion that the Chinese public should stomach a future delay in retirement simply because it is ‘a common international practice’. He argued that laws and policies, especially those that ‘concern significant public interests’, must provide the people with ‘stable expectations’. ‘The age of retirement and the timing of pension payments,’ he stressed, ‘are the State’s commitments to and agreements with the people—contracts that must not be breached lightly.’ He observed that retirement reforms in developed countries followed ‘due legal process, democratic channels, and consultation with the people’. If China were to dispense with the necessary processes, it would ‘breach the contract with an entire generation’ (与一代人的违约), Cao presciently warned. Eleven years later, reposts of his op-ed were quickly censored and the original disappeared from the newspaper’s online archives.

The Chinese state’s impulse to pass the Reform Plan hastily was understandable, as strong public opposition had forced it to repeatedly postpone the reform over the past decade. By pushing the whole package through the legislature on a highly expedited timeline, it could present the reform as a fait accompli, thereby rendering moot public calls for reconsideration and pre-empting attempts to bargain with the government over specifics. Yet, by settling for a quick fix for the looming crisis, the Chinese Government myopically sacrificed the greater benefits it could have gained by extending the legislative timetable—even by just a few months—to allow for further deliberation and consultation.

The NPCSC itself has recognised that ‘public participation can bolster the legality and fairness of legislative decision-making’. As it elaborated in a 2019 volume touting its legislative accomplishments: ‘When the decision-making process is undemocratic and public participation insufficient, the enacted laws may present the will of only a minority, making them unjust; they may also lie dormant once enacted, failing to solve actual problems’. Taking the time to publicly justify the Reform Plan and to credibly consult the public on such a complex and far-reaching matter—just as the State Council did in 1957—could have, in the best case envisioned by the NPCSC, fostered ‘a sense of identification’ (认同感) with the reform and ‘raise[d] the public’s willingness to abide by’ it. At a minimum, it could have ‘confer[red] procedural legitimacy on the NPCSC, the process, and the resulting legislation’ and ‘help[ed] lessen, if not prevent, opposition’ to the reform.

In comparison, the costs of cutting procedural corners here were immense. Not only did this move stand in tension with the NPCSC’s decades-long procedural reforms and cast doubt on China’s commitment to ‘scientific, democratic, and law-based lawmaking’, but it also needlessly damaged the legislature’s own credibility and legitimacy and sowed distrust in the legislative process. After all, the average Chinese citizen is unlikely to grasp the NPCSC’s procedural intricacies well enough to identify the Reform Plan as a QSD and to understand that it could be passed through an abridged process. And, given that officials had promised—time and time again—to consult the public on any retirement reform, citizens were especially justified in expecting such an opportunity in this case. In the end, taking the procedural shortcut did not—and could not—end the controversy over delaying retirement, despite the censors’ best efforts. It would only make the next unpopular but necessary reform in China that much harder to enact.

Each issue will start with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage we have published on our main site, NPC Observer. If, during that month, we have also written posts that aren’t tied to current events, I’ll then provide a round-up in “Non-News of the Month.” Finally, depending on the month and my schedule, I may end an issue with discussions of an NPC-related topic that is in some way connected to the past month.

If you enjoy the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Month

On March 5–11, the 14^th NPC met for its third plenary session, a rather mundane event. At the closing meeting on March 11, it approved all reports and legislation submitted for review. All official documents from the session as well as the relevant vote results are compiled in this post:

Among the documents approved were the first major amendments to the Delegates to the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses [全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法] since 2010. I’ve coauthored an analysis of the amendments for The Diplomat with Professor Sun Ying, a leading Chinese scholar on the system of people’s congresses and currently a visiting scholar at Yale Law School. Here’s an excerpt from the introduction:

Despite [the] common conception [that delegates play mere rubber-stamping roles], empirical research shows that delegates do in fact respond to their constituents and advocate their interests—albeit within strictly policed bounds. . . . They, in other words, bring needed information about nonsensitive matters to China’s policymakers.

To gather such information, the delegates engage in various activities when not attending the relevant people’s congress’s short, annual sessions. Under the Delegates Law, the standing body of a congress . . . is responsible for organizing such activities. . . . Such supporting work makes up part of these standing bodies’ “delegates-related work,” which (to a lesser extent) also entails supervising the delegates . . . .

In recent years, the [Communist Party] under General Secretary Xi Jinping has directed—and the people’s congresses have experimented with—various reforms, both procedural and institutional, to improve “delegates-related work,” though the specifics vary across jurisdictions. The overall goal is to make sure that delegates can—and do, in fact—effectively discharge their representative duties within politically acceptable bounds. Last month’s Delegates Law amendments codified many of those reforms, thereby both placing them on a strong legal footing and upgrading them to statutory requirements that apply nationwide.

I will return to the NPCSC’s annual work report below.

On March 11, the NPC website posted an overview of the legislature’s “Constitution-related work” and constitutional enforcement efforts in 2024, attributed to the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission’s Office for Constitution. I have yet to write it up, but I thought it’s not as interesting as last year’s. It heavily focuses on the legislature’s efforts to enforce the Constitution through legislation and to promote the implementation of constitutional policies by other state organs, basically by hearing the State Council’s specialized work reports. As for constitutional review and constitutional interpretation, the overview discloses little of substance.

On March 14, the NPCSC held a symposium commemorating the 20^th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law [反分裂国家法]. NPCSC Chairman Zhao Leji gave a speech, alongside four other attendees, including Lin Xiangyang, commander of the Eastern Theater Command. As the South China Morning Post notes, this “mark[ed] the first time that a PLA frontline commander has delivered a speech at such a meeting.”

On March 27, the NPCSC held a “mobilization and deployment meeting” for topical research on “various major issues” relating to the drafting of the 15^th Five-Year Plan. This means that, over the subsequent four and a half months, the NPC apparatus will dispatch teams across the country to research and investigate a variety of issues relevant to the 15^th Five-Year Plan. Five years ago, the legislature produced 22 research reports, which it said would later serve as references for the Party’s decisionmaking and the State Council’s drafting efforts. The full text of these reports won’t be made public immediately, but in August the NPCSC General Office is expected to submit a public report to the NPCSC summarizing this cycle’s research reports. The Party will then put forward its recommendations for formulating the 15^th Five-Year Plan at a Central Committee plenum in the fall. And the NPC will, lastly, approve the Plan next March.

NPC Lawmaking in 2025: A Preview

I’ll end this newsletter with a closer look at the Chinese legislature’s preliminary legislative agenda for 2025. As disclosed by the NPCSC’s work report last month, the following 34 bills have been tentatively scheduled for review this year, along with a few additional legislative tasks. I expect these bills to substantially overlap with the entries on the NPC’s finalized legislative agenda for 2025, which will be approved as early as this week and released by early May. A few of the bills listed below may end up being “backup projects” [预备审议项目]—ones that most likely won’t be submitted for review in 2025.

(The following is excerpted from the official English translation of the work report, with my edits.)

2. Advancing high-quality legislative work. . . . To enhance the systems for whole-process people’s democracy, we will revise the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees [村民委员会组织法] and the Organic Law of Urban Residents’ Committees [城市居民委员会组织法].

We will formulate a Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress [民族团结进步促进法] to forge a strong sense of national identity, reinforcing the Chinese people as one cohesive community.

In order to strengthen the legal framework for the development of the socialist market economy, we will formulate a Private Economy Promotion Law* [民营经济促进法], a Law on National Development Plans* [国家发展规划法], a Finance Law [金融法], a Financial Stability Law* [金融稳定法], and a Cultivated Land Protection and Quality Improvement Law [耕地保护和质量提升法]. We will also revise the Anti–Unfair Competition Law* [反不正当竞争法], the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law [企业破产法], the Agriculture Law [农业法], the Fisheries Law* [渔业法], the Civil Aviation Law* [民用航空法], and the Banking Supervision and Administration Law [银行业监督管理法].

In the social and cultural sectors, we will formulate a Law on Publicity and Education on the Rule of Law* [法治宣传教育法], a Social Assistance Law [社会救助法], a Childcare Service Law [托育服务法], and a Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation Law [检察公益诉讼法]. We will also revise the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases* [传染病防治法] and the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language [国家通用语言文字法].

With a focus on refining the systems concerning ecological conservation, we will continue with the compilation of an Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典] and formulate a National Parks Law* [国家公园法].

To modernize the national security system and public security governance mechanisms, we will formulate an Atomic Energy Law* [原子能法], a Public Health Emergency Response Law* [突发公共卫生事件应对法], and a Hazardous Chemicals Safety Law* [危险化学品安全法]. We will also revise the Road Traffic Safety Law [道路交通安全法], the Food Safety Law [食品安全法], the Cybersecurity Law [网络安全法], the Public Security Administration Penalties Law* [治安管理处罚法], the Prison Law [监狱法], and the State Compensation Law [国家赔偿法].

In regard to legislation in areas involving foreign affairs, we will revise the Maritime Law* [海商法], the Foreign Trade Law [对外贸易法], and the Arbitration Law* [仲裁法].

We will intensify research on legislation in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, the digital economy, big data, autonomous driving, the low-altitude economy, and aerospace. We will initiate a clean-up of the laws [法律清理]. . . .

Bills already pending before the NPCSC are each marked with an asterisk (*). Among them, the draft Law on National Development Plans was submitted by the State Council on February 10 and has yet to be scheduled for an initial review (but could be as soon as next week). In addition, the following five bills that have already gone through two reviews will most certainly pass in 2025:

• draft Private Economy Promotion Law;

• draft Financial Stability Law;

• draft revision to the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases;

• draft revision to the Public Security Administration Punishments Law; and

• draft National Parks Law.

Two other things to note: First, the work report says the legislature will begin a clean-up of existing laws this year. As I’ve explained:

[This endeavor] serves to identify inconsistencies among existing statutory provisions as well as provisions that are grossly out of step with reality. For issues that are easier to fix (e.g., outdated statutory cross-references), the legislature may pass the necessary amendments or repeals in one go soon after the clean-up is completed. The NPCSC last cleaned up its laws in 2008–09, ahead of the anticipated establishment of the “socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics” in late 2010, and resulted in the immediate repeals of 8 laws and minor amendments to 59 others.

The 2008–09 clean-up took about a year, so we might not know the results of this round—what laws the legislature will have decided to repeal or amend—until 2026.

Second, in line with the NPC’s new norm of reviewing legislation at its annual sessions, it looks like next year’s bill will be the Law on National Development Plans to coincide with the approval of the 15^th Five-Year Plan. The Ecological and Environmental Code may also be ready for the NPC’s approval in 2026, though I still believe 2027 is a more realistic target.

That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!

The NPCSC is meeting later this month, and here’s our preview of its agenda, though an official announcement is expected as soon as this week.

This will be the last crosspost for #NPC2025. But we’re not yet done with our coverage—I’m working with a colleague on an analysis of the Delegates Law amendment (see below), although, if all goes according to plan, it will be published somewhere else.

I’ll be back in your inbox to recap March in a few weeks. Until then, happy reading!

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[The following post was first published on NPC Observer]

The third session of China’s 14^th National People’s Congress (NPC) concluded on Tuesday, March 11. Below we have compiled a list of all official documents from this session (except for two legislative reports the NPC has so far neglected to release). We have also linked to the submitted (i.e., draft) version of the six main reports for your reference. Unless otherwise noted, the documents are available in Chinese only. The vote results for each bill and resolution are listed below in brackets, in the order of yea–nay–abstention.

Work Reports

State Council (i.e., Government Work Report)

• Approved version: zh | en

• Submitted version: zh | en

• Approval resolution [2882–1–1]

NPC Standing Committee

• Approved version: zh | en

• Submitted version: zh | en

• Approval resolution [2875–5–4]

Supreme People’s Court

• Approved version

• Submitted version

• Approval resolution [2841–31–12]

Supreme People’s Procuratorate

• Approved version

• Submitted version

• Approval resolution [2850–27–7]

Delegates Law Amendment

• Amendment [2881–3–0]

  • Full text of the Law as amended

• Explanation

• NPC Constitutional and Law Committee report on results of deliberations

• NPC Constitution and Law Committee report on suggestions for revisions

• Presidential order

National Economic and Social Development Plans

• National Development and Reform Commission report

  • Approved version: zh | en

  • Submitted version: zh | en

• NPC Financial and Economic Affairs Committee’s review report

• Approval resolution [2866–8–10]

Central and Local Budgets

• Ministry of Finance report

  • Approved version: zh | en

  • Submitted version: zh | en

• NPC Financial and Economic Affairs Committee’s review report

• Approval resolution [2857–17–10]

Other

• Secretariat report on the disposition of bills submitted by the delegates

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I’m crossposting all our coverage of the 2025 NPC session on our main site to this Substack. You can deselect “NPC Observer Crossposts” in the settings for this newsletter to opt out of the crossposts.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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[The following post was first published on NPC Observer]

China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) has released its 2025 session’s agenda and daily schedule of meetings, as well as a preliminary schedule of press events during the session. This year’s session will open on the morning of March 5 and close on the afternoon of March 11, lasting seven full days. As the NPC spokesperson announced last year, the Premier will not hold a press conference after this session (or during the remainder of this NPC’s term “absent special circumstances”).

All times below are in China Standard Time (UTC +8:00). For a primer on the NPC and its annual sessions, check out this FAQ.

The 2025 session’s agenda contains the following seven items:

1. Deliberate the Government Work Report;

2. Review a report on the implementation of the 2024 Plan for National Economic and Social Development (“Development Plan”) and on the draft 2025 Development Plan; and review the draft 2025 Development Plan;

3. Review a report on the execution of the 2024 Central and Local Budgets (“Budgets”) and on the draft 2025 Budgets; and review the draft 2025 Budgets;

4. Deliberate a draft amendment to Law on the Delegates to the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses (“Delegates Law”) [全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法];

5. Deliberate the work report of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC);

6. Deliberate the work report of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC); and

7. Deliberate the work report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP).

Key documents will be introduced and voted on according to the following schedule:

• March 5 (a.m.): Hear the Government Work Report; review the report on the Development Plans and the 2025 Development Plan; review the report on the Budgets and the 2025 Budgets; and hear an explanation of the draft Delegates Law amendment.

• March 8 (a.m.): Hear the NPCSC’s, SPC’s, and SPP’s work reports.

• March 11 (p.m.): Vote on various resolutions concerning the work reports, Development Plans, and Budgets; and vote on the draft Delegates Law amendment.

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A more detailed description of the session’s daily schedule follows. The “Delegates’ Corridors” and “Ministers’ Corridors” are brief Q&As that will take place immediately before and after, respectively, the plenary meetings. We will update this post with links to all plenary meetings and press events throughout the session. [Please check the original version of this post for updates.]

Wednesday, March 5

🎙 8 a.m.: Delegates’ Corridor

9 a.m. (1^st plenary meeting): Hear the Government Work Report from Li Qiang (Premier); review the report on the Development Plans and the 2025 Development Plan; review the report on the Budgets and the 2025 Budgets; and hear an explanation of the draft Delegates Law amendment by Li Hongzhong (NPCSC Vice Chairman).

🎙 a.m.: Ministers’ Corridor

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the Government Work Report as delegations.

Thursday, March 6

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate the Government Work Report in small groups.

3 p.m.: Delegates review, in small groups, the report on Development Plans and the draft 2025 Development Plan, as well as the report on the Budgets and the draft 2025 Budgets.

🎙 p.m.: Press conference on the economy

Friday, March 7

9 a.m.: Delegates review, in small groups, the report on Development Plans and the draft 2025 Development Plan, as well as the report on the Budgets and the draft 2025 Budgets.

🎙 a.m.: Press conference on foreign affairs

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the draft Delegates Law amendment in small groups.

Saturday, March 8

🎙 8 a.m.: Delegates’ Corridor

9 a.m. (2^nd plenary meeting): Hear the NPCSC’s work report from Zhao Leji (NPCSC Chairman); hear the SPC’s work report from Zhang Jun (SPC President); and hear the SPP’s work report from Ying Yong (SPP Procurator-General).

🎙 a.m.: Ministers’ Corridor

📄 12 p.m.: Deadline for submitting delegate bills

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the NPCSC’s work report in small groups.

Sunday, March 9

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate, in small groups, a revised version of the draft Delegates Law amendment as well as the SPC’s and SPP’s work reports.

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate the SPC’s and SPP’s work reports in small groups.

🎙 p.m.: Press conference on “the people’s livelihood”

Monday, March 10

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate the NPCSC’s, SPC’s, and SPP’s work reports as delegations.

3 p.m.: Delegates deliberate, in small groups, three draft resolutions on the Government Work Report, Development Plans, and Budgets, respectively.

Tuesday, March 11

9 a.m.: Delegates deliberate, in small groups, three draft resolutions on the NPCSC’s, SPC’s, and SPP’s work reports, respectively.

🎙 2 p.m.: Delegates’ Corridor

3 p.m. (3^rd plenary meeting): Vote on all resolutions and the draft Delegates Law amendment.

🎙 p.m.: Ministers’ Corridor

Each issue will start with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage we have published on our main site, NPC Observer. If, during that month, we have also written posts that aren’t tied to current events, I’ll then provide a round-up in “Non-News of the Month.” Finally, depending on the month and my schedule, I may end an issue with discussions of an NPC-related topic that is in some way connected to the past month.

If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao

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News of the Month

On February 24–25, the 14^th NPCSC met for its fourteenth session, which was convened by the Council of Chairpersons on February 17. While the session focused on preparing for the 2025 NPC session, it also reviewed a draft Private Economy Promotion Law (PEPL) [民营经济促进法] and a draft revision to the Civil Aviation Law [民用航空法].

On February 25, the NPCSC released the draft Civil Aviation Law for public comment through March 26. The draft PEPL was not released at the same time, however. The legislature may be revising that draft based on lawmakers’ feedback and could release an updated version for public comment later. Or it may have decided to forego another round of public consultation in hopes of passing the law quickly. When asked about the PEPL’s status on Tuesday, the NPC’s spokesperson didn’t mention any plan to seek public comment again (or, for that matter, any decision not to do so).

2024 Delegate Bills: Selected Developments

The NPC will convene in less than 24 hours, opening an annual window for the delegates to submit bills. There’s thus no better time to review the fate of their submissions last year. I’ve previously posted an explainer on delegate bills, focusing on the procedure for processing them and their role in Chinese lawmaking.

For purposes of this post, here’s what you need to know: Delegate bills are referred to the various NPC special committees for deliberation after an NPC session closes. The special committees then report their recommended dispositions to the NPCSC at the end of the year. Depending on what the delegates propose in a given year, the reports may offer updates on legislative projects already included in an official legislative plan. They also discuss the possibility that new legislative proposals may (eventually) appear on the official agenda. The special committees’ 2024 year-end reports are compiled here.

In 2024, NPC delegates submitted 298 bills, all but 4 of which propose legislation. Below, I discuss a few developments disclosed in the reports that I found important or interesting.

Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee

Two delegate bills propose enacting a Household Registration Law [户籍法] to, among other things, relax the restrictions on migration and simplify the procedures for household registration and migration. This Law was already included in the 14^th NPCSC’s five-year legislative plan as a Category II project. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) disclosed that it had begun research and drafting and would next carry out field research and “widely solicit opinions” in conjunction with the relevant departments.

The Hainan delegation proposes enacting a Detention Centers Law [看守所法] to replace the State Council’s 1990 Detention Center Regulations and its implementing rules. The bill argues that the existing legislation is “too general” and lacks specific provisions on the functions, management, and oversight of detention centers. This Law, too, is a Category II project in the 14^th NPCSC’s legislative plan. The MPS previously released a draft for public comment in 2017. According to the report, the MPS included “clear provisions” on “all the major issues raised by the bill” in a draft that it was preparing for the State Council’s review.

Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee

Two delegate bills propose enacting a Climate Change Response Law [应对气候变化法] to achieve China’s “dual carbon” goals and develop a legislative scheme for reducing carbon emissions. Legislation to “address climate change as well as achieve carbon peak and carbon neutrality” is a research project in the current NPCSC’s five-year legislation plan. According to the report, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment had completed a draft Climate Change Response Law and was actively working to advance the process. The report also discloses that the Environmental and Ecological Code being drafted would include “general and guiding provisions” on climate-change response. The Code may be submitted for review as early as 2025.

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Social Development Affairs Committee

Two delegate bills propose enacting a Basic Labor Standards Law [基本劳动标准法] to lay down comprehensive and uniform rules on matters including working hours, rest and leave, salary and wages, and occupational safety and health. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions agreed, believing it is necessary to “review and integrate existing basic labor standards and related regulations.” The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security sounded less enthusiastic: “[T]he establishment of basic labor standards requires a comprehensive consideration of various factors, including the level of economic and social development, the supply and demand relationship in the labor market, the tolerance of both labor and management, and their respective interests and demands.” It vowed to conduct further research and “initiate legislative work when conditions are ripe.” The Committee, for its part, noted that the Law was a research project in the NPCSC’s current five-year legislative plan. It argued that basic labor standards are “closely linked to the most pressing, direct, and practical concerns of workers” and disclosed it had begun research on such a Law to “help build a societal consensus as early as possible.”

Delegates Chen Jing et al. propose enacting a Child Welfare Law [儿童福利法]. In response, the Ministry of Civil Affairs revealed that such a Law had been included in the Central Commission for Comprehensive Law-Based Governance’s legislative plan on “major and emerging fields” and that it had already drawn up a preliminary recommended draft and would next work on improving it. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ), for its part, emphasized the complexity of such a Law, noting that it would implicate matters such as “infant and child development, health services, family parenting services, and maternal and childcare facilities” and would require a comprehensive consideration of “social needs, fiscal capacity, and the sustainability of the welfare system.” The Committee promised to advocate for the Law’s inclusion in an annual NPCSC legislative plan when the time is ripe.

Delegates Lu Luanmei et al. propose amending the Anti–Domestic Violence Law [反家庭暴力法] to, among other changes, designate “economic control” and sexual abuse as independent forms of domestic abuse and include former spouses and former cohabitants within the Law’s scope. While the MOJ and the All-China Women’s Federation appear to favor the changes, all national criminal justice authorities showed little enthusiasm. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) thought it “somewhat reasonable” to treat “abnormal economic control and sexual coercion” as domestic abuse, but contended that “it is difficult to delineate their scope and standards.” The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) and the MPS argued that sexual coercion and abuse of former intimate partners are already punishable under China’s criminal and public-order laws. They also worried that “treating economic control as an independent category of domestic violence might raise public concerns about excessive state intervention in family life,” so recommended caution. The Committee, too, believed that the definition of domestic abuse must consider “the prevailing societal consensus and level of public acceptance” and carefully “determine the extent of state intervention in family relationships.” So it looks like the Law won’t be amended any time soon.

Constitution and Law Committee

Delegates Li Li et al. propose including a part on green and low-carbon development in the Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典] to provide for carbon peak and carbon neutrality. Two other delegate bills propose enacting laws on environmental civil public interest litigation and compulsory environmental pollution liability insurance, respectively. The Committee revealed that the NPCSC had formed a special working group to draft on the Code and reaffirmed the goal of enacting such a Code within the current NPC’s term (ending in 2028). The report also indicated that the Code would address all three issues raised by the delegate bills (so no separate law would be enacted).

Delegates Tang Weijian et al. propose enacting a Law on Judicial Interpretations [司法解释法] to prescribe the basic principles that judicial interpretations (JIs) should follow; regulate the agenda-setting, drafting, deliberations, promulgation, filing, and oversight of JIs; establish a public hearing mechanism for JIs; improve the legality review of JIs; and authorize collateral review of JIs in litigation. The Committee notes that the Legislation Law and the NPCSC’s recent legislation on “recording and review” have provided the “basic statutory bases” for the formulation and oversight of JIs. It vowed to work with the SPC and SPP to carry out further research, but it does not appear such a Law would be forthcoming.

Delegates Ding Shunsheng et al. propose amending the Administrative Litigation Law [行政诉讼法] to grant the procuratorates the general authority to issue “procuratorial suggestions” [检察建议] to administrative organs that unlawfully exercise their authority or fail to act when required by law, urging them to make corrections. The Law now allows the procuratorates to do so only over certain issues (e.g., environmental protection). According to the Committee, the relevant parties disagreed on whether the procuratorates should be allowed to conduct general oversight of administrative organs in this way, so the delegates’ proposal is unlikely to become law anytime soon.

Financial and Economic Affairs Committee

Three delegate bills propose enacting a Digital Economy Promotion Law [数字经济促进法] to, among others, establish schemes on the rights protection, income distribution, and circulation involving data elements; define the ownership, usage, and operational rights for corporate, personal, and public data; enhance the protection of data throughout their lifecycles; and promote the integration of digital and real economies. The Committee noted that such a Law was already included as a Category II project in the current NPCSC’s five-year legislative plan. It also disclosed that it formed a drafting team with 18 other agencies—including the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the National Data Administration—and began working on the Law in May 2024. The Committee vowed to advance the legislative process and would strive to submit a bill to the NPCSC “as soon as possible.”

Delegates Wang Wei et al. propose enacting a Defense Industry Law [国防工业法] to regulate the development and management of the defense industry. According to the report, the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense began drafting such a Law in 2015. The report also discloses that such legislation was included in the Central Commission for Comprehensive Law-Based Governance’s legislative plan on “major and emerging fields” as well as the agendas of two other Communist Party bodies on defense matters. The Committee recommended that the relevant departments speed up research and drafting and submit the bill when the time is ripe.

Delegates Si Fuchun et al. propose enacting a Chips Law [芯片法] to regulate key aspects of the integrated circuit industry, including critical supply chains, materials, equipment, high-end applications, and fundamental scientific research. The National Development and Reform Commission was of the view that legislation on the semiconductor industry requires an overall consideration of various factors including industrial development, market competition, and international impact, and that its necessity and feasibility require further debate and research. The Committee agreed, signaling that a Chips Law wouldn’t appear on the legislative agenda soon.

Education, Science, Culture & Public Health Committee

Delegates Fang Yan et al. propose enacting an Artificial Intelligence Law [人工智能法] to regulate the application and development of artificial intelligence (AI), especially by strengthening protections for state secrets and preventing AI-driven espionage. The report notes that legislation on the “healthy development of AI” has appeared in both the NPCSC’s current five-year legislative plan as a research project and in its 2024 legislative plan as a backup project. The Committee also disclosed that the Ministry of Science and Technology is leading the drafting of an AI Law and has drawn up a “framework draft.” For its part, the Committee has been conducting its own research and promised to monitor the development of AI and urge the relevant parties to speed up the drafting process.

That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!

I’ll be back in your inbox later today with the agenda and daily schedule of the 2025 NPC session. Stay tuned!