September 2024: Retirement Age, Military Training & Economic Data Fraud
NPC's 70th anniversary. State honors marking PRC's 75th. Plus: Six draft laws for public comment.
Welcome back to NPC Observer Monthly, a monthly newsletter about China’s national legislature: the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC).
Each issue will start with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage we have published on our main site, NPC Observer. If, during that month, we have also written posts that aren’t tied to current events, I’ll then provide a round-up in “Non-News of the Month.” Finally, depending on the month and my schedule, I may end an issue with discussions of an NPC-related topic that is in some way connected to the past month.
If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll consider sharing it. —Changhao
News of the Month
On September 5, the amendment to the Charity Law [慈善法] (adopted on Dec. 29, 2023) took effect.
On September 10–13, the 14th NPCSC convened for its eleventh session and approved four bills at the end of the four-day session.
First up, the bill that made international headlines: the Decision on Gradually Raising the Statutory Retirement Ages [关于实施渐进式延迟法定退休年龄的决定], which we translated here. As we see it, China’s plan to delay retirement has three core components:
Over a period of 15 years starting on January 1, 2025, the retirement age will gradually increase to 63 (from 60) for men; to 55 (from 50) for female blue-collar workers; and to 58 (from 55) for female white-collar workers.
Over a period of 10 years starting on January 1, 2030, the minimum contribution period for employees to receive monthly pension benefits after they retire will be extended from 15 to 20 years.
The new retirement ages won’t be hard cut-offs; instead, qualified employees will have the option to retire early or late. Those who have met the minimum contribution period may retire up to three years early, but not before they reach the original retirement age. And those who otherwise must retire may, with their employers’ consent, work for up to three more years.
We have also written a short commentary to give our take on two procedural issues: Why was the NPCSC involved in such a major policy decision from the outset? And was there anything unusual about the swift and secretive process by which the Decision was adopted?
Next, the NPCSC adopted a decision to confer various state honors on 15 individuals in celebration of the PRC’s 75th anniversary. The legislature has helpfully released an English translation of the decision and Xi Jinping’s subsequent (ceremonial) presidential order to formally confer the honors, so I won’t go into any more detail here. Check out this post if you want to learn more about China’s state honors system.
Finally, the NPCSC approved two other pieces of legislation: a comprehensively revised National Defense Education Law [国防教育法], which took effect on September 21; and amendments to the Statistics Law [统计法], which took immediate effect. Here’s a brief look at each of the two bills.
Revised National Defense Education Law
The National Defense Education Law was originally enacted in 2001 and, save for a technical amendment in 2018, had not been meaningfully updated until last month. Although this update is styled as a comprehensive revision, it mainly incorporates reforms of the defense education system that have already been implemented in practice, so its on-the-ground impact will likely be limited. Here I’ll note several of the more (symbolically) important changes.
First, the revision provides a definition of sorts for “national defense education” (NDE) [国防教育]. This endeavor, according to the revised Law, educates all citizens on “the theories, knowledge, and skills as well as the sci-tech, legal, psychological, and other such aspects of national defense and military development” (art. 2). At the “core” of NDE is “patriotic education,” with the goal of fulfilling “national defense obligations” (id.).
Second, consistent with China’s recent defense legislation, the revision enshrines the Communist Party’s leadership over NDE efforts (art. 4). In this particular context, the Party’s leadership is more than rhetorical, as the Central Propaganda Department—through its Bureau of Propaganda and Education (aka Bureau of National Defense Education for All)—is now the national body in charge of “guiding, overseeing, and overall coordinating national defense education nationwide” (art. 5). The State Council lost its authority over NDE during recent military reforms.
Third, the revision details the requirements for NDE in schools, which is deemed the “foundation” of the overall NDE efforts (att. 13). It specifies the goal of NDE for primary, junior secondary, senior secondary, and undergraduate education, aiming to arm students with an increasingly strong grasp of defense-related “theories, knowledge, and skills” while deepening their “sense of national defense” (see arts. 14–15). The revision also reiterates the requirement that high schools and universities organize military training for their students (arts. 17–19). They must follow national curricula to “strengthen training in military skills, hone the students’ will and character, and improve their sense of organization and discipline” (art. 16). Under the national syllabus for high-school military training, for instance, students must receive a minimum of 7 days (or 56 hours) of training, including at least 12 hours spent learning about the history and current structure of the Chinese military, the basics of military branches, and major weaponry; and at least 44 hours on practicing drill movements, tactical movements, basic combat, and first aid.
Statistics Law Amendments
The Statistics Law was first enacted in 1983 and had not been updated for 15 years until last month. Here, “statistics” [统计] refers to official efforts to collect data on the state of China’s socioeconomic development (see art. 2 as amended).
Last month’s amendments were limited in scope, with most substantive changes focused on combatting data fraud. To start, the Law now prohibits government officials from “overly or covertly” directing their subordinates or the entities under statistical investigation to report false data (art. 7, para. 2). Those who violate this provision will be subject to internal discipline (art. 40). Officials were already barred from altering collected data or ordering their subordinates to fabricate or tamper with them (art. 7, para. 2). In addition, the amendments codified the unified authority of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to organize and implement efforts to calculate regional gross domestic product (GDP) (art. 20). Previously, the provinces calculated their own regional GDP separately. Because local governments have an incentive to inflate reports of economic activity, the combined regional GDP figures “frequently exceed[ed] the national total” reported by the NBS. In early 2020, China introduced unified accounting of regional GDP to “improve the quality of data and the credibility of government statistics.”
The amendments also toughen the penalties for investigated entities that obstruct statistical work. Those who refuse to provide data, provide false or incomplete data, destroy records or documents, or otherwise obstruct investigations are now subject to a discretionary fine of up to RMB 100,000 (increased from 50,000) (art. 44, para. 2). Serious violations will result in a mandatory fine of RMB 100,000–500,000 (previously 50,000–200,000) (id.).
On September 13, the NPCSC released the following bills for public comment through October 12:
draft revision to the Law on Preventing and Controlling Infectious Diseases [传染病防治法];
draft Energy Law [能源法];
draft revision to the Anti–Money Laundering Law [反洗钱法];
draft Public Health Emergency Response Law [突发公共卫生事件应对法];
draft National Parks Law [国家公园法]; and
draft amendment to the Supervision Law [监察法].
As for the draft Supervision Law amendment, my colleague Jeremy Daum writes that the bill “propose[s] expanding supervision powers to include a spectrum of measures that limit suspects’ freedom to different degrees . . . . These new measures closely track corresponding language and powers in the Criminal Procedure Law, but apply to the broader range of misconduct in the jurisdiction of the supervision commissions.” His full analysis of the draft is available here.
On September 15, the NPC turned 70. The day before, the Communist Party and the NPCSC held a commemorative ceremony in the Great Hall of the People, where Xi Jinping delivered a major speech.
The speech has two key sections. In the first, Xi highlighted the five “significant advantages” of the people’s congress system—that is, the system’s ability to ensure the Party’s leadership over national governance; to ensure that “the people run the country”; to ensure a “vibrant but stable and orderly” political system through democratic centralism; to ensure law-based governance; and to ensure “national unity” and “long-term stability.”
In the next main section, Xi outlined the work priorities of the people’s congresses going forward, though I didn’t spot anything new. This is unsurprising, as the Party and Xi himself have repeatedly directed people’s congress reforms over the past decade, most recently in the 2024 Third Plenum decision. But this speech nonetheless serves as a useful summary of those past pronouncements.
The Tracking People’s Daily Substack has covered Xi’s speech in detail, and I recommend those interested to check it out:
Finally, the NPC launched a web portal to celebrate its 70th birthday, which features the official (but non-binding) English translations of 28 pieces of legislation relating to the people’s congress system. By my count, the following 14 translations were released for the first time:
1983 Several Provisions on the Direct Elections of the Delegates to the People’s Congresses at or Below the County Level [关于县级以下人民代表大会代表直接选举的若干规定];
2014 Decision on the Designation of the National Constitution Day [关于设立国家宪法日的决定];
2015 Law on Deputies to the National People’s Congress and to the Local People’s Congresses [全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法];
2015 Law on National Medals and National Honorary Titles [国家勋章和国家荣誉称号法];
2018 Decision on Implementing the Constitutional Oath System [关于实行宪法宣誓制度的决定];
2018 Decision on the Functions and Duties of the Constitution and Law Committee of the National People’s Congress [关于全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会职责问题的决定];
2018 People’s Courts Organic Law [人民法院组织法];
2018 People’s Procuratorates Organic Law [人民检察院组织法];
2018 Budget Law [预算法];
2020 Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses [全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会选举法];
2020 Decision on Strengthening the Supervision of State-Owned Asset Management [关于加强国有资产管理情况监督的决定];
2021 Decision on Strengthening the Review of and Supervision over the Central Budget [关于加强中央预算审查监督的决定];
2021 Decision on Strengthening the Oversight of Economic Work [关于加强经济工作监督的决定]; and
2024 State Council Organic Law [国务院组织法].
We have accordingly updated our pages for China’s national laws and quasi-legislative decisions.
That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!
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