October 2025: Neighborhood Party
Also: Cybersecurity Law amendments, environmental tax pilot for VOCs, and potential weakening of environmental public interest litigation in China.
Welcome back to NPC Observer Monthly, a newsletter about China’s national legislature: the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC).
Each issue starts with “News of the Month,” a recap of major NPC-related events from the previous month, with links to any coverage published on our main site, NPC Observer. Then, in “Non-News of the Month,” I provide a round-up of any post we’ve published on the main site that’s not tied to current events. Finally, I usually end an issue with a more in-depth look an NPC-related topic linked to the past month in some way.
If you’re enjoying the newsletter, I hope you’ll share it widely. —Changhao
News of the Month
On October 24–28, the 14th NPCSC met for its eighteenth session, during which it reviewed 10 legislative bills.
On the session’s first day, it heard and approved a (previously undisclosed) bill to designate the next day (October 25) as the annual “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration” [台湾光复纪念日]. On October 25, 1945, Japanese forces in Taiwan surrendered to the Republic of China following Japan’s defeat in World War II. The NPCSC’s decision reads in its entirety:
In 1945, all the sons and daughters of China, including compatriots in Taiwan, advanced bravely and fought heroically, achieving the great victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Taiwan was thus restored and returned to the embrace of the motherland. The restoration of Taiwan was an important outcome of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, solid proof of the Chinese government’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, a vital link in the historical fact and the legal chain affirming that Taiwan is part of China, and a source of shared pride and collective national memory for compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To uphold the fruits of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the postwar international order, demonstrate a firm will to adhere to the one-China principle and safeguard national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, strengthen the shared national historical memory of compatriots across the Strait, promote the spirit of patriotism, and inspire compatriots on both sides of the Strait to make new contributions to national reunification and rejuvenation in the New Era and on the new journey, the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress has decided, in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China:
1945年，包括台湾同胞在内的全体中华儿女前仆后继、浴血奋战，取得中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争的伟大胜利，台湾随之光复，重回祖国怀抱。台湾光复是中国人民抗日战争胜利的重要成果，是中国政府恢复对台湾行使主权的重要铁证，是台湾作为中国一部分的历史事实和法理链条的重要一环，是两岸同胞的共同荣光和全体中华儿女的民族记忆。为维护世界反法西斯战争胜利成果和战后国际秩序，展现坚持一个中国原则和捍卫国家主权、统一、领土完整的坚定意志，强化两岸同胞共同民族历史记忆，弘扬爱国主义精神，激励两岸同胞在新时代新征程中为国家统一、民族复兴作出新的贡献，根据《中华人民共和国宪法》，第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议决定：
October 25 is designated as Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration. The State is to hold commemorative activities in various forms.
将10月25日设立为台湾光复纪念日。国家通过多种形式举行纪念活动。
On October 28, the NPCSC adopted five other bills:
revision to the Maritime Law [海商法] (eff. May 1, 2026);
amendment to the Villagers’ Committees Organic Law [村民委员会组织法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026);
revised Urban Residents’ Committees Organic Law [城市居民委员会组织法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026);
amendment to the Cybersecurity Law [网络安全法] (eff. Jan. 1, 2026); and
amendment to the Environmental Protection Tax Law [环境保护税法] (eff. Oct. 28, 2026).
I’ll focus on the updated organic statutes of China’s neighborhood organizations below, after first taking a brief look at each of the other bills.
First, the first amendments to the 2016 Cybersecurity Law—in particular, the first statutory provision on AI governance—have already generated a ton of analyses and commentaries. Check out, for example, this one by China Briefing. I’ve also prepared a comparison chart (in Chinese). The amendments will take effect on New Year’s Day.
Second, the 33-year-old Maritime Law was updated for the first time since 1992. This statute operates as a blend of property, contracts, and tort law, but tailored to the maritime context. It governs ships, crews, cargoes, and shipping, while also addressing issues including accidents, marine salvage, ship-source oil pollution, and choice of law in maritime disputes. It looks like a wonderfully technical statute that I wish I knew more about. Here, I’ll just flag one provision added only before the final reading. Article 308, paragraph 2 provides:
Where any country or region adopts discriminatory prohibitions, restrictions, or other similar measures against the PRC in fields relating to maritime transport and shipbuilding, the PRC may, in light of actual circumstances, take corresponding measures against the relevant country or region.
任何国家或者地区在海上运输和船舶建造相关领域对中华人民共和国采取歧视性的禁止、限制或者其他类似措施的，中华人民共和国可以根据实际情况对有关国家或者地区采取相应的措施。
Such a provision authorizing countermeasures against “discriminatory” foreign conduct has almost become standard for any statute with implications for foreign relations.1 The phase “relevant country or region” in the second clause was changed from “said country or region” shortly before the Law’s passage, in response to lawmaker suggestions to “increase the flexibility of the countermeasures.”
The revised Maritime Law will enter into force on May 1, 2026.
Third, the Environmental Protection Tax Law was amended to authorize the State Council to pilot levying the tax on the emission of additional volatile organic compounds—pollutants that contribute to the formation of ground-level ozone and smog—beyond the 18 currently listed in the Law. A new Article 27 reads in its entirety:
Based on the needs of national economic and social development and environmental protection, the State Council is to carry out a pilot program for levying the environmental protection tax on enterprises, public-service institutions, and other producers and operators that directly discharge volatile organic compounds not listed in the “Table of Taxable Pollutants and Equivalent Values” appended to this Law. The measures for the implementing the pilot program are to be formulated by the State Council and filed with the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for recording.
国务院根据国民经济和社会发展以及环境保护需要，对直接向环境排放本法所附《应税污染物和当量值表》规定以外的挥发性有机物的企业事业单位和其他生产经营者开展征收环境保护税试点工作。试点实施办法由国务院制定，报全国人民代表大会常务委员会备案。
The State Council and its relevant departments shall, in light of the characteristics of volatile organic compounds, reasonably define the scope of taxation and the range of tax rate, improve monitoring techniques and methods for calculating emissions, strengthen work coordination, and accelerate the advancement of the pilot program.
国务院及其有关部门应当根据挥发性有机物的特点，合理设定征税范围和税额幅度，完善监测技术和排放量计算方法，加强工作协同，加快推进试点工作。
Within five years from the date the pilot’s implementation measures take effect, the State Council shall report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the pilot levy of the environmental protection tax on volatile organic compounds and propose recommendations for amending the Law.
国务院自试点实施办法施行之日起五年内，就征收挥发性有机物环境保护税试点情况向全国人民代表大会常务委员会报告，并提出修改法律的建议。
This new article (specifically, paragraph 3) is notable for being the first reform authorization to require the authorized body to propose legislation to codify the reform by a clear deadline.2 Most prior authorizations contained the boilerplate language that the relevant laws shall be amended or enacted if the reforms have proven feasible or if the conditions have become ripe.
The amendment has already taken effect, though the State Council has not yet issued detailed rules to start the pilot.
The NPCSC is seeking public comment on the other bills it reviewed last month through November 26:
Part on Pollution Prevention and Control and Part on Legal Liability and Supplementary Provisions of the draft Ecological and Environmental Code [生态环境法典];
draft Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation Law [检察公益诉讼法]; and
draft Cultivated Land Protection and Quality Improvement Law [耕地保护和质量提升法].
While as a general policy I no longer write about draft legislation, I wanted to make an exception for the new draft Part on Legal Liability and Supplementary Provisions of the Ecological and Environmental Code. This Part, among myriad other things, will codify rules governing environmental public interest litigation in China.
In a change that would’ve flown under my radar if it weren’t for this post by the leading environmental NGO Friends of Nature [自然之友], the draft appears to no longer allow preventive public interest suits—litigation brought before irreversible environmental damage occurs. As Friends of Nature explains, “preventive public-interest litigation is a critical form of litigation for effectively stopping environmental harm from occurring, and this type of litigation plays an irreplaceable and important role in particular when confronted with irreversible ecological risks such as the extinction of endangered species.” In 2017, the organization brought China’s first preventive environmental suit that successfully halted the construction of dam that would’ve flooded the largest remaining habitat of the green peafowl, an endangered species.
As mentioned, the comments period closes on November 26.
Updated Organic Laws of Urban Residents’ Committees and Villagers’ Committees
Under Article 111 of the PRC Constitution, urban residents’ committees and villagers’ committees (together, neighborhood committees) are “grassroots self-governing mass organizations.” Their formation, functions, and operations are governed by two statutes first enacted in the late 1980s: the 1987 Provisional Villagers’ Committees Organic Law (VCOL) and the 1989 Urban Residents’ Committees Organic Law (URCOL).
The provisional VCOL became a permanent statute in 1998, was overhauled in 2010, and most recently underwent a small but important change in 2018 (more on this below). The URCOL, except for the same minor amendment in 2018, had never been comprehensively revised until last month. Both statutes now contain 50 articles in seven chapters.
On paper, neighborhood committees don’t constitute a separate level of government, though higher-level governments have often been tempted to use them as de facto administrative units. Still, “[s]tate organs cannot give direct orders to [neighborhood committees] without creating at least some tension between the nominal legal recognition of self-governance and the reality of top-down governance.”3
Communist Party entities have never faced the same constraint, and recent research shows that, since 2018, the Party has deepened its penetration into both urban and rural grassroots communities, increasingly blurring the boundaries between the nominally self-governing neighborhood committees and the lowest levels of government.4 Key mechanisms through which the prior legal separation is being dismantled include the election of neighborhood Party secretaries as heads of neighborhood committees under a policy known as “carried on one shoulder” [一肩挑], stricter political vetting for neighborhood committee candidates, and the formalization of Party entities’ role in neighborhood decisionmaking.5 These measures were all codified in the two organic laws last month. In a way telegraphing the changes that were to come, the two laws’ 2018 amendments extended the terms of neighborhood committees from three years to five precisely so that they would align with the five-year terms of grassroots Party organizations.
To be sure, the two statutes still maintain the formal status of neighborhood committees as “self-governing mass organizations through which [residents and villagers] manage, serve, educate, and oversee themselves” (art. 2, para. 1).6 Local governments may only “provide guidance, support, and help” for the committees, which, in turn, are supposed to “assist” with the former’s work (art. 6). Any task delegated by a local government must “comply with the provisions of laws and regulations” and the local government must bear the necessary expenses (art. 43, para. 2). The Party, by contrast, in now statutorily embedded in neighborhood governance, as reflected in the following provisions:
As a general principle, neighborhood committees must uphold the Party’s leadership in their work (art. 4, para. 1). The amended VCOL retains—and the revised URCOL has added—a provision providing generally that the Party’s grassroots organizations are to carry out work consistent with the Party Constitution and “lead and support“ neighborhood committees in performing their duties (art. 4, para. 2).
The central and local “departments that guide and supervise grassroots mass self-governance”—likely referring to the Party’s Central Society Work Department and its local counterparts—are tasked with “guiding and supervising” related work (art. 5).
Reflecting the “carried on one shoulder” policy, neighborhood Party chiefs “may” serve as committee heads “through legal procedures” (art. 8, para. 3). Though the laws stop short of using the mandatory “shall,” the Party has called for “comprehensive implementation” of the policy or used mandatory language in policy documents. The laws also expressly contemplate “cross-appointments” [交叉任职] between neighborhood committees and corresponding grassroots Party organizations (id.).
Neighborhood committees are now tasked with publicizing the Party’s policies (in addition state policies as well the Constitution, laws, and regulations), among other statutory duties (VCOL art. 11; URCOL art. 10). They and their members must also abide by those policies (VCOL art. 12; URCOL art. 11).
Grassroots Party organizations now have the statutory right to nominate candidates for neighborhood committees (joint nominations by voters are still allowed) (art. 18). Candidates must uphold the Party’s leadership; those expelled from the Party are ineligible to run (id.).
Any “important matter” that must be decided by the assembly of community members [居民/村民会议] or their representatives [居民/村民代表会议] must first be studied and discussed by the community Party organization (VCOL art. 28; URCOL art. 30). In practice, this process consists of the four steps in the “Four Discussions” portion of the Party’s “Four Discussions and Two Disclosures” [四议两公开] policy for deciding on and disclosing major community affairs. The relevant grassroots Party organization first puts forward a proposal, followed by deliberations by the neighborhood committee and then by the assembly of Party members [党员大会] in the community. The assembly of community members or their representatives finally votes on the proposal.
Last month’s revisions to the two statutes also introduced a host of other changes, including to the rules on committee composition, functions, elections, meetings, and oversight. Check out these comparison charts (URCOL; VCOL) for detail. The updated organic laws will take effect on New Year’s Day.
That’s all for this month’s issue. Thanks for reading!
For recent examples, see Article 88, paragraph 2 of the revised Arbitration Law [仲裁法] and Article 60 of the Atomic Energy Law [原子能法].
The NPCSC’s February 2018 decision to extend the original two-year IPO reform did require the State Council to “put forward opinions on amending the relevant statutory provisions before the period of extension expires.” But, in that case, a bill to revise the Securities Law [证券法] had been pending before the NPCSC since April 2015. So the State Council’s obligation under the February 2018 decision amounted to no more than commenting on the pending legislation—short of proposing a bill of its own.
Yutian An & Taisu Zhang, Pandemic State-Building: Chinese Administrative Expansion Since 2012, 42 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 330, 380 (2024).
See, e.g., Ben Hillman, Shouldering the Burden: The Communist Party’s Deepening Penetration into Village China, 263 China Q. 634, 644 (2025); An & Zhang, supra note 3, at 404.
See Hillman, supra note 4, at 641–45; An & Zhang, supra note 3, at 404–05.
Inline statutory citations are common to both statutes unless otherwise specified.